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ABSTRACT
XIAOWEI YING.Privacy and spectral analysis of social network randomization.
(Under the direction of DR. XINTAO WU)
Social networks are of significant importance in various application domains. Un-
derstanding the general properties of real social networks has gained much attention
due to the proliferation of networked data. Many applications of networks such as
anonymous web browsing and data publishing require relationship anonymity due to
the sensitive, stigmatizing, or confidential nature of the relationship. One general ap-
proach for this problem is to randomize the edges in true networks, and only release
the randomized networks for data analysis. Our research focuses on the development
of randomization techniques such that the released networks can preserve data utility
while preserving data privacy.
Data privacy refers to the sensitive information in the network data. The released
network data after a simple randomization could incur various disclosures including
identity disclosure, link disclosure and attribute disclosure. Data utility refers to the
information, features, and patterns contained in the network data. Many important
features may not be preserved in the released network data after a simple randomiza-
tion. In this dissertation, we develop advanced randomization techniques to better
preserve data utility of the network data while still preserving data privacy. Specifi-
cally we develop two advanced randomization strategies that can preserve the spectral
properties of the network or can preserve the real features (e.g., modularity) of the
network. We quantify to what extent various randomization techniques can protect
data privacy when attackers use different attacks or have different background knowl-
edge. To measure the data utility, we also develop a consistent spectral framework to
measure the non-randomness (importance) of the edges, nodes, and the overall graph.
Exploiting the spectral space of network topology, we further develop fraud detection
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techniques for various collaborative attacks in social networks. Extensive theoretical
analysis and empirical evaluations are conducted to demonstrate the efficacy of our
developed techniques.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Social networks are of significant importance in various application domains such
as marketing, psychology, epidemiology and homeland security. The management
and analysis of these networks have attracted increasing interests in the sociology,
database, data mining and theory communities. Most previous studies are focused
on revealing interesting properties of networks and discovering efficient and effective
analysis methods [7, 9, 10, 33, 36, 54, 56, 58, 60, 84, 87, 89, 91, 98].
Social networks often contain some private attribute information about individuals
as well as their sensitive relationships. Many applications of social networks such as
anonymous Web browsing require identity and/or relationship anonymity due to the
sensitive, stigmatizing, or confidential nature of user identities and their behaviors.
The privacy concerns associated with data analysis over social networks have incurred
the recent research. In particular, privacy disclosure risks arise when the data owner
wants to publish or share the social network data with the third party for research
or business-related applications. Privacy-preserving techniques [3] for social network
publishing aim to protect privacy through masking, modifying and/or generalizing
the original data while without sacrificing much data utility.
A network G(V, E) is a set of n nodes connected by a set of m links, where V
denotes the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of links. In our work, we mainly
focus on undirected, and un-weighted graphs without self-loops. Let A = (aij)n×n
denote the adjacency matrix of G: aij = 1 if node i and j are connected and aij = 0
otherwise. The degree of node i, di, is the number of the nodes connected to node
i, i.e., di =
∑
j aij, and d = {d1, . . . , dn} denotes the degree sequence. The released
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graph after perturbation is denoted by G̃(Ṽ , Ẽ). Ã = (ãij)n×n is the adjacency matrix
of G̃, and d̃i and d̃ are the degree and degree sequence of G̃ respectively. Note that,
for ease of presentation, we use the following pairs of terms interchangeably: “graph”
and “network”, “node” and “vertex”, “edge” and “link”, “entity” and “individual”,
“attacker” and “adversary”.
1.1 Privacy in Publishing Social Networks
In a social network, nodes usually correspond to individuals or other social entities,
and an edge corresponds to the relationship between two entities. Each entity can
have a number of attributes, such as age, gender, income, and a unique identifier.
One common practice to protect privacy is to publish a naive node-anonymized ver-
sion of the network, e.g., by replacing the identifying information of the nodes with
random IDs. While the naive node-anonymized network permits useful analysis, as
first pointed out in [8, 46], this simple technique does not guarantee privacy since ad-
versaries may re-identify a target individual from the anonymized graph by exploiting
some known structural information of his neighborhood.
The privacy breaches in social networks can be grouped into three categories: iden-
tity disclosure, link disclosure, and attribute disclosure. The identity disclosure cor-
responds to the scenario where the identity of an individual who is associated with a
node is revealed. The link disclosure corresponds to the scenario where the sensitive
relationship between two individuals is disclosed. The attribute disclosure denotes
the sensitive data associated with each node is compromised. Compared with existing
anonymization and perturbation techniques of tabular data [40, 41, 51], it is more
challenging to design effective anonymization techniques for social network data be-
cause of difficulties in modeling background knowledge and quantifying information
loss.
Adversaries usually rely on background knowledge to de-anonymize nodes and learn
the link relations between de-anonymized individuals from the released anonymized
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graph. The assumptions of the adversary’s background knowledge play a critical role
in modeling privacy attacks and developing methods to protect privacy in social net-
work data. In the following, we briefly introduce some background knowledge and
how the adversary can utilize them to breach the privacy of the network. However, we
should point out that it is very challenging to model all types of background knowl-
edge of adversaries and quantify their impacts on privacy breaches in the scenario of
publishing social networks with privacy preservation [64, 114].
One type of background knowledge is fraudulent members. The adversary can him-
self join the network or bribe some individual in the network. The created fraudulent
nodes in the network can be utilized to compromise the privacy information. For
example, in the active attack [8], an adversary creates a small number of new user ac-
counts with links to the targeted individuals and establishes a highly distinguishable
pattern of links among the new accounts. Once the anonymized graph is released,
the adversary can then efficiently find these new accounts together with the target
individuals in the released anonymized network.
Another type of background knowledge is the neighborhood of the targeted indi-
vidual. The adversaries are assumed to possess some knowledge on the neighborhood
of the target, such as degree, the topological structure of the neighbor, and some
statistics about the neighborhood (e.g., the number of triangles, centrality value etc.)
[46, 47, 63, 113]. Different from active attack that can target arbitrary individuals in
the network, the background knowledge of neighborhood is more detrimental to those
nodes playing central role in the social network. This is because the central nodes
usually have higher degrees than most of the other nodes, and hence their neigh-
borhood structures are very likely to be unique in the network. Once the adversary
knows such knowledge, he has a high probability to identify the neighborhood in the
anonymized graph and identify the targeted individual.
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1.2 Randomization as a Privacy Preservation Approach
One of the reasons that naive anonymization can not prevent privacy breaches is
that adversary may have various background knowledge about the targets and the
network. With the background knowledge, the adversaries may be able to uniquely
link a node, an edge, or a subgraph to the targeted individuals, and the privacy is
then jeopardized. Even when the background knowledge does not lead to the unique
identification of the targeted individual, it can still significantly reduce the number of
candidates and hence increase the adversary’s confidence. Therefore, many privacy
preservation approaches aim to modify the released graph so that there should be
multiple nodes, link, or subgraphs that match the background knowledge of the tar-
geted individual. Currently there are mainly three categories of privacy preservation
approaches:
• K-anonymity: this approach modifies graph structure via a sequence of edge
deletions and additions such that each node in the modified graph is indistin-
guishable with at least K − 1 other nodes in terms of some types of structural
patterns such as degree and neighborhood subgraph.
• Edge randomization: This approach modifies graph structure by randomly
adding and(or) deleting edges or switching edges. It protects against re-identification
in a probabilistic manner.
• Clustering-based generalization: This approach clusters nodes and edges into
groups and anonymizes a subgraph into a super-node. The details about indi-
viduals are hidden.
Our work mainly focus on the randomization approach. Randomization approaches
have been well investigated in privacy-preserving data mining for numerical data (e.g.,
[3, 4, 41, 51]) and categorical data (e.g., [39, 40, 93]). For social networks, two edge-
based randomization strategies have been commonly adopted:
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• Rand Add/Del: randomly add k false edges followed by deleting k true edges.
This strategy preserves the total number of edges in the original graph.
• Rand Switch: randomly switch a pair of existing edges (t, w) and (u, v) (satisfy-
ing edge (t, v) and edge (u,w) do not exist in G) to (t, v) and (u,w), and repeat
this process for k times. This strategy preserves the degree of each vertex.
After randomization, the randomized graph is expected to be different from the
original one. The adversary is generally not able to re-identify the correct individual if
he simply finds the nodes, links, or subgraphs that match the background knowledge.
As a result, the node identities as well as the true sensitive relationship between two
nodes are protected. We will discuss why randomized graphs are resilient to structural
attacks in Chapter 3.
Link Privacy Disclosure Risks. The randomization approaches protect against re-
identification in a probabilistic manner. Therefore, we quantify the privacy disclosure
risk by the probability that the adversary estimates the true data correctly. The
process of randomization and the randomization parameter k are assumed to be
published along with the released graph.
We first quantify to what extent the randomization approaches can protect sensi-
tive links in Chapter 3. There exist some scenarios that node identities (and even
entity attributes) are not confidential but sensitive links between target individuals
are confidential and should be protected. For example, in a transaction network, an
edge denoting a financial transaction between two individuals is considered confiden-
tial while nodes corresponding to individual accounts is non-confidential. In such
cases, data owners can release the edge randomized graph without removing node
annotations. To extent to which releasing a randomized graph G̃ jeopardizes the link
privacy is measured by the adversary’s posterior belief about the existence of edge
(i, j) given randomized graph G̃. We will investigate two types of posterior belief in
Chapter 3: the posterior probability in which the adversary only utilizes the existence
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(or non-existence) of a link in G̃, and the enhanced posterior probability derived by
exploiting the proximity between two nodes.
With the released graph G̃, the adversary can first rely on the observation of
existing (or non-existing) link (i, j) in G̃ to breach the true sensitive link between
node i and j. Take Rand Add/Del as an example. The adversary’s prior belief about
the existence of edge (i, j) (without exploiting the released graph) can be calculated
as Pr(aij = 1) =
2m
n(n−1) . With the released graph and perturbation parameter k, the
posterior belief when observing ãij = 1 is Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) = m−km . If Pr(aij =
1|ãij = 1) is significantly higher than Pr(aij = 1), releasing the randomized graph
can lead to high privacy disclosure risk.
However, the above effort to measure link disclosure risks of randomization mainly
relies on the randomization magnitude. We further propose an attacking model that
exploits the relationship between the existence of a link and the similarity of the
node pairs in the released randomized graph. Proximity measures have been shown
to be effective in the classic link prediction problem [62] (i.e., predicting the future
existence of links among nodes given a snapshot of a current graph). We investigate
four proximity measures (common neighbors, Katz measure, Adamic/Adar measure,
and commute time) and quantify how much the posterior belief on the existence of a
link can be enhanced by exploiting those similarity values derived from the released
graph which is randomized by the Rand Add/Del strategy. One difference between
the proximity based link prediction and the proximity based privacy breach is that,
the data miner derives the similarity of nodes based the true (probably incomplete)
graph, whereas the adversary derives the measure from the randomized graph.
Identity Privacy Disclosure Risks. In Chapter 4, we study the risk of identity
disclosure associated with randomization procedures. Since the goal of an adversary
is to map the nodes/edges in the released graph to real world entities/relationships,
we investigate the relationship between the amount of randomization and the ad-
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versarys ability to correctly infer the node identity, and quantify both identity and
link disclosure risks when adversaries know the degrees of target individuals. When
the graph is published using naive anonymization, once the identities of the targeted
nodes are compromised, the link privacy is also breached. This is because all the
links in the released graph are true links. However, this is not true if we release
the randomized graph, as the observed link can actually be a fake link. When both
the nodes’ identities and link existence are uncertain to the adversaries, releasing the
randomized graph can greatly reduce the privacy disclosure risks.
1.3 Data Utility and Feature Preserving Randomization
Data Utility. An important goal of publishing social network data is to permit useful
analysis tasks. In general, it is very challenging to quantify the information loss of
anonymizing social networks, because different analysis tasks may expect different
utility properties to be preserved. In our work, we consider two types of measures to
evaluate the data utility of social network data.
• Graph topological properties: one of the most important applications of social
network data is for analyzing graph properties. To understand and utilize the
information in a network, researches have developed various measures to indi-
cate the structure and characteristics of the network from different perspectives.
[23]. Properties including degree sequences, shortest connecting paths, and clus-
tering coefficients are addressed in many works [46, 47, 63, 104, 106, 113].
• Graph spectral properties: the spectrum of a graph is defined as the set of
eigenvalues of the graph’s adjacency matrix or other derived matrices. The
eigenvalues and eigenvectors decode various properties of the graph as well as
the edges and nodes in the graph. The graph spectrum has close relations with
many graph characteristics and can provide global measures for some network
properties [84].
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• Aggregate network queries: an aggregate network query calculates the aggregate
on some paths or subgraphs satisfying some query conditions. One example is
that the average distance from a medical doctor vertex to a teacher vertex in
a network. Some researchers considered the accuracy of answering aggregate
network queries as the measure of utility preservation [11, 22, 113, 115].
Edge randomization may significantly affect the utility of the released randomized
graph. To preserve utility, certain aggregate characteristics (a.k.a., feature) of the
original graph should remain basically unchanged or at least some properties can
be reconstructed from the randomized graph. However, as what we will show later,
many topological features are lost due to randomization. In Chapter 5, we propose
two randomization procedures that can preserve structural properties.
Spectrum Preserving Randomization. Since the spectra of graph matrices have
close relations with many important topological properties such as diameter, pres-
ence of cohesive clusters, long paths and bottlenecks, and randomness of the graph
[84], we aim to preserve the data utility by preserving two important eigenvalues
during the randomization: the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix and the
second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix. Pure randomization tends to
move the eigenvalues toward one direction, and the eigenvalues of the randomized
graph can be significantly different from the original values. The two proposed al-
gorithms, Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch, selectively pick up those edges that can
increase (or decrease) the target eigenvalue by examining the eigenvector values of
the nodes involved in the randomization. By doing so, they guarantee that the eigen-
values after randomization do not move far from the original value. Our empirical
evaluations showed that the proposed algorithms can keep the spectral features as
well as many topological features close to the original ones even when the magnitude
of randomization is large.
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Markov Chain Based Feature Preserving Randomization. The degree se-
quence and topological features are of great importance to the graph structure. One
natural idea is that it can better preserve the data utility if the released graph G̃
preserves the original degree sequence and a certain topological feature, such as tran-
sitivity or average shortest distance [44, 104]. To preserve data utility, data owners
may want to preserve some particular feature S within a precise range in the released
graph. All the graphs that satisfy the degree sequence d and the feature constraint
S form a graph space Gd,S (or Gd if no feature constraint). Starting with the original
graph, series of switches form a Markov chain that can explore the graph space Gd,S.
We propose an algorithm that can generate any graph in Gd,S with equal probabil-
ity. The constraint S guarantees the utility of the randomized graph, and the equal
probability for all the graphs in Gd,S aims to reduce the privacy disclosure risk.
Privacy Analysis for Feature Preserving Randomization. We also study the
link disclosure risks for feature preserving randomization procedures in Chapter 5.
Note that the adversaries can exploit the released graph as well as feature constraints
to breach link privacy. The feature constraint may reduce the graph space and increase
the risk of privacy disclosure. We study the attacking model in which the adversary is
able to calculate the posterior probability of existence of a certain link by exploiting
the graph space Gd,S. If many graphs in the graph space have link (i, j), the original
graph is also very likely to have link (i, j), and hence the adversary’s posterior belief
about link (i, j) is given by
Pr[G(i, j) = 1|Gd,S] = 1|Gd,S|
∑
Gt∈Gd,S
Gt(i, j).
Knowing the degree sequence d and the feature constraint S, the adversary can
generate and exploit the graph space via the Markov chain that starts with the
released graph G̃. The adversary can take the node pairs with highest posterior
beliefs as candidate links. This attacking model works because the convergence of
10
the Markov chain does not depend on the initial point. Our evaluations showed that
some feature constraints can significantly enhance the adversary’s attacking accuracy
and the extent to which a feature constraint jeopardizes link privacy varies for different
graphs.
1.4 Spectral Analysis on Social Network Randomization
Social networks tend to contain some amount of randomness and some amount
of non-randomness. Consider an online social network where each node denotes an
individual and an edge between two nodes denotes a social interaction between the
two individuals. An individual’s social network tends to consist of members of the
same ethnic group, race, or social class. Intuitively, two friends of a given individual
are more likely to be friends with each other than they are with other randomly chosen
members. The edge connecting one individual’s two friends contains less randomness.
However, an individual also tends to have some number of random friends from other
groups and those edges between this individual and his random friends contain more
randomness. The amount of randomness versus non-randomness at node/edge levels
can clearly affect various properties of a social network.
As we discussed earlier, there are numerous features, measure and statistics that
characterize the graph from various perspectives. It is tedious, if not impossible,
to consider all the features in analyzing the social network. Among the three types
data utility measures mentioned in Section 1.3, we mainly focus on the graph spectral
properties in our work. It has been show that many topological features have an close
relationship with the graph spectrum [84]. This is also corroborated by our spectrum
preserving randomization procedures. The spectrum preserving randomization proce-
dures aim to preserve data utility via preserving some certain graph eigenvalues. Our
empirical studies show that when the spectral features are preserved during the edge
randomization, many topological features are preserved as well. In spectral analysis of
social network randomization, we mainly focus on two closely related questions: how
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the graph spectra reflect the difference between a real-world graph (or a randomized
one) and the random one, and how to quantify the difference.
A Framework of Non-randomness Measures. In Chapter 6, we present a frame-
work which provides a series of non-randomness measures at all granularity levels,
from edge, node, subgraph to the whole graph. Non-randomness specified at the edge
level can help users quantify how different a given interaction is from random ones.
Similarly, non-randomness at the node level can help users quantify how different a
given individual is from random nodes (those individuals actually not belonging to
this social network). In our framework, we first examine how much non-randomness
a given edge (social interaction) has, then measure a node’s non-randomness by ex-
amining the non-randomness values of edges connecting to this node. Finally, we
derive the non-randomness measure of the entire graph (subgraph) by incorporating
the non-randomness values of all edges within the graph (subgraph).
Our framework of non-randomness measure is based on our finding that the real-
world graphs exhibit the clear line orthogonality patterns in the adjacency spectral
space, and the patterns are closely related to their topological structure. We show
that graph with k clear communities displays k quasi-orthogonal lines in the space
spanned by the leading k eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix, and nodes from the
same community all lie on or around one line starting from the the origin with central
nodes far away from the origin and noisy nodes close to the origin. We further explain
why community structure results to such pattern in the adjacency spectral space, and
why it is different from the pattern in the normal or Laplacian spectral space. We show
that graph non-randomness can be obtained mathematically from the spectra of the
adjacency matrix of the network. Both theoretical and empirical studies in spectral
geometries of social networks show that our proposed non-randomness measures well
characterize and capture graph randomness.
Applications. One application of the graph non-randomness framework is the com-
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munity partition. Utilizing the spectral patterns corresponding to the community
structure in the adjacency spectral space, we develop a graph partition algorithm Ad-
jCut in Chapter 6. Our AdjCut algorithm is different from the normal or Laplacian
spectrum based community partition algorithms in two aspects. First, our AdjCut al-
gorithm partitions the graph by fitting the k-orthogonal lines in the adjacency spectral
space, while the normal or Laplacian based algorithms find the cluster in their spec-
tral spaces. Second, our AdjCut algorithm tends to reduce the edges non-randomness
among the graph communities, whereas the normal or Laplacian based algorithms
simply minimize the number of cuts among the communities.
In Chapter 7, we investigate another application of the graph non-randomness
measures: the fraud detection in social network settings. One merit of the graph
non-randomness framework is that it not only captures the randomness added by
the randomization process, but also more general randomness due to various types
of noise. For example, in the active attack, the adversaries join the network and
introduce fraudulent nodes and links to the original graph. The subgraph created by
the adversaries is expected to have patterns different from the original graph, thus
introducing randomness to the original graph to some extent. Therefore, the non-
randomness framework can be used to detect frauds in the social network. Based on
the non-randomness framework, we propose a general framework for detecting attacks
in social networks. Particularly, we focus on the random link attack (RLA) in which
the adversaries join the network, form some subgraph among themselves, and send
links to a randomly selected legitimate users. Many attacks in social networks can be
modeled (or partly modeled) as RLA, such as the bipartite core attack [19, 77] and
the distributed denial of service attack. We show that node non-randomness values
of the fraudulent nodes are significantly lower than normal nodes regardless how
the adversaries create links among themselves. Therefore, by identifying the nodes
with significantly low non-randomness measure, we can capture a large proportion of
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fraudulent nodes with few false positives.
1.5 Graph Features and Data Sets
In this section, we summarize some graph features and data sets that are commonly
used all over the work.
Features. The harmonic mean of the shortest distance h is defined in [61] as:
h =
{
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i6=j
1
dij
}−1
(1.1)
The inverse of the harmonic mean of the shortest distance, also known as the global
efficiency, varies between 0 and 1, with h−1 = 0 when all vertices are isolated and
h−1 = 1 when the graph is complete.
The modularity Q indicates the goodness of the community structure [23]. It is
defined as the fraction of all edges that lie within communities minus the expected
value of the same quantity in a graph in which the vertices have the same degrees
but edges are placed at random without regard for the communities. A value Q = 0
indicates that the community structure is no stronger than would be expected by
random chance and values other than zero represent deviations from randomness.
Formally, for a graph with g groups, the modularity is defined to be Q =
∑
i eij −
∑
ijk eijeki = Tr(e) − ‖e2‖ where ‖e‖ indicates the sum of all elements of e and
Tr(e) denotes the trace of a matrix (i.e., the sum of the entries on the diagonal).
The element eij is the fraction of edges in the original graph that connect vertices in
group i to those in group j. The modularity measure Q indicates the goodness of the
community structure, and the real-world unweighted networks with high community
structure generally have Q values within a range from 0.3 to 0.7 [73].
Q =
∑
i
[eii − (
∑
j
eij)
2], (1.2)
where eij is the proportion of edges between community i and j. Since the modularity
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measure is defined on a given partition, its change indicates how the quality of the
original partition changes along the perturbation.
The transitivity C is one type of clustering coefficient measure and characterizes
the presence of local loops near a vertex. It is formally defined as
C =
3N∆
N3
(1.3)
where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected triples.
The subgraph centrality SC is used to quantify the centrality of vertex i based the
subgraphs [31].
SC =
1
n
n∑
i=1
SCi =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
P ki
k!
(1.4)
where P ki is the number of paths that start with i and end in i with length of k.
Data Sets. We give some basic information of the data sets that are commonly used
in our work, and some basic statistics are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Statistics summary of datasets
Network n m Partition Labels
karate 34 78 None
dolphins 62 159 None
polbooks 105 441 2 partitions
Enron 151 869 None
E-mail 1133 5451 None
polblogs 1222 16714 2 partitions
netsci 1589 2742 None
Facebook 63731 817090 None
polbooks : US politics book data [59] contains 105 vertices and 441 edges. In this
graph, nodes represent books about US politics sold by the online bookseller Ama-
zon.com while edges represent frequent co-purchasing of books by the same buyers
on Amazon. Nodes are separated into groups according to their political views:
“liberal”, “neutral”, or “conservative”. These alignments were assigned separately
by Mark Newman based on a reading of the descriptions and reviews of the books
posted on Amazon.
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polblogs : political blogosphere data set [1] compiles the data on the links among
US political blogs, containing over 1,000 vertices and 15,000 edges. The blogs were
labeled as either liberal or conservative, based on incoming and outgoing links and
posts around the time of the 2004 presidential election. The original data is a directed
graph. Here we simply consider aij = 1 if the two blogs have a link between them.
Enron: the Enron email network was built from email corpus of a real organiza-
tion over the course covering a 3 years period. We used a pre-processed version of
the dataset provided by [85]. This dataset contains 252,759 emails from 151 Enron
employees, mainly senior managers. We regard there is an edge between node i and
j if there is at least 5 emails between them if not otherwise noted.
dolphins : the dolphins data set contains an undirected social network of 159 fre-
quent associations between 62 dolphins in a community living off Doubtful Sound,
New Zealand [67].
karate: the karate date set contains the network of 78 pairs of friendships between
the 34 members of a karate club at a US university, as described by Wayne Zachary
in 1977 [111].
E-mail : The E-mail graph is the network of e-mail interchanges between members
of the Univeristy Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona) (http://deim.urv.cat/~aarenas/
data/welcome.htm).
netsci : the net science data set contains a coauthorship network of scientists work-
ing on network theory and experiment, as compiled by M. Newman in May 2006
[74].
Facebook : the date set contains a subset of all of the user-to-user links from the
Facebook New Orleans networks [95]. The crawler started from a single user and
visited all friends of the user and their friends in a breadth-first-search fashion. The
crawler could only view users who made their profiles visible to the network. This is
an undirected graph though the crawler treated it like a directed graph. Since friend
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link on facebook is created with the confirmation on both side, we convert the result
of crawler to an undirected graph. It contains 63731 users and 817090 links. A link
between two users means they appear on each other’s friend list.
CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORKS
In this chapter, we briefly review some recently proposed privacy-preserving tech-
niques for publishing social network data. It is difficult to compare and/or categorize
current techniques systematically. However, we would like to point out that privacy-
preserving techniques are different from each other mainly in the following aspects:
(1) assumptions of attacking models and background knowledge of the adversaries; (2)
network data settings (simple or rich); (3) disclosure risks (identity disclosure, link
disclosure, attribute disclosure.); (4) privacy-preserving approaches (K-anonymity,
generalization, or randomization); and (5) utility preservation targets (graph features,
accuracy of structural queries, etc.). Before presenting privacy-preserving approaches,
we first review some attacks that can incur privacy breaches in social networks.
2.1 Privacy Attacks on Naive Anonymized Networks
The practice of naive anonymization replaces the personally identifying information
associated with each node with a random ID. However, an adversary can potentially
combine external knowledge with the observed graph structure to compromise pri-
vacy, de-anonymize nodes, and learn the existence of sensitive relationships between
explicitly de-anonymized individuals.
Active Attacks and Passive Attacks. Backstrom et al. presented two different
types of attacks on anonymized social networks [8].
• Active attacks: an adversary chooses an arbitrary set of target individuals,
creates a small number of new user accounts with edges to these target individ-
uals, and establishes a highly distinguishable pattern of links among the new
accounts. The adversary can then efficiently find these new accounts together
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with the target individuals in the released anonymized network.
• Passive attacks: an adversary does not create any new nodes or edges. Instead,
he simply constructs a coalition, tries to identify the subgraph of this coalition
in the released network, and compromises the privacy of neighboring nodes as
well as edges among them.
The active attack is based on the uniqueness of small subgraphs embedded in the
network. The constructed subgraph H by the adversary needs to satisfy the following
three properties in order to make the active attack succeed:
• There is no other subgraph S in G such that S and H are isomorphic.
• H is uniquely and efficiently identifiable regardless of G.
• The subgraph H has no non-trivial automorphisms.
Backstrom et al. showed that a randomly generated subgraph H formed by O(
√
log n)
nodes can compromise the privacy of arbitrarily target nodes with high probability
for any network. The passive attack is based on the observation that most nodes in
real social network data already belong to a small uniquely identifiable subgraph. A
coalition X of size k is initiated by one adversary who recruits k − 1 of his neigh-
bors to join the coalition. It assumes that the users in the coalition know both the
edges amongst themselves (i.e., the internal structure of H) and the names of their
neighbors outside X. Since the structure of H is not randomly generated, there is
no guarantee that it can be uniquely identified. The primary disadvantage of the
passive attack in practice, compared to the active attack, is that it does not allow one
to compromise the privacy of arbitrary users. The adversaries can adopt a hybrid
semi-passive attack: they create no new accounts, but simply create a few additional
out-links to target users before the anonymized network is released. We refer readers
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to [56] for more details on theoretical results and empirical evaluations on a real social
network with 4.4 million nodes and 77 million edges extracted from LiveJoural.com.
Structural Queries. Hay et al. studied three types of background knowledge to
be used by adversaries to attack naively-anonymized networks [47]. They modeled
adversaries’ external information as the access to a source that provides answers
to a restricted knowledge query Q about a single target node in the original graph.
Specifically, background knowledge of adversaries is modeled using the following three
types of queries.
• Vertex refinement queries: these queries describe the local structure of the graph
around a node in an iterative refinement way. The weakest knowledge query,
H0(x), simply returns the label of the node x; H1(x) returns the degree of
x; H2(x) returns the multiset of each neighbors’ degree, and Hi(x) can be
recursively defined as:
Hi(x) = {Hi−1(z1),Hi−1(z2), · · · ,Hi−1(zdx)}
where z1, · · · , zdx are the nodes adjacent to x.
• Subgraph queries: these queries can assert the existence of a subgraph around
the target node. The descriptive power of a query is measured by counting
the number of edges in the described subgraph. The adversary is capable of
gathering some fixed number of edges focused around the target x. By exploring
the neighborhood of x, the adversary learns the existence of a subgraph around
x representing partial information about the structure around x.
• Hub fingerprint queries: a hub is a node in a network with high degree and
high betweenness centrality. A hub fingerprint for a target node x, Fi(x), is a
description of the node’s connections to a set of designated hubs in the network
where the subscript i places a limit on the maximum distance of observable hub
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connections.
The above queries represent a range of structural information that may be available
to adversaries, including complete and partial descriptions of node’s local neighbor-
hoods, and node’s connections to hubs in the network.
Vertex refinement queries provide complete information about node degree while a
subgraph query can never express Hi knowledge because subgraph queries are exis-
tential and cannot assert exact degree constraints or the absence of edges in a graph.
The semantics of subgraph queries seem to model realistic adversary capabilities more
accurately. It is usually difficult for an adversary to acquire the complete detailed
structural description of higher-order vertex refinement queries.
Other Attacks. Narayanan and Shmatikov assumed that the adversary has two
types of background knowledge: aggregate auxiliary information and individual aux-
iliary information [71]. The aggregate auxiliary information includes an auxiliary
graph Gaux(Vaux, Eaux) whose members overlap with the anonymized target graph and
a set of probability distributions defined on attributes of nodes and edges. These
distributions represent the adversary’s (imperfect) knowledge of the corresponding
attribute values. The individual auxiliary information is the detailed information
about a very small number of individuals (called seeds) in both the auxiliary graph
and the target graph.
After re-identifying the seeds in target graph, the adversaries immediately get
a set of de-anonymized nodes. Then, by comparing the neighborhoods of the de-
anonymized nodes in the target graph with the auxiliary graph, the adversary can
gradually enlarge the set of de-anonymized nodes. During this propagation process,
known information such as probability distributions and mappings are updated re-
peatedly to reduce the error. The authors showed that even some edge addition and
deletion are applied independently to the released graph and the auxiliary graph,
their de-anonymizing algorithm can correctly re-identify a large number of nodes in
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the released graph.
2.2 K-anonymity Privacy Preservation via Edge Modification
The adversary aims to locate the vertex in the network that corresponds to the tar-
get individual by analyzing topological features of the vertex based on his background
knowledge about the individual. Whether individuals can be re-identified depends on
the descriptive power of the adversary’s background knowledge and the structural
similarity of nodes. To quantify the privacy breach, Hey et al. [47] proposed a general
model for social networks as follows:
Definition 2.1: K-candidate anonymity. A node i is K-candidate anonymous
with respect to a structure query Q if |candQ(i)| ≥ K where candQ(i) = {j ∈
V |Q(j) = Q(i)}. A graph satisfies K-candidate anonymity with respect to Q if all
the nodes are K-candidate anonymous with respect to Q.
In other words, there exist at least K − 1 other nodes in the graph that match
query Q(i), and the nodes in candQ(i) are indistinguishable with respect to query Q.
Then, releasing a K-candidate anonymous graph has less risk to breach the privacy.
Three types of queries (vertex refinement queries, subgraph queries, and hub fin-
gerprint queries) were presented and evaluated on the naive anonymized graphs. Hay
et al. presented a generalization technique that groups nodes into super-nodes and
edges into super-edges to satisfy the K-anonymity [47].
Several methods have been investigated to prevent node re-identification based
on the K-anonymity concept. These methods differ in the types of the structural
background knowledge that an adversary may use.
K-degree Generalization . Liu and Terzi pointed out that the degree sequences of
real-world graphs are highly skewed, and it is usually easy for adversaries to collect
the degree information of a target individual [63]. They investigated how to modify
a graph via a set of edge addition (and/or deletion) operations in order to construct
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a new K-degree anonymous graph, in which every node has the same degree with
at least K − 1 other nodes. The K-degree anonymity property prevents the re-
identification of individuals by the adversaries with prior knowledge on the number
of social relationships of certain people (i.e., vertex background knowledge). The
authors imposed a requirement that the minimum number of edge-modifications is
made in order to preserve the utility.
Problem 2.1: Given a graph G(V, E), construct a new graph G̃(Ṽ , Ẽ) via a set of
edge-addition operations such that 1) G̃ is K-degree anonymous; 2)V = Ṽ ; and 3)
Ẽ ∩ E = E.
The proposed algorithm is outlined below.
1. Starting from the degree sequence d of the original graph G(V, E), construct a
new degree sequence d̃ that is K-anonymous and the L1 distance, ‖d̃ − d‖1 is
minimized.
2. Construct a new graph G̃(Ṽ , Ẽ) such that dG̃ = d̃, Ṽ = V , and Ẽ = E (or
Ẽ ∩ E ≈ E in the relaxed version).
The first step is solved by a linear-time dynamic programming algorithm while the
second step is based on a set of graph-construction algorithms given a degree sequence.
The authors also extended their algorithms to allow for simultaneous edge additions
and deletions. Their empirical evaluations showed that the proposed algorithms can
effectively preserve the graph utility (in terms of topological features) while satisfying
the K-degree anonymity.
K-neighborhood Anonymity. Zhou and Pei assumed that the adversary knows
subgraph constructed by the immediate neighbors of a target node [113]. A node u is
K-neighborhood anonymous if there exist at least K−1 other nodes v1, . . . , vK−1 ∈
V such that the subgraph constructed by the immediate neighbors of each node
v1, · · · , vK−1 is isomorphic to the subgraph constructed by the immediate neighbors of
23
u. A graph satisfies K-neighborhood anonymity if all the nodes are K-neighborhood
anonymous. The definition can be extended from the immediate neighbor to the
d-neighbors (d > 1) of the target vertex, i.e., the vertices within distance d to the
target vertex in the network.
Problem 2.2: Given a graph G(V, E), construct a new graph G̃(Ṽ , Ẽ) satisfying the
following conditions: 1) G̃ is K-neighborhood anonymous; 2)V = Ṽ ; 3) Ẽ ∩ E = E;
and 4) G̃ can be used to answer aggregate network queries as accurately as possible.
The simple case of constructing a K-neighborhood anonymous graph satisfying
condition 1-3) was shown as NP -hard. The proposed algorithm is outlined below.
1. Extract the neighborhoods of all vertices in the network. A neighborhood compo-
nent coding technique, which can represent the neighborhoods in a concise way,
is used to facilitate the comparisons among neighborhoods of different vertices
including the isomorphism tests.
2. Organize vertices into groups and anonymize the neighborhoods of vertices in
the same group until the graph satisfies K-anonymity. A heuristic of starting
with vertices with high degrees is adopted since these vertices are more likely
to be vulnerable to structural attacks.
Zhou and Pei studied social networks with vertex attributes information in addition
to the unlabeled network topology [113]. The vertex attributes form a hierarchy.
Hence, there are two ways to anonymize the neighborhoods of vertices: generalizing
vertex labels and adding edges. In terms of utility, it focuses on using anonymized
social networks to answer aggregate network queries.
K-automorphism Anonymity. Zou et al. adopted a more general assumption:
the adversary can know any subgraph around a certain individual [115]. If such a
subgraph can be identified in the anonymized graph with high probability, user α has
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a high identity disclosure risk. The authors aimed to construct a graph G̃ so that for
any subgraph X ⊂ G, G̃ contains at least K subgraphs isomorphic to X.
Definition 2.2: Graph isomorphism and automorphism. Given two graphs
G1(V1, E1) and G2(V2, E2), G1 is isomorphic to G2 if there exists a bijective function
f : V1 → V2 such that for any two nodes u, v ∈ V1, (u, v) ∈ E1 if and only if
(f(u), f(v)) ∈ E2. If G1 is isomorphic to itself under function f , G1 is an automorphic
graph, and f is called an automorphic function of G1.
Definition 2.3: K-automorphic graph. Graph G is a K-automorphic graph if 1)
there exist K−1 non-trivial automorphic functions of G, f1, . . . , fK−1; and 2) for any
node u, fi(u) 6= fj(u) (i 6= j).
If the released graph G̃ is a K-automorphic graph, when the adversary tries to re-
identify node u through a subgraph, he will always get at least K different subgraphs
in G̃ that match his subgraph query. The authors then considered the following
problem:
Problem 2.3: Given the original graph G, construct graph G̃ such that E ⊆ Ẽ and
G̃ is a K-automorphic graph.
The following steps briefly show the framework of their algorithm:
1. Partition graph G into several groups of subgraphs {Ui}, and each group Ui
contains Ki ≥ K subgraphs {Pi1, Pi2, . . . , PiKi} where any two subgraphs do
not share a node or edge.
2. For each Ui, make Pij ∈ Ui isomorphic to each other by adding edges. Then,
there exists function f
(i)
s,t (·) under which Pis is isomorphic to Pit.
3. For each edge (u, v) across two subgraphs, i.e. u ∈ Pij and v ∈ Pst (Pij 6=
Pst), add edge
(
f
(i)
j,πj(r)
(u), f
(s)
t,πt(r)
(v)
)
, where πj(r) = (j + r) mod K, r =
1, 2, . . . , K − 1.
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After the modification, for any node u, suppose u ∈ Pij, define fr(·) as fr(u) =
f
(i)
j,πj(r)
(u), r = 1, . . . , K − 1. Then, fr(u), r = 1, . . . , K − 1, are K − 1 non-trivial
automorphic functions of G̃, and for any s 6= t, fs(u) 6= ft(u), which guarantees the
K-automorphism.
To better preserve the utility, the authors expected that the above algorithm in-
troduces the minimal number of fake edges, which implies that subgraphs within one
group Ui should be very similar to each other (so that Step 2 only introduces a small
number of edges), and there are few edges across different subgraphs (so that Step
3 will not add many edges). This depends on how the graph is partitioned. If G is
partitioned into fewer subgraphs, there are fewer crossing edges to be added. How-
ever, fewer subgraphs imply that the size of each subgraph is large, and more edges
within each subgraph need to be added in Step 2. The authors proved that to find the
optimal solution is NP -complete, and they proposed a greedy algorithm to achieve
the goal.
Recently, W. Wu et al. [101] proposed a concept called K-symmetry model similar
to K-automorphism. Both of the methods aim to modify the graph so that for any
node in graph G, there are at least K-1 other nodes automorphic to the node. The
difference is that the method in [101] achieve this goal by the orbit copying operation,
which adds both edges and nodes. In term of the data utility, different from some
K-anonymity approaches such as [63, 113, 115] and feature preserving randomization
approaches such as [104, 106], the graph modification procedure in [101] does not
aim to preserve one or some particular features. To retrieve meaningful information
about the original graph, the authors develop a sampling method that reconstructs an
approximate version of the original graph, and the analyst calculates graph features
from the approximate version instead of from the anonymized one directly.
Comparison of K-anonymity and randomization approaches. Bonchi et
al. [12] compared the K-anonymity, especially the K-degree anonymity approach,
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with the randomization procedures on both the privacy and utility aspects. The
authors proposed a new information-theoretic perspective on quantifying the level
of anonymity that is obtained by random perturbation. Their work quantifies the
anonymity level provided by the randomization by means of entropy. Based on thor-
ough experimentation on large datasets and various features, the authors showed that
randomization techniques achieve meaningful levels of obfuscation while preserving
most of the features of the original graph. They also claimed that sparsification,
which removes true edges randomly, outperforms perturbation, as it maintains better
the characteristics of the graph at the same anonymity levels.
In [107], the authors also compare randomization approaches with the K-anonymity.
Their work adopts a different metric to measure the level of anonymity. Their metric
aims to guarantee that the probability for the adversary to successfully re-identity an
arbitrary individual in the randomized graph is less than a given threshold. When the
entropy based measure satisfies the threshold, it is still possible for a small number
of individuals not to meet the privacy anonymity level.
2.3 Privacy Preservation via Generalization
To preserve privacy, both K-anonymity and randomization approaches modify the
graph structure by adding and (or) deleting edges and then release the detailed graph.
Different from the above two approaches, generalization approaches can be essentially
regarded as grouping nodes and edges into partitions called super-nodes and super-
edges. The idea of generalization has been well adopted in anonymizing tabular data.
For social network data, the generalized graph, which contains the link structures
among partitions as well as the aggregate description of each partition, can still be
used to study macro-properties of the original graph.
Hay et al. applied structural generalization approaches that groups nodes into clus-
ters, by which privacy details about individuals can be hidden properly [47]. To en-
sure node anonymity, they proposed to use the size of a partition as a basic guarantee
27
against re-identification attacks. Their method obtains a vertex K-anonymous super-
graph by aggregating nodes into super-nodes and edges into super-edges, such that,
each super-node represents at least K nodes and each super-edge represents all the
edges between nodes in two super-nodes. Because only the edge density is published
for each partition, it is impossible for the adversary to distinguish between individuals
in partition. Note that more than one partition may be consistent with a knowledge
query about target individual x. Hence, the size of a partition is used to provide a
conservative guarantee against re-identification and there exists an improved bound
on the size of candidate sets.
To retain utility, the partitions should fit the original network as closely as possible
given the anonymity condition. The proposed method estimates fitness via a maxi-
mum likelihood approach. The likelihood is defined as one over the size of possible
worlds implied by the partition. For any generalization G, the number of edges in
the super-node X is denoted as c(X,X), the number of edges between X and Y is
denoted as c(X,Y ), the set of possible worlds that are consistent with G is denoted
by W(G) whose size is given by:
|W(G)| =
∏
X∈V
(
1
2
|X|(|X| − 1)
c(X,X)
) ∏
X,Y ∈V
( |X||Y |
c(X,Y )
)
The likelihood for a graph g ∈ W(G) is then 1/|W(G)|. The partitioning of nodes is
chosen so that the generalized graph satisfies privacy constraints and maximizes the
utility (1/|W(G)|).
Their algorithm searches the approximate optimal partitioning, using simulated
annealing [82]. Starting with a single partition containing all nodes, the algorithm
proposes a change of state by splitting a partition, merging two partitions, or moving a
node to a different partition. The movement from one partition to next valid partition
is always accepted if it increases the likelihood and accepted with some probability if
it decreases the likelihood. Search terminates when it reaches a local maximum.
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One problem of this generalization approach is that since the released network only
contains a summary of structural information about the original network (e.g., degree
distribution, path lengths, and transitivity), users have to generate some random
sample instances of the released network. As a result, uncertainty may arise in the
later analysis since the samples come from a large number of possible worlds.
2.4 Feature Reconstruction from the Randomized Graph
Wu et al. focused on whether we can reconstruct a graph Ĝ from the randomized
one G̃ such that Ĝ is closer to the original graph G than G̃ in terms of some feature f ,
i.e., |f(Ĝ)− f(G)| ≤ |f(G̃)− f(G)| [99]. If a good reconstructed graph can be found,
the data analyst or the attacker can calculate graph features or breach privacy based
on the reconstructed graph Ĝ instead of the randomized one G̃. In particular, Wu
et al. studied the use of low rank approximation approach to reconstruct structural
features from the graph randomized via Rand Add/Del.
Recall that the edge randomization process can be written in the matrix form
Ã = A + E, where A (Ã) is the adjacency matrix of the original (randomized) graph
and E is the perturbation matrix. In the setting of randomizing numerical data, a
data set U with m records of n attributes is perturbed to Ũ by an additive noise data
set V with the same dimensions as U . In other words, Ũ = U + V . Distributions
of U can be approximately reconstructed from the perturbed data Ũ using distri-
bution reconstruction approaches (e.g., [3, 4]) when some a-priori knowledge (e.g.,
distribution, statistics etc.) about the noise V is available. Specifically, Agrawal and
Aggawal [3] provided an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm for reconstructing
the distribution of the original data from perturbed observations. However, it is un-
clear whether similar distribution reconstruction methods can be derived for network
data. This is because 1) it is hard to define distribution for network data; and 2)
the randomization mechanism for network data is based on the positions of randomly
chosen edges rather than the independent random additive values for all entries for
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numerical data.
The low rank approximation has been well investigated as a point-wise reconstruc-
tion method in the numerical setting. A spectral filtering based reconstruction method
was first proposed in [52] to reconstruct original data values from the perturbed data.
Similar methods (e.g., PCA based reconstruction method [51], SVD based reconstruc-
tion method [41]) were also investigated. All methods exploited spectral properties
of the correlated data to remove the noise from the perturbed one.
Let λi (λ̃i) be A’s (Ã’s) i-th largest eigenvalue in magnitude whose eigenvector is
xi (x̃i). Then, the rank l approximations of A and Ã are respectively given by:
Al =
l∑
i=1
λixix
T
i and Ãl =
l∑
i=1
λ̃ix̃ix̃
T
i .
By choosing a proper l, Wu et al. showed that Ãl can preserve the major information
of the original graph and filter out noises added in the rest dimensions. This is because
real-world data is usually highly correlated in a low dimensional space while the
randomly added noise is distributed (approximately) equally over all dimensions. In
Ãl, those entries close to 1 are more likely to have true edges while those entries close
to 0 are less likely to have edges. Therefore the reconstructed graph Â can be simply
derived by setting the 2m largest off-diagonal entries in Ãl as 1, and 0 otherwise.
Empirical evaluations showed that many accurate features can be reconstructed via
the low rank approximation even when the magnitude of additive noise k equals to
0.8m.
Wu et al. also empirically studied the link disclosure risk by comparing the number
of different edges between the reconstructed graph and the original one, i.e. ‖Â−A‖2F .
The preliminary results [99] showed that the reconstructed graph has more false links
compared with the randomized graph Ã, indicating that the link disclosure risk of
the reconstructed graph may not be higher than the randomized graph.
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2.5 Anonymizing Rich Graphs
Real social network sources usually contain much richer information in addition to
the simple graph structure. For example, in an online social network, the main entities
in the data are individuals whose profiles can list lots of demographic information,
such as age, gender and location, as well as other sensitive personal data, such as
political and religious preferences, relationship status, etc. Between users, there are
many different kinds of interactions such as friendship and email communication.
Interactions can also involve more than two participants, e.g., many users can play
a game together. Bhagat et al. [11] referred to the connections formed in the social
networks as rich interaction graphs. Various queries on the network data are not
simply about properties of the entities in the data, or simply about the pattern of the
link structure in the graph, but rather on their combination. Thus it is important for
the anonymization to mask the associations between entities and their interactions.
Notice that for rich social networks, a K-anonymous social network may still leak
privacy. For example, if all nodes in a K-anonymous group are associated with
some sensitive information, the adversary can derive that sensitive attribute of target
individuals. Mechanism analogous to l-diversity [68] can be applied here. Several
rich graph data models, which may contain labeled vertices/edges in addition to the
structural information associated with the network, have been investigated in the
privacy-preserving network analysis.
Link Protection in Rich Graphs. Zheleva et al. considered a graph model, in
which there are multiple types of edges but only one type of nodes [112]. Edges are
classified as either sensitive or non-sensitive. The problem of link re-identification
is defined as inferring sensitive relationships from non-sensitive ones. The goal is to
attain privacy preservation of the sensitive relationships, while still producing useful
anonymized graph data. They proposed to use the number of removed non-sensitive
edges to measure the utility loss. Several graph anonymization strategies were pro-
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posed, including the removal of all sensitive edges and/or some non-sensitive edges,
and the cluster-edge anonymization. In the cluster-edge anonymization approach, all
the anonymized nodes in an equivalence class are collapsed into a single super-node
and a decision is made on which edges to be included the collapsed graph. One
feasible way is to separately publish the number of edges of each type between two
equivalence classes. The difference between the cluster-edge anonymization approach
and the generalization approach in [47] is that the former aggregates edges by type
to protect link privacy while the latter clusters vertices to protect node identities.
Campan and Truta considered an undirected graph model, in which edges are not
labeled but vertices are associated with some attributes including identifier, quasi-
identifier, and sensitive attributes [15]. Those identifier attributes such as name and
SSN are removed while the quasi-identifier and the sensitive attributes as well as the
graph structure are released. To protect privacy in network data, they adopted the
K-anonymity model for both the quasi-identifier attributes and the quasi-identifier
relationship homogeneity. The goal is that any two nodes from any cluster are indis-
tinguishable based on either their relationships or their attributes. They also proposed
an edge generalization based method for structural anonymization. They perform so-
cial network data clustering followed by anonymization through cluster collapsing.
Specifically, the method first partitions vertices into clusters and attaches the struc-
tural description (i.e., the number of nodes and the number of edges) to each cluster.
From the privacy standpoint, an original node within such a cluster is indistinguish-
able from other nodes. Then all vertices in the same cluster are made uniform with
respect to the quasi-identifier attributes and the quasi-identifier relationship. This
homogenization is achieved by using generalization, for both the quasi-identifier at-
tributes and the quasi-identifier relationship. All vertices in the same cluster are
collapsed into one single vertex (labeled by the number of vertices and edges in the
cluster) and edges between two clusters are collapsed into a single edge (labeled with
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the number of edges between them). The method takes into account the information
loss due to both the attribute generalization and the changes of structural properties.
Users can tune the process to balance the tradeoff between preserving more structural
information and preserving more vertex attribute information.
Anonymization Techniques on Rich Graphs. Cormode et al. [22] studied a
particular type of network data that can be modeled as bipartite graphs – there are
two types of entities, and an association only exists between two entities of different
types. One example is the pharmacy (customers buy products). The association
between two nodes (e.g., who bought what products) is considered to be private and
needs to be protected while properties of some entities (e.g., product information
or customer information) are public. Their anonymization method can preserve the
graph structure exactly by masking the mapping from entities to nodes rather than
masking or altering the graph structure. As a result, analysis principally based on the
graph structure is correct. Privacy is ensured in this approach because given a group
of nodes, there is a secret mapping from these nodes to the corresponding group of
entities. There is no information published that would allow an adversary to learn,
within a group, which node corresponds to which entity.
Bhagat et al. adopted a flexible representation of rich interaction graphs which is
capable of encoding multiple types of interactions between entities [11]. Interactions
involving large number of participants are represented by a hypergraph, denoted by
G(V, I, E). V is the node set. Each entity v ∈ V has a hidden identifier u and a set of
properties. Each entity in I is an interaction between/among a subset of entities in V .
E is the set of hyperedges: for v ∈ V and i ∈ I, an edge (v, i) ∈ E represents node v
participates in interaction i. The authors assumed that adversaries know part of the
links and nodes in the graph. They presented two types of anonymization techniques
based on the idea of grouping nodes in V into several classes. The authors pointed
out that merely grouping nodes into several classes can not guarantee the privacy.
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For example, consider the case where the nodes within one class form a complete
graph via a certain interaction. Then, once the adversary knows the target is in the
class, he can be sure that the target must participate in the interaction. The authors
provided a safety condition, called class safety to ensure that the pattern of links
between classes does not leak information: each node cannot have interactions with
two (or more) nodes from the same group. Note that the released graph contains the
full topological structure of the original graph, some structural attacks such as the
active attack and passive attack [8] can be applied here to de-anonymize the nodes in
V . However, the adversary cannot further obtain the attributes of the target, for the
attributes of those nodes within the same class are mixed together, which is similar
to the anatomy approach [102] for the tabular database.
Beyond the ongoing privacy-preserving social network analysis which mainly fo-
cuses on un-weighted social networks, in [26, 65], the authors studied the situations
in which the network edges as well as the corresponding weights are considered to be
private.
Das et al. considered the problem of anonymizing the weights of edges in the social
network [26]. The authors proposed a framework to re-assign weights to edges so that
a certain linear property of the original graph can be preserved in the anonymized
graph. A linear property is the property that can be expressed by a specific set of linear
inequalities of edge weights. If the newly assigned edge weights also satisfy the set of
linear inequalities, the corresponding linear property is also preserved. Then, finding
new weight for each edge is a linear programming problem. The authors discussed two
linear properties in details, single source shortest paths and all pairs shortest paths,
and proposed the algorithms that can efficiently construct the corresponding linear
inequality sets. Their empirical evaluations showed that the proposed algorithms can
considerably improve the edge k-anonymity of the modified graph, which prevents
the adversary to identify an edge by its weight.
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Liu et al. also proposed two randomization strategies aiming to preserve the shortest
paths in the weighted social network [65]. The first one, which is easier to implement,
is the Gaussian randomization multiplication strategy. The algorithm multiplies the
original weight of each edge by an i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with mean 1 and
variance σ2. In the original graph, if the total weight of the shortest path between two
nodes is much smaller than that of the second shortest path, the strategy can preserve
the original shortest path with high probability. The authors further proposed the
second strategy which can preserve a set of the target shortest paths or even all the
shortest paths in the graph. The authors pointed out that all edges can be divided
into three categories: the all-visited edge which belongs to all shortest paths, the non-
visited edge which belongs to no shortest path, and the partially-visited edge which
belongs to some but not all shortest paths. In order to preserve the target shortest
paths, one can then reduce the weight of all-visited edges, increase the weight of non-
visited edges, and perturb the weight of partially-visited edges within a certain range.
The weight sum of a target shortest path is changed and is probably not the same as
the original one, but the difference is minimized by the proposed greedy perturbation
algorithm.
2.6 Differential Privacy for Querying Social Network Data
Differential privacy [28, 29] is a paradigm of post-processing the output of queries
such that the inclusion or exclusion of a single individual from the data set makes no
statistical difference to the results found. Differential privacy is agnostic to auxiliary
information an adversary may possess, and provides guarantees against arbitrary at-
tacks. Differential privacy is achieved by introducing randomness into query answers.
Definition 2.4: (ε-differential privacy) A mechanism K is ε-differentially private if
for all databases x and x′ differing on at most one element, and any subsets of outputs
S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)× Pr[K(x′) ∈ S].
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Differential privacy provides formal privacy guarantees that do not depend on an
adversary’s background knowledge (including access to other databases) or compu-
tational power. It focuses on comparing the risk to an individual when included in,
versus when not included in the database, which is different from prior work on com-
paring an adversary’s prior and posterior views of an individual. In other words, it
achieves the ad omina privacy goal: anything that can be learned about a participant
from the database should be learnable without access to the database.
Theorem 2.1: [29] For f : D → Rd, the mechanism Kf that adds independently
generated noise with distribution Lap(∆f/ε) to each of the d output terms satisfies
ε-differential privacy, where the sensitivity, ∆f , is ∆f = max
x,x′
‖f(x) − f(x′)‖1 for all
x, x′ differing in at most one element.
The mechanism for achieving differential privacy computes the sum of the true
answer and random noise generated from a Laplace distribution. The magnitude of
the noise distribution is determined by the sensitivity of the computation and the
privacy parameter specified by the data owner. The sensitivity of a computation
bounds the possible change in the computation output over any two neighboring
databases (differing at most one record). The privacy parameter controls the amount
by which the distributions induced by two neighboring databases may differ (smaller
values enforce a stronger privacy guarantee).
Enabling accurate analysis of social network data while preserving differential pri-
vacy has been little studied except a few recent results: techniques for computing
properties such as degree distributions [48] and clustering coefficient [80]. In social
network analysis, the robustness of various graph features such as modularity often
has a high sensitivity, which is different from traditional aggregate functions (often
with low sensitivity values) on tabular data.
CHAPTER 3: LINK DISCLOSURE ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we investigate the link privacy disclosure risk of a randomized
graph. We focus on the situation when the existence of a certain link is considered
confidential. When releasing or outsourcing network data, there exist some scenarios
that node identities (and even entity attributes) are not confidential but sensitive links
between target individuals are confidential and should be protected. For example, in a
transaction network, an edge denoting a financial transaction between two individuals
is considered confidential while nodes corresponding to individual accounts is non-
confidential. To make the discussion concise, we simply assume that the identity of
each node is released with the data. In Chapter 4, we will investigate the node privacy
disclosure risk and the combination of both the link and node privacy disclosure.
To prevent the entry-wise privacy disclosure in publishing data, randomization is
a widely adopted strategy for privacy-preserving data analysis. For numerical data,
additive noise based randomization approaches have been well investigated in privacy-
preserving data mining (e.g., [3, 4]). For categorical data, randomized response model
has also been applied to prevent the privacy disclosure [39, 40, 93]. Randomization
can also be used to prevent the disclosure of link privacy.
The process of randomization and the randomization parameter k are assumed to
be published along with the released graph. By using adjacency matrix, the edge
randomization process can be expressed in the matrix form Ã = A + E, where E =
(eij)n×n is the perturbation matrix: eij = eji = 1 if edge (i, j) is added, est =
ets = −1 if edge (s, t) is deleted, and 0 otherwise. Naturally, edge randomization
can be considered as an additive-noise perturbation. After the randomization, the
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randomized graph is expected to be different from the original one. As a result, the
node identities as well as the true sensitive or confidential relationship between two
nodes are protected. However, we should note that the randomization approaches
protect against re-identification in a probabilistic manner.
In Section 3.1, we derive the attacker’s prior belief on the existence of a link as
well as his posterior belief on the link when observing an existing (or non-existing)
link in the released graph. Based on the prior and posterior beliefs, we also derive
the minimal randomization magnitude needed to preserve privacy to a given level. In
Section 3.2, we derive the enhanced the posterior belief on a link that exploits the
similarity between the two nodes. Some results in this chapter are also reported in
[103, 106].
3.1 Randomization and Link Privacy
The link disclosure problem of edge-randomized graphs focuses on networks where
node identities (and even entity attributes) are not confidential but sensitive links be-
tween target individuals are confidential. The problem can be regarded as, compared
to not releasing the graph, to what extent releasing a randomized graph G̃ jeopardizes
the link privacy.
When it comes to link privacy, it is usually aij = 1 that people want to hide, not
aij = 0 and attackers are capable of calculating posterior probabilities. Formally, we
use Pr(aij = 1) to denote the users’ prior belief about the event of aij = 1 and use
Pr(aij = 1|G̃) to denote its posterior belief about aij = 1. The released graph G̃ is
regarded as jeopardizing the privacy if Pr(aij = 1|G̃) > Pr(aij = 1). If only the basic
statistics of a graph such as m and n are given, the adversary’s prior belief about the
existence of edge (i, j) (without exploiting the released graph) can be calculated as
Pr(aij = 1) =
2m
n(n− 1) . (3.1)
For Rand Add/Del, with the released graph and perturbation parameter k, the pos-
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terior belief when observing ãij is
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) = m− k
m
, and Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0) = k
N −m, (3.2)
where N =
(
n
2
)
. Next, we give the posterior probability of Pr(aij = 1|ãij) under Rand
Switch randomization strategy.
We here assume that the attacker has no other information except each vertex’s
degree which is kept unchanged in the perturbed data for the Rand Switch strategy.
Intuitively, Si =
di
n−1 is the probability that a randomly selected vertex turns out an
neighbor of vertex i’s. Therefore, the prior probability can be shown as
Pr(aij = 1) = Si + Sj − SiSj. (3.3)
The posterior probability Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) is the probability that an edge (i, j) in
G̃ is a true edge in G. let ci denote the number of false edges associated to vertex i in
graph G̃, i.e. ci =
1
2
∑n
j=1 |ãij−aij|, and E(ci) is its expectation. Then, Pi = 1− E(ci)di
is vertex i’s proportion of true edges. Hence,
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) = Pi + Pj − PiPj (3.4)
Similarly, Qi =
E(ci)
n−1−di is vertex i’s proportion of false edges,
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0) = Qi + Qj −QiQj (3.5)
The key of calculating (3.4) and (3.5) is to calculate E(ci). Here, we give the result
on its calculation.
Result 3.1: For Rand Switch, denote ci =
1
2
∑
j 6=i |ãij − aij|, 0 ≤ ci ≤ Ci :=
min{di, n − 1 − di}. Denote qi as the probability that a switching occurs to ver-
tex i. It can be approximated as qi ≈ dim +
∑
k 6=i
dk
m
· di−aik
m−dk . The expectation of ci is
shown as
E(ci) = (0, 1, 2, . . . , Ci) ((1− qi)I + qiPi)k e1.
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where e1 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
T , Pi = (p
(i)
st )(Ci+1)×(Ci+1) and
p
(i)
st =



t2
di(n−1−di) , (s = t− 1)
t(n−1−2t)
di(n−1−di) , (s = t)
(di−t)(n−1−di−t)
di(n−1−di) , (s = t + 1)
0, (otherwise).
(3.6)
Proof. The probability that a switching occurs to vertex is a constant. By saying a
switch occurs to vertex i, we mean that one of the two switched edges connects to
vertex i. Suppose one switch occurs to vertex i. In the ith row of the adjacency
matrix ai = (ai1, ai2, . . . , ai,n), one component, say aip, changes from 1 to 0 and
another component aiq change from 0 to 1. Equivalently, we replace a 1 in ai. Since
we select the edges uniformly, every 1 (0) has same possibility to become 0 (1). Given
r of the k times of switch to vertex i, we first calculate E(ci|r). The change of ci
follows the Markov chain with the stationary probabilities, and ci has finite states:
0, 1, . . . , Ci. Then, it is easy to establish the transition matrix Pi whose elements
p
(i)
st = Pr(c
(n+1)
i = s|c(n)i = t) is shown in (3.6). The initial probability distribution
vector is e1. Hence,
E(ci|r) =
Ci∑
x=0
x Pr(ci = x) = (0, 1, 2, . . . , Ci)P
r
i e1.
E(ci) =
k∑
x=0
E(ci|r = x) Pr(r = x) =
k∑
x=0
(
k
x
)
qxi (1− qi)k−x E(ci|r = x)
= (0, 1, 2, . . . , Ci) ((1− qi)I + qiPi)k e1.
3.1.1 Link Privacy Protection vs. Perturbation k
As the magnitude of the perturbation increases, there are more false edges in the
network, and the released graph approaches to a pure random graph. Therefore, large
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magnitude of perturbation can enhance the privacy protection, but, on the other
hand, may decrease the utility, resulting a dataset useless for mining any meaningful
information. In this section, we develop our formal privacy protection measures.
We define the absolute measure of protection as
τa(i, j) = 1−max{Pr(aij = 1 | ãij = 0), Pr(aij = 1 | ãij = 1)} (3.7)
Note that the second term in (3.7) can be considered as the maximal suspicion of
existing aij = 1. The relative measure of protection is defined as
τr(i, j) =
τa(i, j)
1− Pr(aij = 1) (3.8)
Our following result shows how to calculate the privacy measure.
Result 3.2: For Rand Add/Del, assume k ≤ (1− r)m where r = 2m
n(n−1) is the sparse
ratio, we have
τa(i, j) =
k
m
, τr(i, j) =
kN
m(N −m)
where N =
(
n
2
)
.
For Rand Switch, after k switches, for vertex i, let ci denote the number of false
edges associated to vertex i in graph G̃, i.e. ci =
1
2
∑n
j=1 |ãij − aij|, and E(ci) is its
expectation. Then,
τa(i, j) = (1− Pi)(1− Pj), (3.9)
τr(i, j) =
1− Pi
1− Si ·
1− Pj
1− Sj , (3.10)
where Pi = 1− E(ci)di , and Si =
di
n−1 .
Proof. The result for Rand Add/Del is easy to derive. We only give the proof for
Rand Switch. Notice that Pi is a decreasing function of k and Qi is an increasing with
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k, and
lim
k→∞
Pi = lim
k→∞
Qi =
di
n− 1 .
We thus have, Pi ≥ Qi. As a result
Pi + Pj − PiPj ≥ Qi + Qj −QiQj.
(3.9) and (3.10) is then derived by incorporating (3.4) and (3.3) in (3.8).
The measures of protection (τa and τr) are defined in terms of one individual
edge. In the privacy preserving data mining, one natural question is how many
perturbations we need such that we can guarantee the protection for all individual
edges are above some threshold. Formally, we expect
• For Rand Add/Del strategy,
J1(k) = min
i,j
τr(i, j) =
kN
m(m−N) > 1− ε.
• For Rand Switch strategy,
J2(k) = min
i,j
τr(i, j) = min
i,j
{
1− Pi
1− Si ·
1− Pj
1− Sj
}
> 1− ε.
It is easy to check that the protection for all individual edges remains the same
with Rand Add/Del strategy. The relative measure in Rand Switch is a function of
k, di, and dj. Our next result shows we only need to consider the protection of the
edges that connect the two vertices with the smallest degrees.
Result 3.3: We re-numerate the vertices by their degree in ascending order: d1 ≤
d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dn,
J2(k) =
1− P1
1− S1 ·
1− P2
1− S2 , (3.11)
Proof. We first prove that given a fixed k, if two vertices i and j, di ≤ dj, then
1− Pi
1− Si ≤
1− Pj
1− Sj . (3.12)
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Table 3.1: τr vs. k for two strategies on Political Book data
1− ε Rand Add/Del Rand Switch
0.1 48 54
0.2 96 84
0.3 150 114
0.4 210 141
0.5 282 174
0.6 372 210
0.7 492 258
0.8 654 318
0.9 936 420
To a single vertex i, Rand Switch strategy actually rearranges the position of 1 and
0 on the ith row of the adjacency matrix. A false edge of vertex i corresponds to a
1 reallocated elsewhere in the ith row of the adjacency matrix. Hence, to produce
the same proportion of false edges, the number of 0’s in j-th row of adjacency matrix
should at least increase to
dj
di
(n− 1− di):
E(ci)
n− 1− di ≤
E(cj)
dj
di
(n− 1− di)
≤ E(cj)
dj
di
(n− 1− dj)
,
and with some simple deduction (3.12) follows. Since d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dn, then by
the above property, (3.11) stands.
Table 3.1 shows the number of perturbations we need for Rand Add/Del strategy
and Rand Switch when we aim to achieve different levels of privacy protection (1 −
ε). Similarly Figure 3.1 shows how graph characteristics vary with different privacy
protection thresholds for both Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch strategies. We can
see the higher the privacy protection we aim, the more perturbation we need, and the
less the utility of the graph we can achieve.
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Figure 3.1: Graph characteristic vs. varying privacy protection on Political Book
data
3.2 Enhanced Posterior Link Beliefs with Proximity Measures
In this section, we investigate an attacking model that exploits the relationship
between the probability of existence of a link and the similarity measure values of
node pairs in the released randomized graph.
3.2.1 Existence of Links vs. Similarity Measure
Let mij be a similarity measure on node pair (i, j) in graph G (a larger value of
mij indicates that nodes i and j are more similar). We apply four similarity measures
in our work. The first one is the number of common neighbors: CNij =
∑n
k=1 aikakj.
The second one is the Adamic/Adar measure [2] , which is the weighted number
of common neighbors. The weights are assigned based on the information theory:
Adij =
∑n
k=1
1
log dk
aikakj, where dk is the degree of node k. The third one is the
Katz measure, which is a weighted sum of the number of paths in the graph that
connect two nodes. Shorter paths are given the larger weight with parameter β
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[53]: Kij =
∑∞
k=1 β
kP
(k)
ij , where P
(k)
ij denotes the number of paths from i to j with
length equal to k while β is a damping factor. In this work, we take β = 0.1. The
fourth one is the commute time CTij, which is the expected steps of random walks
from i to j and back to i. The commute time is a distance measure: more similar
nodes have smaller CT values. The commute time can be calculated through the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the graph’s normal matrix [66]. Let N = D−
1
2 AD−
1
2
where D = diag{d1, d2, . . . , dn}. N has n real eigenvalues: ν1 ≥ ν2 ≥ ν3 · · · νn with
corresponding eigenvectors z1, z2, . . . , zn, and let zki denote the the k’th entry of zi.
Then
CTij = 2m
n∑
k=2
1
1− νk
(
zki√
di
− zkj√
dj
)2
.
Let ρ(Ω) denote the proportion of true edges in the set of node pairs Ω:
ρ(Ω) =
1
|Ω|
∑
(i,j)∈Ω
aij,
where |Ω| denotes the number of elements in set Ω. Let Sx = {(i, j) : mij = x} denote
the set of all node pairs with the similarity measure mij = x. Hence ρ(Sx) denotes
the proportion of true edges in the Sx, which can be considered as the probability
of existence of a link between node pair (i, j) in Sx. Next, we empirically show how
ρ(Sx) varies with x in real social networks.
Figure 3.2 shows how the proportions of true edges in Sx are varied with similarity
measure values x in terms of four measures (Common neighbors, Katz, Adamic/Adar,
and Commute time) in the US political books network (polbooks). We can observe
that ρ(Sx) increases with x. In other words, the probability that aij = 1 is highly
correlated with similarity measure mij: the larger mij is, the more likely aij is equal
to 1.
We then perturb the polbooks network by adding 200 false edges and deleting 200
true edges. From the perturbed graph G̃, we define S̃x = {(i, j) : m̃ij = x} as the set
of node pairs with similarity measure m̃ij = x. Figure 3.3 shows how the proportions
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Figure 3.2: Similarity measure vs. the prob. of true edges in the original graph (ρ(Sx))
for polbooks
of true edges in S̃x (i.e., the probability of existence of a link) are varied with similarity
measure values x in terms of four measures in the randomized polbooks network. We
can observe that the same pattern still holds even if the randomized graph itself is
quite different from the original one (200 false edges out of 441 edges). In the next
section, we will show how attackers exploit m̃ij in the perturbed graph G̃ to improve
their posterior belief on existence of a true link between nodes (i, j) in the original
graph.
Proximity measures have been shown to be effective in the classic link prediction
problem [62] (i.e., predicting the future existence of links among nodes given a snap-
shot of a current graph). In [62], the authors compute the similarity measures of all
the node pairs, and regard the node pairs with high similarity has greater probability
to be connected in the future. The strategy is consistent with our observation.
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Figure 3.3: Similarity measure vs. the prob. of true edges in the randomized graph
(ρ(S̃x)) for polbooks
3.2.2 Link Prediction by Exploiting Similarity Measure
In this section, we quantify how much the posterior belief can be enhanced by ex-
ploiting similarity measure between two nodes (i, j) in the randomized graph. Recall
that the randomization strategy is to randomly add k false edges followed by deleting
k true edges. In other words, every true link is to be deleted independently with prob-
ability p1 and every non-existing link is to be added independently with probability
p2. We can easily derive p1 = k/m and p2 = k/[
(
n
2
)−m].
Let m̃ij denote the similarity measure of nodes i and j in G̃. We define S̃x = {(i, j) :
m̃ij = x} as the set of node pairs with m̃ij = x in the perturbed graph. Then we
have Pr(aij = 1|m̃ij = x) = ρ(S̃x), and Pr(aij = 0|m̃ij = x) = 1− ρ(S̃x). Recall that
ρ(S̃x) denotes the proportion of true edges in the set S̃x derived from the perturbed
graph. Also notice that Pr(ãij = 1|aij = 1) = 1 − p1 and Pr(ãij = 1|aij = 0) = p2.
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With the Bayes’ theorem, the posterior belief is then given by
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x) = (1− p1)ρ(S̃x)
(1− p1)ρ(S̃x) + p2[1− ρ(S̃x)]
, (3.13)
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0, m̃ij = x) = p1ρ(S̃x)
p1ρ(S̃x) + (1− p2)[1− ρ(S̃x)]
. (3.14)
(3.13) ((3.14)) shows the enhanced posterior belief that an observed (missing) edge
(i, j) in the G̃ is a true edge in G. The following property shows that the event of
an observed link ãij = 1 usually has more indications to be a true link than that of
ãij = 0.
Property 3.1: Let r denote the sparse ratio of the graph, r = m/
(
n
2
)
. If k ≤ (1−r)m,
given a fixed x, we have the following inequality stands:
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x) ≥ Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0, m̃ij = x). (3.15)
Proof. It is easy to verify that when 1− p1 − p2 ≥ 0, Inequality (3.15) stands if and
only if (1− p1 − p2)[1− ρ(S̃x)] ≥ 0. We need only guarantee 1− p1 − p2 ≥ 0. Notice
that p1 =
k
m
, and p2 =
k
(n2)−m
, then we have
1− p1 − p2 ≥ 0 ⇔ 1− k
m
− k(n
2
)−m ≥ 0 ⇔
(
n
2
)
k ≤ m
[(
n
2
)
−m
]
⇔ k ≤
[
1− m(n
2
)
]
m = (1− r)m.
Many real-world social networks are very sparse (r ≈ 0). Hence k ≤ (1 − r)m is
usually satisfied. We thus focus on the risk of the released links, Pr(aij = 1|ãij =
1, m̃ij = x).
One issue here is that attackers cannot know the proportion of true edges in S̃x
from the perturbed graph. What they can know actually is the proportion of observed
edges in S̃x. Our next result shows the maximum likelihood estimate of ρ(S̃x) can be
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derived from the proportion of observed edges in S̃x.
Result 3.4: Given the perturbed graph and a fixed x, define S̃1x = S̃x ∩ Ẽ = {(i, j) :
ãij = 1, m̃ij = x}. Assume p1 + p2 6= 1, then the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) of ρ(S̃x) is given by
ρ̂
(
S̃x
)
=
|S̃1x|/|S̃x| − p2
1− p1 − p2 , (3.16)
and the MLE is unbiased.
Proof. Let N = |S̃x|, N1 = |S̃1x| and ρ = ρ(S̃x). Then, for a randomly selected node
pair (i, j), ãij is a Bernoulli random variable:
Pr(ãij = 1|m̃ij = x) = (1− p1)ρ + p2(1− ρ)
Pr(ãij = 0|m̃ij = x) = p1ρ + (1− p2)(1− ρ)
Then the likelihood function of S̃x is
L = [(1− p1)ρ + p2(1− ρ)]N1 [p1ρ + (1− p2)(1− ρ)]N−N1 .
Take derivative to ln L with respect of ρ, we have
d ln L
dρ
=
N1(1− p1 − p2)
(1− p1)ρ + p2(1− ρ) −
(N −N1)(1− p1 − p2)
p1ρ + (1− p2)(1− ρ) .
Set d ln L
dρ
= 0, we have ρ̂ = N1/N−p2
1−p1−p2 , and the unbiasedness is then obvious.
By replacing ρ(S̃x) in (3.13) with ρ̂(S̃x) (shown in (3.16)), we have derived our en-
hanced posterior belief Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x). Attackers may simply calculate
the posterior belief of all node pairs in the perturbed graph and choose top-t node
pairs as predicted candidate links.
For those similarity measures with continuous ranges (e.g., commute time), the
number of node pairs with similarity measure equal exactly to x is usually small.
In practice, we can apply histogram approximation by partitioning the value of the
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similarity measure: x0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xi ≤ · · · , and for x ∈ [xi−1, xi)
|S̃1x|
|S̃x|
=
|{(i, j) : ãij = 1, m̃ij = x ∈ [xi−1, xi)}|
|{(i, j) : m̃ij = x ∈ [xi−1, xi)}| .
A probably more statistically preferred method is to use the kernel estimator:
|S̃1x|
|S̃x|
=
∑
i<j ãijK[(x−mij)/h]∑
i<j K[(x−mij)/h]
,
where K(x) is the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and h is the parameter
controlling the smoothness.
We would emphasize that our enhanced posterior belief Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x)
more accurately reflects the existence of a true link than the posterior belief Pr(aij =
1|ãij = 1) without exploiting the similarity measure derived in previous work [106].
We can see that Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) (shown in (3.2)) is the same for all observed
links. On the contrary, our enhanced posterior belief Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x)
tends to be larger for those observed links with higher similarity values, and tends to
be smaller for links with lower similarity values. Hence, it can more accurately reflect
the existence of true links. We show our theoretical explanations in Results 3.5 and
3.6 and will compare the precisions of top-t predicted links derived from these two
posterior beliefs in our empirical evaluations.
Result 3.5: Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x) is an increasing function of ρ(S̃x), and when
ρ(S̃x) ≥ p2p1+p2 , we have the following inequality stands:
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x) ≥ Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1). (3.17)
Proof. Notice that Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) = m−km = 1− p1, and with (3.13), it is easy to
verify this result.
Our next result shows more clearly the relationship between a-priori belief (3.1),
posterior belief without exploiting similarity measures (3.2), and our enhanced pos-
terior belief with exploiting similarity measures in (3.13) and (3.14).
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Result 3.6: Both the sum of a-priori belief over all node pairs and the sum of
posterior belief (without exploiting similarity measures) overall all node pairs are
equal to the number of edges:
∑
i<j Pr(aij = 1) =
∑
i<j Pr(aij = 1|ãij) = m.
The sum of our enhanced posterior belief (with exploiting similarity measures) also
approaches to the number of edges:
∑
i<j Pr(aij = 1|ãij, m̃ij) → m as n →∞.
Proof.
∑
i<j Pr(aij = 1) = m is obvious. Notice that the number of edges does not
change along the perturbation, then we have
∑
i<j
Pr(aij = 1|ãij) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ẽ
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) +
∑
(i,j) 6∈Ẽ
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0)
= m · m− k
m
+
[(
n
2
)
−m
]
· k(n
2
)−m = m. (3.18)
Given a randomized graph G̃, ãij and m̃ij are fixed for all i and j. Let Φ denote
the set of m̃ij values in G̃, we have
1
m
∑
i<j
Pr(aij = 1|ãij, m̃ij) =
∑
x∈Φ



1
m
∑
(i,j)∈S̃1x
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x)
+
1
m
∑
(i,j)∈S̃x−S̃1x
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0, m̃ij = x)


 . (3.19)
Consider the first term of the right hand side of (3.19). To make the notation simple,
we write ρ = ρ(S̃x).
1
m
∑
(i,j)∈S̃1x
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x) = (1− p1)ρ
(1− p1)ρ + p2(1− ρ) ·
∑
i<j ãij
|S̃x|
· |S̃x|
m
. (3.20)
Since |S̃x| → ∞ as m →∞. Given x, for all (i, j) ∈ S̃x, ãij are i.i.d. bernoulli random
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variables, and with the law of large numbers, we have
∑
i<j ãij
|S̃x|
→ Pr(ãij = 1) = (1− p1)ρ + p2(1− ρ), as |S̃x| → ∞ (3.21)
Substituting (3.21) into (3.20), we have,
lim
m→∞

 1
m
∑
(i,j)∈S̃1x
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x)

 = (1− p1)ρ |S̃x|
m
. (3.22)
Note that |S̃x|
m
≤ 1, the above equation is well defined. Similarly, we also have
lim
m→∞

 1
m
∑
(i,j)∈S̃x−S̃1x
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0, m̃ij = x)

 = p1ρ |S̃
1
x|
m
. (3.23)
Combining (3.19), (3.22) and (3.23) together, we have
1
m
∑
i<j
Pr(aij = 1|ãij, m̃ij) →
∑
x∈Φ
(
[(1− p1)ρ + p1ρ] |S̃
1
x|
m
)
→ 1 as m →∞.
Then, due to the law of large number, we can conclude that we prove the result.
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Figure 3.4: Posterior belief for polbooks network
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between the two posterior beliefs and the common
neighbors for the polbooks data. We set k = 200. We can observe that the posterior
belief without exploiting the similarity measure, Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1), is 0.55 for
all observed links. However, our enhanced posterior belief Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij)
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are greater than 0.55 for those links with more than 2 common neighbors as shown
in Figure 3.4(a). Figure 3.4(b) shows the distribution of the calculated posterior
belief values. We can observe that 33.5% of released links have their posterior beliefs
enhanced with similarity measures.
3.2.3 Privacy Protection vs Perturbation k
When attackers utilize the similarity measure, the absolute measure of protection
for an individual link (i, j) can be defined as
τa(i, j) = 1−max
x
{
max
t=0,1
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t, m̃ij = x)
}
(3.24)
where the second term denotes the maximal suspicion of existing aij = 1. Compared
with the protection under the attack without exploiting similarity measures, we define
the relative measure of protection as
τr(i, j) =
τa(i, j)
1−maxt=0,1 Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t) .
The measures of protection (τa and τr) are defined in terms of one individual
edge. In the privacy preserving data mining, one natural question is how many
perturbations we need such that we can guarantee the protection for all individual
edges are above the threshold. Our next result shows the formula of the minimum
number of perturbations to achieve the protection of all individual links. It is of
great importance to evaluate the relationship between the required minimum number
of perturbations and the utility loss of the perturbed graph.
Result 3.7: In the original graph, let Sx = {(i, j) : mij = x}, ρmax = maxx ρ(Sx),
and sparse ratio r = m/
(
n
2
)
. When the protection threshold ε < 1−ρmax
1−r , there exists
the minimum k such that τr(i, j) ≥ ε stands for all the node pair (i, j) is given by:
kmin =
[(1− r)ερmax − r(1− ρmax)]m
ε(ρmax − r) . (3.25)
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Proof. When k ≤ (1− r)m, with Result 3.1 and 3.5, we have that
max
x
{
max
t=0,1
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t, m̃ij = x)
}
= Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1, m̃ij = x0),
where x0 is the value such that ρ(S̃x) is maximized: ρ(S̃x0) = maxx ρ(S̃x). Let
ρ̃max = ρ(S̃x0). Meanwhile,we can also conclude
max
t=0,1
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t) = Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1).
Then we have
τr(i, j) =
p2[1− ρ̃max]
p1[(1− p1)ρ̃max + p2(1− ρ̃max)] . (3.26)
Substitute p1 =
k
m
= k
rN
and p2 =
k
N−m =
k
(1−r)N into (3.26), we can verify that τr(i, j)
is an increasing function of k, and the maximum value is 1−ρ̃max
1−r when k = (1− r)m.
When k ≥ (1− r)m, we similarly have the following:
max
x
{
max
t=0,1
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t, m̃ij = x)
}
= Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0, m̃ij = x0),
max
t=0,1
Pr(aij = 1|ãij = t) = Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 0).
In this case, τr(i, j) is a decreasing function of k, and the maximum is also
1−ρ̃max
1−r when
k = (1 − r)m. Therefore, kmin exists if and only if ε ≤ 1−ρ̃max1−r , and kmin < (1 − r)m.
Then, τr(i, j) is given by (3.26). Solving the inequality τr(i, j) ≥ ε, we have that
k ≥ [(1− r)ερ̃max − r(1− ρ̃max)]m
ε(ρ̃max − r) .
However, ρ̃max = maxx ρ(S̃x) varies from time to time due to the perturbation, and
data owner can substitute it with the true maximum value ρmax = maxx ρ(Sx), then
we get the result.
3.2.4 Empirical Evaluation
We use four network data sets (polbooks, Enron, E-mail, polblogs) in our evaluation.
For each graph G, we randomly add k false edges and delete k true edges. We set
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k = 0.3m, 0.5m, 0.7m in our work. We apply four similarity measures (Common
neighbors, Katz, Adamic/Adar, Commute time) to predict top-t candidate links.
The prediction performance is evaluated by the precision of the top-t predicted links.
We vary t values from 0.1m to 0.5m for all four data sets.
For each t, we calculate the precision of prediction links with different similarity
measures. We also calculate the precision of prediction links using the posterior belief
without exploiting the similarity measure. Figure 3.5 plots our results on four data
sets. We can observe that for all four data sets we can achieve very high accuracy
(greater than 0.8) by using our enhanced posterior belief for a subset (top 0.1m) of
released links, which indicates severe privacy disclosures for those sensitive links. We
can also see that our enhanced posterior belief achieves higher precisions than the
previous posterior belief without exploiting similarity measures for most links (0.5m)
with high similarity measure values, indicating that the network topology does indeed
contain latent information from which to infer interactions. From Figure 3.5, we can
also observe that we achieve different precisions using different similarity measures:
one measure which achieves the highest precision for one data set is not necessarily
the one for another data set. It is of great significance to explore what similarity
measures can be exploited by attackers to achieve the highest privacy disclosure for
a given social network. We will investigate this in our future work.
In the next experiment, we vary the noise magnitude k from 0.3m to 0.7m. Table
3.2 shows the precisions of top t predictions using different similarity measures on
four networks. We can see that for every noise magnitude, predictions that utilize
similarity measures achieve a higher accuracy than those without exploiting similar-
ity measures. We can also observe that, for any t, the precision decreases as noise
magnitude k increases. This is intuitively reasonable, for large noises can greatly re-
duce the correlation between the similarity measures and existences of links, and thus
decrease the prediction precision. We would point out that k = 0.7m corresponds to
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Figure 3.5: Precision of top t predictions by the posterior belief w/o similarity mea-
sures for four data sets, k = 0.5m
a large randomization (i.e., 70% original links have been removed). The posterior be-
lief without exploiting similarity measures, Pr(aij = 1|ãij = 1) is only 0.3. However,
the posterior belief with exploiting similarity measures is significantly improved. For
example, the precision of top 0.1m predictions using common neighbors is 0.87 for
polblogs data.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, we conduct privacy analysis for Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch
procedures. We derive the attacker’s prior belief (without the released graph) and
posterior belief (with the observation of an existing or non-existing link) on the ex-
istence of a sensitive link. We derive the minimal randomization magnitude needed
for Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch procedures to preserve privacy to a given level.
We also conduct theoretical analysis on the attacking model in which the attacker
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exploits node proximity measures to enhance his posterior belief on sensitive links.
Our empirical evaluations show that, by exploiting nodes’ similarity measures, the
attacker can significantly increase his confidence on the existence of a sensitive link
between two nodes with high similarity value.
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Table 3.2: Precision of top t predictions by the posterior belief w/o similarity measures
for four data sets, k = 0.3m, 0.5m, 0.7m
(a) Without similarity measures
polbooks Enron E-mail polblogs
k: 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m
t: 0.1m 0.69 0.52 0.28 0.70 0.51 0.30 0.71 0.50 0.30 0.69 0.49 0.29
0.2m 0.70 0.49 0.33 0.70 0.51 0.30 0.69 0.49 0.30 0.70 0.49 0.29
0.3m 0.69 0.53 0.30 0.71 0.48 0.30 0.70 0.49 0.31 0.69 0.50 0.30
0.4m 0.71 0.50 0.30 0.70 0.51 0.28 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.71 0.50 0.29
0.5m 0.72 0.50 0.28 0.69 0.51 0.31 0.70 0.50 0.29 0.70 0.51 0.30
(b) Commute time
polbooks Enron E-mail polblogs
k: 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m
t: 0.1m 0.93 0.76 0.39 0.93 0.81 0.42 0.94 0.88 0.68 0.98 0.96 0.87
0.2m 0.85 0.67 0.36 0.86 0.67 0.41 0.90 0.79 0.48 0.96 0.91 0.69
0.3m 0.82 0.58 0.39 0.81 0.59 0.39 0.88 0.70 0.36 0.95 0.83 0.48
0.4m 0.74 0.54 0.36 0.78 0.54 0.32 0.83 0.59 0.33 0.90 0.71 0.33
0.5m 0.70 0.47 0.30 0.72 0.50 0.28 0.76 0.51 0.29 0.84 0.57 0.23
(c) Katz
polbooks Enron E-mail polblogs
k: 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m
t: 0.1m 0.94 0.79 0.59 0.95 0.75 0.39 0.97 0.88 0.69 1.00 0.98 0.90
0.2m 0.81 0.65 0.42 0.91 0.79 0.36 0.98 0.79 0.53 0.98 0.94 0.73
0.3m 0.75 0.54 0.30 0.87 0.64 0.32 0.94 0.58 0.40 0.97 0.86 0.49
0.4m 0.76 0.53 0.23 0.80 0.53 0.32 0.88 0.55 0.30 0.94 0.73 0.32
0.5m 0.70 0.50 0.27 0.75 0.49 0.30 0.79 0.48 0.24 0.88 0.52 0.20
(d) Common neighbors
polbooks Enron E-mail polblogs
k: 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m
t: 0.1m 0.97 0.85 0.45 0.97 0.86 0.41 0.99 0.96 0.70 0.99 0.98 0.87
0.2m 0.94 0.72 0.35 0.96 0.76 0.34 0.98 0.86 0.49 0.98 0.94 0.58
0.3m 0.90 0.64 0.33 0.93 0.66 0.32 0.96 0.70 0.44 0.97 0.86 0.39
0.4m 0.84 0.59 0.26 0.89 0.60 0.31 0.91 0.60 0.34 0.95 0.70 0.26
0.5m 0.82 0.43 0.28 0.83 0.49 0.28 0.82 0.49 0.27 0.90 0.50 0.22
(e) Adamic/Adar
polbooks Enron E-mail polblogs
k: 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m 0.3m 0.5m 0.7m
t: 0.1m 0.98 0.83 0.43 0.98 0.85 0.42 1.00 0.97 0.67 1.00 0.98 0.86
0.2m 0.94 0.67 0.37 0.96 0.73 0.36 0.99 0.82 0.54 0.99 0.94 0.57
0.3m 0.90 0.59 0.33 0.93 0.65 0.31 0.95 0.74 0.45 0.97 0.85 0.41
0.4m 0.83 0.55 0.34 0.89 0.59 0.29 0.90 0.60 0.34 0.94 0.66 0.27
0.5m 0.81 0.49 0.29 0.84 0.51 0.28 0.84 0.49 0.28 0.91 0.51 0.23
CHAPTER 4: IDENTITY DISCLOSURE ANALYSIS
The link disclosure corresponds to the scenario where the sensitive relationship be-
tween two individuals is disclosed. The identity disclosure corresponds to the scenario
where the identity of an individual who is associated with a node is revealed. In this
chapter, we assume all individuals (nodes) and relationships (links) among them are
sensitive. To prevent identity disclosures, one natural approach is to publish a node-
anonymized version of the network that permits useful analysis without disclosing
the identity of the individuals represented by the nodes. However, as pointed out in
[8, 46], this simple technique of anonymizing graphs by replacing the identifying infor-
mation of the nodes with random ID’s does not guarantee identity/link privacy since
adversaries may potentially construct a highly distinguishable subgraph with edges
to a set of targeted nodes, and then to re-identify the subgraph and consequently the
targets in the released anonymized network.
Adversaries usually rely on background knowledge in order to de-anonymize nodes
and learn the link relations between de-anonymized individuals from the released
perturbed graph. It is challenging to model all types of background knowledge of
adversaries in the scenario of publishing social networks with privacy preservation.
In [114], the authors listed several types of background knowledge: attributes of
vertices, vertex degrees, specific link relationships between some target individuals,
neighborhoods of some target individuals, embedded subgraphs, graph metrics (e.g.,
betweenness, closeness, centrality). We first focus on one most widely used type of
background knowledge, vertex degree and quantify both identity disclosure and link
disclosure when adversaries know the degrees of target individuals, leaving other other
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types of background knowledge for future work.
Let Ω denote the set of all individual identifiers in the network: Ω ={Alice, Bob,. . . , Zack},
and let ψ(·) be the mapping from the individual identifier to the node random id in
the anonymized graph: for any α ∈ Ω, ψ(α) is the node index of the individual α, and
ψ−1(i) is the identity of node i. One natural question for data owners is, compared to
not releasing the graph, to what extent releasing an anonymized/randomized graph
G̃ jeopardizes the privacy.
Resilience to Structural Attacks. Recall that in both active attacks and passive
attacks [8], the adversary needs to construct a highly distinguishable subgraph H with
edges to a set of target nodes, and then to re-identify the subgraph and consequently
the targets in the released anonymized network. As shown in Figure 4.1(a), attackers
form an subgraph H in the original graph G, and attacker 1 and 2 send links to the
target individuals α and β. After randomization using either Rand Add/Del or Rand
Switch, the structure of subgraph H as well G is changed. The re-identifiability of
the subgraph H from the randomized released graph G̃ may significantly decrease
when the magnitude of perturbation is medium or large. Even if the subgraph H
can still be distinguished, as shown in Figure 4.1(b), link (u, s) and (v, t) in G̃ can
be false links. Hence nodes s and t do not correspond to target individuals α and β.
Furthermore (e.g. in the released graph with unchanged node identifier information),
even individuals α and β have been identified, the observed link between α and β can
still be a false link. Hence, the link privacy can still be protected. In summary, it is
more difficult for the adversary to breach the identity privacy and link privacy.
Similarly for structural queries [46], because of randomization, the adversary cannot
simply exclude from those nodes that do not match the structural properties of the
target. Instead, the adversary needs to consider the set of all possible graphs implied
by G̃ and k. Informally, this set contains any graph Gp that could result in G̃ under
k perturbations from Gp, and the size of the set is
(
m
k
)((n2)−m
k
)
. The candidate set of
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Figure 4.1: Resilient to subgraph attacks
a target node includes every node y if it is a candidate in some possible graph. The
probability associated with a candidate y is the probability of choosing a possible
graph in which y is a candidate. The computation is equivalent to compute a query
answer over a probabilistic database and is likely to be intractable.
Disclosure Risk Measures. To quantify disclosure risk, we define two risk mea-
sures: prior risk measure r(ω) is defined as the adversary’s prior confidence on the
event ω without the released graph G̃; and the posterior risk measure r(ω|G̃) is defined
as the adversary’s posterior confidence given the released graph G̃.
For identity disclosure, we assume the adversary has vertex degree background
knowledge, i.e., the target individual’s degree is known to adversaries. To make the
notation concise, we use dα to denote the degree of individual α. We use r(α) to
denote the adversary’s prior confidence on identification of the target individual α.
Correspondingly, we use r(α|dα, G̃) to denote the posterior risk of individual α given
the released randomized graph G̃ and the degree of the target individual α (i.e., vertex
degree background knowledge). We present our quantification results in Section 4.1.1.
For link disclosure, adversaries need to first identity target individual nodes (incor-
porating the vertex degree background knowledge, dα, dβ, with the released graph G̃)
and then compute the posteriori belief of existence of the sensitive link (α, β). We use
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R(aαβ) and R(aαβ|dα, dβ, G̃) to denote the prior risk and posterior risk respectively.
We present our results in Section 4.1.2. In Section 4.2, we compare Rand Add/Del
with the K-degree approach [63]. Some results in this chapter are also reported in
[107].
4.1 Disclosure Analysis in Rand Add/Del
Throughout this section, we illustrate our theoretical results using empirical evalu-
ations on polbooks network. Figure 4.2(b) shows the histogram of its degree sequence.
For example, there are 22 nodes with degree 5 and one node with degree 20. In the re-
mainder of this section, we use one node (random id 15, identifier label “Breakdown”)
with degree 5 and the node (random id 30, identifier label “The Price of Loyalty”)
with degree 20 to illustrate our results.
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Figure 4.2: The politics book network and the histogram of its degree sequence.
4.1.1 Identity Disclosure
In this section, we focus on identity disclosure in the randomized graph. We study
the adversary’s strategy and then quantify identity disclosure. We assume that the
adversary has vertex degree background knowledge, i.e., the degree of the target
individual is known. The adversary needs to take a guess on the mapping function
ψ based on his background knowledge and the released graph G̃. In other words, the
adversary wants to re-identify which node is corresponding to the target individual α
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using the background knowledge of degree dα. To re-identify α in the node set, the
adversary can utilize the randomized degree sequence d̃ = (d̃1, d̃1, . . . , d̃n). Hence,
we can write the posterior risk measure r(α|dα, G̃) as r(α|dα, d̃). Let ψ̂(·) denote the
adversary’s guess of the mapping.
Without the released randomized graph, the background knowledge (such as the
true degree of a target individual) cannot be used to enhance the adversary’s confi-
dence on the identity mapping. Hence, the prior risk measure r(α|dα) = 1n . Next we
deduct the posterior risk measure r(α|dα, d̃).
Recall that, in Rand Add/Del scheme, each true edge can remain in the graph with
a probability p11 =
m−k
m
, and each non-existing link can be added with a probability
p10 =
k
N−m , where N =
(
n
2
)
. Let di and d̃i denote the degree of node i in the G and
G̃ graph respectively, and d̂i is the adversary’s estimator of di.
Lemma 4.1 shows the calculation of Pr(d̃i = x|di), i.e., the probability of a node’s
degree d̃i after randomization given its original degree di.
Lemma 4.1: The distribution of d̃i is given by
Pr(d̃i = x|di) =
x∑
t=0
B(t; di, p11)B(x− t; n− 1− di, p10), (4.1)
where B(t; n, p) denotes the probability mass function of the binomial distribution
with parameter n and p. The expectation and variance of d̃i are given by:
E(d̃i) = p11di + p10(n− 1− di), (4.2)
V(d̃i) = dip11(1− p11) + (n− 1− di)p10(1− p10). (4.3)
Proof. Let d+i denote the remaining true edges after Add/Del process, and d
−
i denote
the added links by the process. Since each existing or non-existing link are processed
independently, d+i and d
−
i follow the binomial distributions B(di, p11) and B(n− 1−
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di, p10) respectively:
Pr(d+i = t|di) = B(t; di, p11) =
(
di
t
)
pt11(1− p11)di−t. (4.4)
Pr(d−i = t|di) = B(t; n− 1− di, p10) =
(
n− 1− d̃i
t
)
pt10(1− p10)n−1−d̃i−t. (4.5)
Since d̃i = d
+
i + d
−
i , the distribution of d̃i is just the convolution of (4.4) and (4.5)
and we get (4.1). Note the d+i and d
−
i are independent, then
E(d̃i) = E(d
+
i ) + E(d
−
i ) = p11di + p10(n− 1− di),
V(d̃i) = V(d
+
i ) + V(d
−
i ) = dip11(1− p11) + (n− 1− di)p10(1− p10).
Rearrange (4.2), we can have the following result:
Lemma 4.2: Given a randomized graph, the moment estimator (ME) of di is given
by:
d̂i =
d̃i − p10(n− 1)
p11 − p10 , (4.6)
and d̂i is the unbiased estimator of di.
The unbias property is straightforward from (4.2).
By combining Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, we can calculate the posterior probability
Pr(dα|d̃i) (i.e., the likelihood of the observed node i having the degree dα in the original
graph).
Lemma 4.3: In the randomized graph G̃, the adversary observes a node i with degree
d̃i, then the adversary’s confidence on di = x is given by
Pr(di = x|d̃i) = Pr(d̃i|di = x) Pr(di = x)∑n−1
d=0 Pr(d̃i|d = x) Pr(d = x)
. (4.7)
When the original degree distribution is unavailable to the adversary, the estimated
degree sequence from (4.6) can be applied instead.
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Lemma 4.3 is a direct result from Bayes’ theorem.
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Figure 4.3: Values of Pr(di|d̃i = 5) and Pr(di|d̃i = 20) after applying Rand Add/Del
on polbooks network (k=10%m),
Figure 4.3 shows values of two posterior probabilities: Pr(di|d̃i = 5) and Pr(di|d̃i =
20). Generally speaking, the distribution of Pr(di|d̃i) is not symmetric, and it skews
to the side with larger degree frequency. In Figure 4.3, for a node with d̃i = 20,
Pr(di = 21|d̃i = 20) > Pr(di = 20|d̃i = 20) > Pr(di = 19|d̃i = 20),
this is because the adversary can estimate that, in the original graph Pr(di = 21) >
Pr(di = 20) > Pr(di = 19), and Lemma 4.3 incorporates this information in the
calculation. We can also observe that the posterior probability that the original degree
value di is far away from the observed value d̃i tends to be zero. In other words, it is
very unlikely that a node’s degree has a significant change after perturbation.
Recall our node identification problem is that given the true degree dα of a target
individual α, the adversary aims to discover which node in the randomized graph
corresponds to individual α. To the adversary, every node in the randomized graph
is possible with probability Pr(dα|d̃i).
Given a list of posterior probabilities Pr(dα|d̃i) calculated using Lemma 4.3, the
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adversary can make the following probabilistic decision:
ψ̂(α) = i, with probability
Pr(di = dα|d̃i)∑n
j=1 Pr(dj = dα|d̃j)
. (4.8)
Result 4.1: Assume the node identities are unknown to the adversary. For any
individual α ∈ Ω, the prior risk measure is
r(α|dα) = 1
n
. (4.9)
The posterior risk measure, which equals to the accuracy of the probabilistic decision
in (4.8), is then given by:
r(α|dα, d̃) = Pr[ψ̂(α) = ψ(α)] = Pr(dα|d̃α)∑n
j=1 Pr(dj = dα|d̃j)
. (4.10)
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Figure 4.4: Apply Rand Add/Del on polbooks network (k=10%m), values of Pr(di =
5|d̃i) and Pr(di = 20|d̃i) when d̃i varies.
In our polbooks example, recall that we select two individuals: α (label “Break-
down”) with known degree 5 and β (label “The Price of Loyalty”) with known degree
20. From Figure 4.2(b), we can see that there are 22 nodes with degree 5 and only one
node with degree 20. Figure 4.4 shows values of Pr(di = 5|d̃i) and Pr(di = 20|d̃i). Us-
ing Equation 4.10, we can easily calculate identity disclosure risk, r(α|dα = 5) = 0.135
and r(β|dβ = 20) = 0.024. It is intuitive to learn that identify disclosure risk given the
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Figure 4.5: r(α|dα) vs. k after applying Rand Add/Del on polbooks network
vertex degree background knowledge is dependent on the degree distribution Pr(di)
of the original graph.
Another question is how the identity risk disclosure r(α|dα) varies with the mag-
nitude of randomization. In Figure 4.5, we show how two identity disclosure risks,
r(α|dα = 5) and r(β|dβ = 20), vary as the perturbation magnitude (k) changes. We
can observe that both identity disclosure risks decrease when k increases. The risk
value r(α|dα = 5) is consistently low even if very few or no perturbations are intro-
duced. This is because there are 22 nodes with the degree 5 in the original graph.
However, for r(β|dβ = 20), we can see that randomization can significantly decrease
its disclosure risk: the disclosure risk is 100% when we release the anonymized graph
without edge randomization while the disclosure risk decreases 0.39 (0.2) when we
apply Rand Add/Del with k = 2.5%m(5%m).
4.1.2 Link Disclosure
The adversary’s goal is to predict whether there is a sensitive link between two tar-
get individuals α, β ∈ Ω by exploiting the released graph and individual degrees dα, dβ.
Given the true degrees of α and β and one released graph G̃, let R(α, β|dα, dβ, G̃)
denote the posterior risk measure on the link between α and β when the node iden-
tities are unknown to the adversary. Similarly, R(α, β) is the prior risk measure on
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link disclosure.
Lemma 4.4: For Rand Add/Del scheme, the prior and posterior risk measures of the
existence of a link between node i and j are given by:
Pr(aij = 1) =
m
N
; (4.11)
Pr(aij = 1|ãij) =



m−k
m
, if ãij = 1,
k
N−m , if ãij = 0.
(4.12)
where N = n(n− 1)/2.
Lemma 4.4 shows the link disclosure risks on the simple scenario where node iden-
tities are available to adversaries, i.e., for any target individual α ∈ Ω, the adversary
knows its corresponding index, ψ(α) = i, in the released randomized graph.
In general, the adversary does not know individuals’ corresponding node indices in
the released graph. Instead, the adversary may only have vertex degree background
knowledge, i.e., the degrees of target individuals are known.
Result 4.2: In the scenario where node identities are unknown to the adversary, for
any two individuals α, β ∈ Ω, the prior risk measure and the posterior risk measure
given G̃ on the link between α and β after applying Rand Add/Del scheme are given
by:
R(aαβ) =
m
n2N
, (4.13)
R(aαβ|dα, dβ, G̃) = m− k
m
(
Pr(dα|d̃α)∑n
j=1 Pr(dj = dα|d̃j)
)(
Pr(dβ|d̃β)∑n
j=1 Pr(dj = dβ|d̃j)
)
.
(4.14)
Proof. Since our risk measures are essentially the accuracy of the adversary’s predic-
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tions, risk measures can be expressed as:
R(aαβ) = r(α)r(β) Pr(aij = 1) (4.15)
R(aαβ|dα, dβ, G̃) = r(α|dα, d̃)r(β|dβ, d̃) Pr(aij = 1|ãij). (4.16)
Combining (4.11), (4.12), (4.9), and (4.10) into (4.15) and (4.16), we have the result
on the link risk for Rand Add/Del when node identities are unknown.
4.1.3 Privacy Protection vs. Perturbation k
From the data owner point of view, we are interested in how much perturbation
should be introduced to protect privacy. To measure the privacy protection, we
thus further define protection measures: the absolute protection measure τa(ω) and
the relative protection measure of τr(ω). We are interested in relationships between
identity (link) privacy protection and the perturbation magnitude k.
Identity Privacy Protection. The absolute and relative identity protection mea-
sures are straightforwardly defined as:
τa(α|d̃) = 1− r(α|dα, d̃), τr(α|d̃) = 1− r(α|dα, d̃)
1− 1/n .
Figure 4.6 shows the histogram distributions of relative protection measures τr(α|G̃)
under three different perturbation magnitudes (k = 5%, 10%, 20%m). We can easily
observe that more nodes are protected when k increases. We can also observe that
the distribution generally has skewness, which indicates the majority of nodes are
resilient to vertex degree background knowledge attack even under a relatively mod-
erate perturbation. The calculation of r(α|dα, d̃) in (4.10) needs an instance of the
randomized graph. In practice, the data owner may expect to determine k before ap-
plying Rand Add/Del such that the randomized data satisfies some privacy protection
threshold. Hence, we should use the expected randomized degree sequence shown in
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Figure 4.6: Histogram of τr(α|G̃) for 105 nodes in polbooks network, under Rand
Add/Del scheme. The skewness of the distribution increases, indicating more nodes
are well protected as k increases.
(4.2) to evaluate the protection measure and choose k such that
J(k) = min
α∈Ω
τr[α|E(d̃)] ≥ 1− ε.
Link Privacy Protection. Similarly, the link privacy protection measures are shown
as:
Γa(aαβ|G̃) = 1−R(aαβ|dα, dβ, G̃),
Γr(aαβ|G̃) = 1−R(aαβ|dα, dβ, G̃)
1−R(α, β) .
Figure 4.7 shows the histogram of Γr(aαβ|G̃) for polbooks network after we apply Rand
Add/Del scheme (k = 10%m). We can see that all Γr values are greater than 90%,
and most links have their relative protection measure values close to 1, indicating that
the protection of Rand Add/Del with k = 10%m almost achieves the same protection
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Figure 4.7: Histogram of Γr(aαβ) for polbooks network,Rand Add/Del (k = 10%m)
Table 4.1: Perturbation parameter k that meet the protection requirement for polbooks
network
1− ε k for identity protection k for link protection
0.5 27 8
0.6 32 9
0.7 59 12
0.8 110 16
0.9 257 37
as without a released graph. Formally, we expect to choose a k such that
J(k) := min
aαβ
Γr(aαβ|G̃) ≥ 1− ε. (4.17)
Note that we use E(d̃) and ãαβ = 1 in calculating (4.17).
Table 4.1 shows the minimal k that meets the identity (link) protection requirement
in (4.17) for polbooks network. We can see that Rand Add/Del scheme can generally
achieve both identity protection and link protection with small or medium perturba-
tions, e.g., k = 59 (or k = 12 ) for the relative protection threshold 0.7 of identity
privacy (or link privacy). We can also observe that Rand Add/Del needs much fewer
perturbations to achieve the link protection than the identity protection. This is
because the adversary needs to identify the target two individuals before predicting
the existence of a link between these two individuals.
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4.2 Comparison with K-degree Generalization Scheme
In this section, we compare the Rand Add/Del scheme with the representative
generalization based scheme (K-degree) in terms of the tradeoff between privacy
protection and utility loss. Since the K-degree scheme is designed to protect the
re-identification of individuals, we focus on identity privacy protection in empirical
evaluations.
4.2.1 Identity Privacy Protection vs. Utility Loss
Graph Characteristics vs. Utility. To achieve utility, we expect the released
randomized graph should also keep structural properties not much changed or those
properties can be reconstructed from the randomized graph. In this section, we use the
following representative real space features: harmonic mean of the shortest distance
h, modularity Q, and transitivity C. We also consider the two spectral features: the
eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix A λ1, and the second eigenvalue of the Laplacian
matrix µ2.
Table 4.2 shows our empirical evaluations on three networks: Polbooks, Polblogs,
and Enron. For each network, we vary K from 2 to 10 and apply both Rand Add/Del
and K-degree Generalization schemes. For Rand Add/Del, we use the absolute iden-
tity protection measure, τa(α|d̃) ≥ 1−1/K, to determine the perturbation magnitude
k and then generate a randomized network using k. We can observe that both Rand
Add/Del and K-degree schemes generally decrease structural properties. For example,
both Q (indicating the goodness of the community structure) and µ2 (showing how
good the communities separate, with smaller values corresponding to better com-
munity structures) increase along K, which indicates the goodness of the community
structure is affected due to edge modification. We can also observe from Table 4.2 that
K-degree scheme generally better preserves structural features than Rand Add/Del.
This is because that K-degree scheme examines the degree sequence of nodes and
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chooses a subset of nodes (that violates the K-degree anonymity property) for edge
modification while Rand Add/Del scheme treats all nodes (edges) equally during ran-
domization. We expect that reconstruction methods can be designed for the purely
randomized graph so features derived from the reconstructed graph (rather than di-
rectly from the released randomized graph) can be more accurate. It is our belief
that it is very hard, if not impossible, to figure out reconstruction methods on the
released data randomized using K-degree scheme. We will investigate reconstruction
methods in our future work.
4.2.2 Further Improvement
Since Rand Add/Del randomly adds and deletes edges, a large number of pertur-
bations are applied to those nodes in low risks. As a result, we sacrifice graph utility
without further improving identity protection. One natural idea is that we can di-
vide the graph into several blocks according to the degree sequence and apply Rand
Add/Del separately to each block using different randomization parameters k.
In many real-world networks, we have fewer nodes with high degrees while more
nodes with low degrees. By simply partitioning the graph into blocks according to
the degree sequence, we expect to introduce fewer perturbations (with better utility
preservation) to achieve the same privacy protection. For each block b, we say an
existing (or non-existing) link (i, j) is in block b if node i or j is in the block. Let nb
be the number of nodes and and mb be the number of links in block b. We randomly
add and delete kb links, then each existing link remains in the randomized graph
with probability p
(b)
11 = 1 − kbmb , and each non-existing link is added with probability
p
(b)
10 =
kb
Nb−mb where Nb =
(
nb
2
) − nb(n − nb). We can use the same methodologies in
calculating the identity/link risks except for replacing the overall p11 and p10 with p
(b)
11
and p
(b)
10 . We call this method blockwise random add/delete strategy, or simply Rand
Add/Del-B for short.
Figure 4.8 shows preliminary results of Rand Add/Del-B on Enron network. In
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Figure 4.8: Identity Protection K vs. Feature Change on Enron data
this experiment, we simply divide the graph into two blocks: nodes with degree
greater than 30 are in the first block while the rest nodes with high degree frequency
values are in the second block. We can observe from Figure 4.8 that this simple
strategy can better preserve graph features than Rand Add/Del. We expect to achieve
even better utility preservation when we have better block partitions (e.g., using
histogram partition algorithms). As we discussed previously, we will also investigate
reconstruction methods on the released data using Rand Add/Del-B scheme.
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4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we quantify both identity disclosure and link disclosure risks as-
sociated with Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch procedures based on one most widely
used type of background knowledge, vertex degree. We compare our Rand Add/Del
with another representative edge modification scheme K-degree generalization scheme
proposed in [63] in terms of the tradeoff between disclosure risks and utility loss. Our
empirical results show that generalized graph via the K-degree generalization scheme
generally better preserves structural features than the randomized graph via the Rand
Add/Del. It is also worth pointing out that the K-degree generalization scheme is
designed to only protect the re-identification of individuals while the Rand Add/Del
can provide both identity and link privacy protection.
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Table 4.2: Identity protection K vs. Feature Changes between Rand Add/Del scheme
(denoted as Rand) and K-degree Generalization scheme (denoted as K-deg); Rows
with K = 1 show the feature values of the original networks
K λ1 µ2 h Q C
Rand K-deg Rand K-deg Rand K-deg Rand K-deg Rand K-deg
polbooks
1 11.93 0.32 2.45 0.40 0.34
2 11.64 12.00 0.61 0.43 2.31 2.35 0.37 0.39 0.30 0.33
3 11.51 12.05 0.79 0.45 2.28 2.32 0.36 0.39 0.29 0.33
4 11.04 12.11 1.16 0.60 2.20 2.28 0.31 0.38 0.22 0.32
5 10.50 12.22 1.43 0.60 2.16 2.28 0.26 0.38 0.17 0.33
6 10.33 12.30 1.16 0.79 2.16 2.23 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.30
7 10.15 12.31 1.41 0.63 2.14 2.27 0.21 0.37 0.13 0.31
8 9.83 12.64 1.53 0.65 2.13 2.26 0.15 0.37 0.10 0.32
9 9.72 12.72 1.43 0.97 2.13 2.20 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.29
10 9.75 12.85 1.61 0.88 2.13 2.19 0.14 0.35 0.1 0.30
polblogs
1 74.08 0.168 2.506 0.405 0.226
2 30.19 74.89 9.30 0.168 2.35 2.500 0.067 0.402 0.027 0.225
3 28.55 74.50 10.58 0.168 2.35 2.484 0.024 0.401 0.022 0.223
4 28.50 75.16 10.72 0.168 2.35 2.494 0.020 0.401 0.022 0.224
5 28.49 75.10 11.11 0.168 2.35 2.475 0.018 0.396 0.022 0.221
6 28.47 76.32 10.86 0.168 2.35 2.469 0.019 0.394 0.022 0.222
7 28.46 75.82 11.09 0.168 2.35 2.461 0.018 0.395 0.022 0.22
8 28.46 76.67 11.14 0.168 2.35 2.462 0.016 0.389 0.022 0.219
9 28.46 77.42 10.68 0.168 2.35 2.486 0.019 0.387 0.022 0.221
10 28.46 78.42 10.72 0.168 2.35 2.458 0.015 0.385 0.022 0.221
Enron
1 17.83 0.80 2.278 0.0074 0.344
2 13.90 18.16 1.60 0.84 2.096 2.25 0.0046 0.0072 0.127 0.33
3 12.69 18.29 3.20 0.86 2.079 2.24 0.0037 0.0072 0.081 0.33
4 12.65 18.45 2.99 1.00 2.079 2.17 0.0037 0.0069 0.078 0.31
5 12.66 19.31 3.04 0.85 2.078 2.17 0.0037 0.0066 0.080 0.31
6 12.63 19.41 2.89 0.84 2.078 2.19 0.0037 0.0065 0.078 0.31
7 12.60 20.04 3.04 0.82 2.078 2.19 0.0037 0.0069 0.078 0.31
8 12.60 19.92 3.11 0.82 2.079 2.12 0.0037 0.0063 0.079 0.29
9 12.61 20.42 2.84 1.45 2.079 2.13 0.0037 0.0061 0.079 0.30
10 12.62 21.39 2.96 0.98 2.077 2.05 0.0037 0.0058 0.078 0.29
CHAPTER 5: FEATURE PRESERVING RANDOMIZATION
Edge randomization may significantly affect the utility of the released randomized
graph. To preserve utility, certain aggregate characteristics (a.k.a., feature) of the
original graph should remain basically unchanged or at least some properties can
be reconstructed from the randomized graph. However, as we show below, many
topological features are lost due to Rand Add/Del or Rand Switch.
Figure 5.1 shows the trend of the change of graph characteristics (including two
spectral, λ1, µ2 and four real, harmonic mean of geodesic path, modularity, tran-
sitivity, and subgraph centrality) as Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch perturbation
strategies are applied to graph polbooks. We can observe that, except the λ1 in Rand
Switch procedure, the graph features can be greatly changed as the randomization
magnitude parameter k increases. For example, µ2 and modularity measure Q are
very different from the original value when k approaches 200, indicating the com-
munity structure is not resilient to random perturbation. The harmonic mean of
the geodesic path shows the similar trend. This is intuitively reasonable, as aver-
age vertex-vertex distance may change sharply when edges across communities are
switched with edges within communities. Note that we have 441 edges in this graph,
even the medium randomization (k = 100) significantly decreases the utility of the
released graph. Generally more perturbation can lead to stronger privacy protection,
but it also greatly changes many features of the network, decreasing the information
utility. For example, network resilience and community structure are of particular
importance in epidemiology where removal of vertices or edges in a contact network
may correspond to vaccination of individuals against a disease. Then the epidemio-
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Figure 5.1: Graph characteristic vs. perturbation with varying k for Rand Add/Del
and Rand Switch
logical solution developed from the randomly perturbed graph may not be applicable
to the real graph.
In this chapter, we investigate how to perturb graphs without changing much net-
work structural features. In Section 5.1, we develop the spectrum preserving random-
ization procedures which preserves some eigenvalues of graph matrices. In Section
5.2, we introduce the Markov chain based randomization procedure, which can pre-
serve any graph feature specified by the users. Some of the results in this chapter are
also reported in [104, 106].
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5.1 Spectrum Preserving Randomization
5.1.1 Theoretical Analysis on Spectral Perturbation
The theory of graph perturbations is concerned primarily with changes in eigen-
values which result from local modifications of a graph such as adding or deleting
an edge. In the following, we let A and Ã be the adjacency matrices of the orig-
inal graph G and the perturbed graph G′ with spectra λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn and
λ̃1 ≥ λ̃2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ̃n respectively.
Lemma 5.1: [25] λ̃1 < λ1 whenever G
′ is obtained from G by deleting an edge or
vertex. Similarly, λ̃1 > λ1 whenever G
′ is obtained from G by adding an edge or a
non-isolated vertex.
Lemma 5.1 shows any proper subgraph of G has smaller index value λ1 and any
supgraph of G has larger index value λ1. This is also one reason why we only focus
on the perturbation strategies that keep the number of edges unchanged. Otherwise,
the index of the graph λ1 may be significantly changed, which will affect many real
space graph characteristics.
Theorem 5.1: Weyl’s Theorem [49]. Given two n×n symmetric matrices A and E,
assume λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn and ε1 ≥ ε2 ≥ · · · ≥ εn are their eigenvalues respectively.
Let Ã = A + E, and λ̃1 ≥ λ̃2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ̃n are its eigenvalues. Then the Weyl’s
inequalities are
λ̃i+j−1 ≤ λi + εj ≤ λ̃i+j−n (5.1)
for 1 ≤ i, j, i + j − 1, i + j − n ≤ n.
Weyl’s theorem states that the eigenvalues of a matrix are perfectly conditioned,
i.e., no eigenvalue can move more than the range specified by (5.1).
Some graph features (e.g., the number of vertices n, the number of edges m) remain
unchanged after randomization and are assumed to be available to attackers. We also
assume that the number of perturbations k is available to both data miners and
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attackers. The reason is that k denotes the magnitude of perturbation which may be
needed to analyze the perturbed graph by data miners. In this section, we present to
what extent the graph spectrum may change with respect to those graph invariants,
specifically, k and n for Rand Add/Del and k, n and di for Rand Switch where di is
the degree of vertex i.
When k = 1, we call the perturbation matrix as the elementary perturbation matrix
(EPM). Obviously, the perturbation matrix E when k > 1 is the sum of EPMs along
the perturbation.
For Rand Add/Del, we have two different cases. One is that we add the edge (i, p)
and delete an existing edge (i, q). In this case, the EPM has the form as below:
E(i,p,q) = Ã− A =


0 1 −1
1 0 0
−1 0 0


⊕ 0n−3. (5.2)
Specifically, eip = epi = 1, and eiq = eqi = −1, where eij denotes the component of E.
The other case is that we add the edge (i, j) and then remove one existing edge (p, q)
where i, j, p, q are distinct. Then,
E(i,j,p,q) =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 −1 0


⊕ 0n−4. (5.3)
Specifically, eij = eji = 1, and epq = eqp = −1.
For Rand Switch, when we switch one pair of edges, (t, w), (u, v) to (t, v) and (u,w),
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the EPM is:
E(t,w,u,v) =


0 1 −1 0
1 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 1
0 −1 1 0


⊕ 0n−4 (5.4)
Specifically, etw = ewt = euv = evu = −1, and etv = evt = euw = ewu = 1. We can
easily derive ε1 = 2,εn = −2, and εi = 0 (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1).
However, when k > 1, it is hard to derive directly the eigenvalues of E based on
the released k. In the following, we show our result based on the Gershgorin Circle
Theorem [49].
Theorem 5.2: Gershgorin Circle Theorem. For an n × n matrix A, define Ri =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i |aij|. Then each eigenvalue of A must be in at least one of the disks in the
complex plane: Ci(A) = {z : |z − aii| ≤ Ri}.
Result 5.1: Let ε1 ≥ ε2 ≥ · · · ≥ εn be the eigenvalues of E. For all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), we
have
εn ≤
∣∣∣λi − λ̃i
∣∣∣ ≤ ε1 (5.5)
or more loosely ∣∣∣λi − λ̃i
∣∣∣ ≤ ‖E‖2 , (5.6)
where for Rand Add/Del,
‖E‖2 ≤ min{2k, n− 1}, (5.7)
and for Rand Switch,
‖E‖2 ≤ 2 min
{
k, max
i
(min{di, n− 1− di})
}
(5.8)
Proof. (5.5) and (5.6) can be easily derived from the Weyl’s theorem.
Notice that the diagonal elements of E are always 0. Hence,
Ci(E) = {z : |z − eii| ≤ Ri} = {z : |z| ≤ Ri} .
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All these circles are concentric, and all the eigenvalues of A are thus in the circle
of the largest radius: ‖E‖2 ≤ maxi{Ri}. and Ri =
∑
j 6=i |eij| is actually the totaly
number of added and deleted edges of vertex i.
Hence, for Rand Add/Del, when k < n/2, the worst case is that all the perturbations
involve the same vertex; when k ≥ n/2, the worst case happens when a certain vertex
is removed all original edges to its neighbors and adds new edges to all the rest
vertices. In this case, maxi{Ri} ≤ min{2k, n− 1}, and (5.7) follows.
For Rand Switch, if one edge is deleted, there must be an edge added to the same
vertex. Therefore
1
2
Ri ≤ min{di, n− 1− di},
through which we immediately get
max
i
Ri ≤ 2 min
{
k, max
i
(min{di, n− 1− di})
}
,
and (5.8) follows.
Actually, the bound given in (5.8) is the loose bound in the worst case. It may
not accurately reflect the magnitude of spectrum change. In Section 4, we develop
our spectrum preserving randomization approach which can control the change of
spectrum during the randomization process. Note that all the above results can be
easily extended to the Laplacian matrix with some simple adjustment since L̃− L =
A− Ã = −E.
5.1.2 Spectrum Preserving Randomization
It has been shown that the eigenvalues of a network are intimately connected to
many important topological features. For example, The eigenvalues of A encode
information about the cycles of a network as well as its diameter. The maximum
degree, chromatic number, clique number, and extend of branching in a connected
graph are all related to λ1. In [96], the authors studied how a virus propagates in a
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real work and proved that the epidemic threshold for a network is closely related to
λ1. Refer to [84] for more relationships between the spectral and real characteristics
of graphs.
Since many graph structures are shown to have strong association with the spec-
trum, a very nature idea is whether we can figure out a perturbation strategy such
that one or some particular eigenvalues will not significantly change. Hence the new
strategy is more probable to better preserve structural characteristics without much
scarifying the privacy protection.
Table 5.1: Conditions on adjusting λ1 and µ2 for Spctr Add/Del
Condition Action
xixj − xpxq > 0 λ̃1 > λ1
xixj − xpxq < 0, and
λ1 − λ2 > x
2
i +x
2
j+x
2
p+x
2
q
2(xpxq−xixj)
λ̃1 < λ1
yiyj − ypyq > 0 µ̃2 < µ2
yiyj − ypyq < 0, and
µ3 − µ2 > y
2
i +y
2
j +y
2
p+y
2
q
2(ypyq−yiyj)
µ̃2 > µ2
Table 5.2: Conditions on adjusting λ1 and µ2 for Spctr Switch
Condition Action
(xt − xu)(xv − xw) > 0 λ̃1 > λ1
(xt − xu)(xv − xw) < 0, and
λ1 − λ2 > xt−xuxw−xv + xw−xvxt−xu
λ̃1 < λ1
(yt − yu)(yv − yw) > 0 µ̃2 < µ2
(yt − yu)(yv − yw) < 0, and
µ3 − µ2 > yt−yuyw−yv +
yw−yv
yt−yu
µ̃2 > µ2
From matrix perturbation community, researchers have achieved results on the
intermediate eigenvalue problem of the second type, i.e., how to determine E such
that the eigenvalue λ1 of A + E can be greater or less than that of A. Specifically,
Cvetkovic et al.[25] gave results on how to increase or decrease λ1 of the adjacency
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matrix by constructing the noise matrix E based on the principal eigenvector values
of the adjacency matrix. We list their results in the first two rows of Table 5.1 and
Table 5.2. For example, according to row 1 in Table 5.1, if we add edge (i, j) and
delete edge (p, q) and xixj − xpxq > 0 stands, λ1 necessarily increases. Note that xi
denotes the ith component in the principal eigenvector of λ1.
In our work, we also need to know whether the eigenvalue µ2 of the Laplacian
matrix L of a particular graph G increases or decreases when an edge is relocated.
We derive sufficient conditions on how to adjust µ2 of the Laplacian matrix for two
random strategies Add/Del and Switch. We summarize our results in the last two
rows of Table 5.1. Note that µ2 is the important eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix
L. We use µi and µ̃i to denote the ith smallest eigenvalue of L and L̃ respectively,
and u2 denotes the eigenvector of µ2. yi is the ith component of u2. Next, we give
the proof of the conditions for adjusting µ2.
Proof. Let ui and ũi be the eigenvector corresponding to µi and µ̃i. Consider the
minimum problem:
min
x∈S
{
xT L̃x
}
,
where S =
{
x : xT ũ1 = 0, and ‖x‖2 = 1
}
.
Since u1 = ũ1, u2 ∈ S. Then
min
x∈S
{
xT L̃x
}
≤ uT2 L̃u2 = µ2 − uT2 Eu2
On the other hand, take x to be ũ2, µ̃2 = minx∈S
{
xT L̃x
}
, hence µ̃2 ≤ µ2−uT2 Eu2.
When uT2 Eu2 > 0, µ̃2 < µ2 always holds. With the concrete form of EPM, in Add/Del
strategy:
uT2 Eu2 = 2(yiyj − ypyq),
and in Switch:
uT2 Eu2 = 2(yt − yu)(yv − yw).
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For the rest part of the table, we focus on the Switch strategy. and Add/Del
strategy can be proved similarly by using the corresponding perturbation matrix E.
Denote λi(M) for ith eigenvalues of matrix M sorted in non-decreasing order:
λ1(M) ≤ λ2(M) ≤ · · · ≤ λn(M). We take t = 1, v = 2, u = 3, w = 4 without loss of
generality. Then, with the second part of the theorem, we have (y1−y3)(y2−y4) < 0,
and
E =


0 1 0 −1
1 0 −1 0 ...
0 −1 0 1
−1 0 1 0
· · · 0(n−4)×(n−4)


,
Based on Laplacian matrix, we construct our own Ē and L̄ needed in the proof:
Ē = (δ + 2)I − E, and L̄ = L− (δ + 2)I, where δ > 0 is a parameter. Then,
• Ē is positive definite;
• λi(L̄) = λi(L)− (δ + 2), and λi(L̄) and λi(L) have the same eigenvector;
• L̄+Ē = L−E = L̃, and therefore µ2 = λ2(L̃) = λ2(L̄+Ē) ≥ λ2(L̄+ĒP2) where
P2 is the orthogonal projection onto the subspace spanned by {Ē−1u1, Ē−1u2}.
(see [25] for more details).
With the similar deduction outlined in [25], we can calculate λ2(L̄ + ĒP2) and thus
get a lower bound of µ̃2:
µ̃2 ≥ min{µ2 − 2− δ + γ, µ3 − 2− δ}, (5.9)
where
γ =
δ(2 + δ)(4 + δ)
δ(δ + 4)− 2bδ + 2a (5.10)
and a = (y1 + y2− y3− y4)2, b = (y1− y3)(y4− y2) > 0. γ is an increasing function of
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δ with range (0,∞). We thus can always choose δ > 0 such that γ = µ3 − µ2, then
we rewrite (5.9) asµ̃2 ≥ µ3 − 2− δ.
Next we deduct the condition under which this lower bound is always greater than
µ2, or equivalently the following inequalities and equation always stands:



µ̃2 ≥ µ3 − 2− δ > µ2
γ =
δ(2 + δ)(4 + δ)
δ(δ + 4)− 2bδ + 2a
γ = µ3 − µ2
(5.11)
It is not difficult to show that when γ = µ3 − µ2 > 2 + ab , and (5.11) stands. Since
2 +
a
b
=
(y1 − y3)
(y4 − y2) +
(y4 − y2)
(y1 − y3) ,
when µ3 − µ2 > (y1−y3)(y4−y2) +
(y4−y2)
(y1−y3) , µ̃2 > µ2 stands. The rest parts of the result are
proved.
Based on the derived conditions, we develop our spectrum preserving approach
which can improve the simple edge randomization by considering the change of spec-
trum in the randomization process. Here we can determine which edges we should
add/remove or switch so that we can control the move of target eigenvalues. As a re-
sult, real graph characteristics (or graph utility) are expected to be better preserved.
We show our Spctr Switch algorithm in Algorithm 1.
In Row 2 of Algorithm 1, we only calculate the first one or two eigenvalues of the
corresponding graph matrices. It is not necessary or desirable to calculate the entire
eigen-decomposition. Note that calculation of the eigenvectors of an n × n matrix
takes in general a number of operations O(n3). An efficient Lanczos method [38]
can be applied to find the second eigenvector of a sparse matrix with m/(λ3 − λ2),
where m is the number of edges in the graph. Row 4 gives the loop condition of
repeated switch operations (we will discuss details on J2(k) and the input privacy
protection threshold ε in Section 5.2). Rows from 6 to 11 present how to switch
86
Algorithm 1 Spectrum Preserving Graph Randomization through Edge Switch
Input: graph data G, protection threshold ε
1. Derive the adjacency matrix A and the Laplacian matrix L.
2. Calculate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors (λ1, λ2, e1) of A and (µ2, µ3, u2) of
L respectively.
3. k = 0
4. While J2(k) ≤ 1− ε
5. From graph G, randomly pick one edge (t, w);
6. If k/2 == 0
7. Find all the edge combinations such that λ̃1 > λ1 and µ̃2 > µ2;
8. Randomly pick one (u, v), switch (t, w) and (u, v) to (t, v) and (u,w) ;
9. otherwise
10. Find all the edge combinations such that λ̃1 < λ1 and µ̃2 < µ2;
11. Randomly pick one (u, v), switch (t, w) and (u, v) to (t, v) and (u,w) ;
12. k = k + 1
based on the sufficient conditions listed in Table 5.2. Algorithm can be modified
to Spctr Add/Del with some minor changes: replacing J2(k) with J1(k) in Row 4;
replacing the switch process with the Add/Del process in Row 8 and 11; and finally,
in Row 7 and 10 referring to Table 5.1 for the conditions under which the eigenvalues
increase or decrease.
It is ideal to derive the sufficient conditions on how much one or some particular
eigenvalues will change. This is the problem of estimating changes in eigenvalues
under a wide range of perturbations. The eigenvalues of the perturbed graph can be
determined as implicit functions of algebraic and geometric invariants of the original
graph. However, this problem has not been solved in the matrix perturbation field.
5.1.3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we focus on four real space characteristics of a graph: harmonic
mean of the shortest distance h, modularity Q, transitivity C, and subgraph cen-
trality SC. Figure 5.2 shows spectral randomization can significantly better preserve
both graph spectrum and real space characteristics of the political book graph data
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Figure 5.2: Graph characteristic vs. varying k between Spctr Switch and Rand Switch
set than the previous random perturbation which does not consider spectrum pre-
serving during the perturbation process. Due to space limitations, we only include
comparison between Spctr Switch and Rand Switch. We can see that Spctr Switch can
significantly better keep both spectral characteristics and real characteristics close to
those computed from the original graph even when we increase the number of switches
k to 180. Note that the spectrum preserving approach adjusts both λ1 and µ2. The
intuition here is that the more eigenvalues we control in perturbation, the more real
space characteristics we can preserve in the randomized graph.
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Table 5.3: Change of the measures for the US political blogs graph where the values
in bold font denote the relative change from Spctr Switch while those in regular font
denote the relative change from Rand Switch
k λ1(%) µ2(%) h(%) Q(%) C(%) SC(%)
300 0.35, 0.33 15.24, 15.68 1.24, 1.13 4.25, 3.87 4.83, 4.55 22.59, 21.67
600 0.55, 0.51 25.75, 22.81 1.94, 1.70 8.31, 6.91 9.07, 7.69 33.05, 30.77
900 0.68, 0.58 28.66, 29.83 2.44, 2.01 12.16, 9.33 12.73, 9.88 39.42, 34.06
1200 0.77, 0.60 32.01, 35.18 2.81, 2.17 15.82, 11.26 15.91, 11.49 43.23, 34.57
1500 0.83, 0.58 37.78, 47.38 3.09, 2.26 19.31, 12.94 18.69, 12.65 45.36, 33.04
1800 0.85, 0.49 28.93, 38.11 3.31, 2.27 22.61, 14.22 21.12, 13.35 46.50, 27.76
2100 0.82, 0.41 37.89, 30.05 3.46, 2.25 25.78, 15.49 23.12, 13.89 45.13, 22.58
2400 0.79, 0.31 50.45, 33.37 3.59, 2.25 28.82, 16.72 24.88, 14.35 43.68, 15.90
2700 0.75, 0.23 50.55, 20.22 3.70, 2.24 31.77, 17.92 26.44, 14.78 42.00, 10.55
3000 0.69, 0.14 54.27, 20.35 3.77, 2.19 34.53, 19.01 27.66, 15.07 39.32, 2.48
We also conduct evaluation on a relatively large data set polblogs. Table 5.3 shows
the relative change of the spectrum λ1, µ2 and the real characteristics (including
the harmonic mean of geodesic path h, modularity Q, transitivity C, and subgraph
centrality SC) between Spctr Switch and Rand Switch when we vary k from 300
to 3000. It is easy to observe that Spctr Switch preserve both spectrum and real
characteristics of the graph much better than Rand Switch.
5.2 Markov Chain Based Feature Preserving Randomization
The degree sequence and topological features are of great importance to the graph
structure. One natural idea is that it can better preserve the data utility if the
released graph G̃ preserves the original degree sequence and a certain topological
feature, such as transitivity or average shortest distance. On the other hand, to
preserve data utility, data owners may want to preserve some particular feature S
within a precise range in the released graph. All the graphs that satisfy the degree
sequence d and the feature constraint S form a graph space Gd,S (or Gd if no feature
constraint). Starting with the original graph, series of switches form a Markov chain
that can explore the graph space Gd,S. In [104], we developed an algorithm that can
generate any graph in Gd,S with equal probability.
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Markov Chain. Suppose we have a finite Markov chain on the random variable X,
X has finite states {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, and X t is the random variable at time t. Denote
pij = Pr(X
t+1 = xj|X t = xi),
as the probability that a process at state space xi moves to state xj in a single step
and naturally
∑
j pij = 1. Pr = {pij}M×M is the transition matrix of the Markov
chain with row sums equal to 1.
Lemma 5.2: [69] Suppose that a finite Markov chain on random variable X has M
states x1, x2, . . . , xM , and it satisfies: 1) any two of its states are accessible from each
other, and 2) any state has a positive probability to stay in itself. Then, the Markov
chain has the unique stationary distribution π = (π1, π2, . . . , πM)
T regardless of
the initial state, where:
πi = lim
t→∞
Pr(X t = xi).
Moreover, π satisfies π = P T π, i.e., π is the eigenvector of P T with eigenvalue 1.
We first revisit previous switching based method (shown in Algorithm 2) on gen-
erating graphs without feature constraints. We then extend this method to generate
graphs with feature range constraints.
5.2.1 Graph Generation without Feature Constraints
Algorithm 2 Uniform graph generator [92]
Input: initial graph G0
Output: Gk as one sample
1: for t ← 1 to a large number k do
2: Gt ← SingleSwitch(Gt−1);
3: end for
4: return Gk;
It has been well studied on how to generate graphs uniformly from the ensemble
of all graphs that have the given degree sequence from the original graph. We show
it in Algorithm 2. The algorithm uses a Markov chain to generate a random graph.
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Procedure 1 Single switch
Gt+1 ← SingleSwitch(Gt)
1: r ← a random number from (0, 1);
2: if r ≥ 1/2 then
3: Randomly pick up two edges (a, b) and (c, d) in Gt;
4: if edge (a, b) and (c, d) are switchable then
5: Gt+1 ←switch (a, b) and (c, d) in Gt;
6: end if
7: end if
The method starts from the original graph and involves carrying out a series of Monte
Carlo switching steps whereby a pair of edges (a-b, c-d) is selected at random and
is exchanged to give (a-d, b-c) or (a-c, b-d), illustrated in Figure 5.3. The switches
preserve the degree sequence for all the graphs along the chain. The exchange is only
performed if it generates no multiple edges or self-edges (we call this switchable in
Procedure 1. The entire process is repeated k times. In the following, we explain
that Algorithm 2 can generate graphs uniformly from the ensemble of all graphs that
have the given degree sequence from the original graph.
ca
b d
(a)
ca
b d
(b)
ca
b d
(c)
Figure 5.3: Switch edges
Theorem 5.3: Let Gd be the set of all the graphs with degree sequence d = {d1, d2, . . . , dn}.
Given the starting point G0 ∈ Gd, the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain in
Algorithm 2 is the uniform distribution over Gd.
Each graph in Gd corresponds to a state in the Markov chain. Line 1 and 2 in
Procedure 1 makes all states have positive probabilities to remain in itself. Also, any
two graphs in Gd are accessible from each other by switchings [92], and with Lemma
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5.2, the Markov chain has the unique stationary distribution π satisfying π = P T π.
For two graphs Gi and Gj in Gd,
pij := Pr[G
t+1 = Gj|Gt = Gi] = 1
2m(m− 1) (5.12)
if the two graphs can be reached from each other by a single switch, and pij = 0
otherwise. Naturally pij = pji, i.e., P
T = P , and hence π is the eigenvector of P
with eigenvalue 1. Since P has its row sums equal to 1, P has the uniform stationary
distribution.
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Figure 5.4: 7 graphs with degree sequence {3, 2, 2, 2, 3}
Example: Consider all the 7 graphs with the degree sequence {3, 2, 2, 2, 3}, shown
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in Figure 5.4. Figure 5.4(h) shows their neighbor relations.
With (5.12), we can easily set the transition matrix of the Markov chain for this
example. In P the off-diagonal entry pij(i 6= j) is
pij =



1
60
, if Gi is adjacent to Gj;
0, if Gi is not adjacent to Gj;
(5.13)
and diagonal entries are set so that the row sum is equal to 1. It’s easy to verify that
P in (5.13) has uniform stationary distribution.
We start with graph G1 and apply Algorithm 2 to generate N = 1000 graphs
(k = 500). The fraction of graphs of each type is shown as below.
Graph G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
Count 128 138 158 143 140 144 149
(5.14)
The χ2-statistics can be easily calculated as
χ26 =
7∑
i=1
[Count(Gi)−N/7]2
N/7
= 3.65 (5.15)
and the corresponding p-value1 is 0.7245, which significantly indicates the uniformity
of the generated samples. ¤
Discussion: It is worth pointing out that not all transition matrices can generate
uniformly sampled graphs. For example, to generate a random graph, one might apply
the naive approach: start with G0, for Gt, find all switchable edge pairs, randomly
pick up one pair, switch them and get Gt+1; repeat the above steps. However, this
naive approach cannot produce the uniform distribution because it actually finds all
the neighbors of Gt and those graphs with more neighbors have higher probability to
be generated.
One open theoretical question is how to determine the number of steps k or provide
1p-value is the fraction of test statistic values that are more extreme than that satisfying uniform
distribution.
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bounds for the mixing of the Markov chain so that the chain can approach station-
arity. Theoretical bounds on the mixing time exist only for specific near-regular
sequences. However, it has been shown that for many networks, k = 10m appear to
be adequate [70], and in [94] the author studied how to accelerate the chain. In our
empirical evaluation, we simply set k = 20m to ensure stationarity. Another problem
of applying Markov chain is that there may exist dependence among the generated
samples. There are various methods to reduce the dependence [35].
Estimate Feature Distribution over Gd. Since graphs obtained by Algorithm
2 are from the uniform stationary distribution. One immediate application of the
uniform graph generator is to estimate statistic of features of graphs in Gd or approxi-
mately construct feature distributions. Let S(·) be a graph feature, and G1, G2, . . . , GN
are N samples obtained by Algorithm 2, then the unbiased estimator of E[S(G)] and
V ar[S(G)] over Gd are given by:
µ̂ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
S(Gi), σ̂
2 =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
[S(Gi)− µ̂]2.
Example continued: In our previous example, the transitivity values are
C(G1) = 0, C(G2) = · · · = C(G7) = 1/3,
and the mean and variance of transitivity over Gd can be calculated as E(C) = 0.2857
and V ar(C) = 0.0136. The estimated mean and variance of transitivity from the
sample group (5.14) is µ̂ = 0.2907 and σ̂2 = 0.0124. The 95% confidence interval
for µ̂ is [0.2838, 0.2976], and we can see that the true mean value falls within the
confidence interval. ¤
Furthermore, we can use the sample distribution to approximate the population
distribution. Let f(x) be the p.d.f. of S over Gd. One method to estimate f(x) using
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the generated samples is the kernel density estimator:
f̂h(x) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K
[
x− S(Gi)
h
]
(5.16)
where K(·) denotes the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution and bandwidth h
is the smoothing parameter.
5.2.2 Graph Generation with Feature Range Constraints
In this section, we study the problem of generating a synthetic graph whose feature
S value is within a precise range of that of the original graph2. This is of great
importance for privacy preserving social network analysis where we aim to preserve
both utility and link privacy in the released perturbed graph.
We would emphasize that graphs generated by Algorithm 2 cannot preserve the
utility of the original graph in general. Table 5.4 shows our empirical evaluation
on four real-world social networks. We generate 3000 samples in Gd for each graph
data using our uniform graph generator . For each feature (λ1, µ2, harmonic mean
of geodesic path h, transitivity C), we calculate its sample mean µ̂ and standard
deviation σ̂. We also include the feature values of the original graphs. We can
observe that there are usually large variations (in terms of feature standard deviation)
in generated graphs. So how to generate graphs satisfying feature constraints is of
great importance.
Formally, let Gd,S denote the ensemble of graphs with the given degree sequence d
and the prescribed feature constraint S. Given an initial graph G0 with its S feature
value s0 and a constraint range [s−, s+], we expect to generate a random graph G ∈ Gd
that satisfies S(G) ∈ [s−, s+]. One simple method is to check S(Gt) value at every
switch step. Algorithm 3 outlines this algorithm3.
2In many practical situations, it is infeasible to require that the features (such as the harmonic
mean of the shortest distance or the transitivity measure) are maintained exactly.
3Note that when s0 6∈ [s−, s+], we can simply call uniform generator to reach a graph where
s0 ∈ [s−, s+] and then run Algorithm 3
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Table 5.4: Features of 4 graphs, including the graph value and the sample mean and
standard deviation
Graphs: dolphins Karate Enron polbooks
n 62 34 151 105
m 159 78 869 441
µ̂ 6.90 7.08 17.54 11.90
λ1 σ̂ 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.15
G 7.19 6.73 17.83 11.93
µ̂ 0.45 0.71 0.91 1.62
µ2 σ̂ 0.19 0.17 0.08 0.17
G 0.17 0.47 0.81 0.32
µ̂ 2.26 1.86 2.05 2.11
h σ̂ 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
G 2.53 1.91 2.18 2.46
µ̂ 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.13
C σ̂ 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
G 0.31 0.26 0.34 0.35
Algorithm 3 Graph generator with feature range constraint
Input: G0, [s−, s+], S(G0) ∈ [s−, s+]
Output: Gk as one sample
1: for t ← 1 to a large number k do
2: Gt ← SingleSwitch(Gt−1);
3: if S(Gt) 6∈ [s−, s+] then
4: Gt ← Gt−1;
5: end if
6: end for
7: return Gk;
One interesting question is that when we preserve one feature of the graph, whether
other features can also be preserved. We conduct some empirical evaluations to
address this problem. We generate N = 500 synthetic graphs by Algorithm 3 for each
of four feature range constraints, Sλ1 , Sµ2 , Sh and SC . The range is S(G) ± 0.5σ̂,
where S(G) is the feature of the true graph and σ̂ is the standard deviation of feature
S in Gd (shown in Table 5.4).
For those synthetic graphs, we also compute the means and standard deviations of
other three uncontrolled features. Table 5.5 shows the means and standard deviations
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of the feature values of the generated graphs for four networks. By comparing with
Table 5.4, we can see that when λ1 is constrained (the Sλ1 column) for polbooks, the
µ2, h or C of the generated graphs is not close to the original graph’s. Instead, their
distributions are similar to that of the synthetic graphs generated with no constraints.
However, when µ2 or h is constrained for polbooks, other three features are also well
preserved.
We also observe that preserving µ2 or h does not always preserve other features.
For Enron data set, when µ2 or h is confined within the range, other three features
can be very different from the original graph’s. This phenomenon indicates that
constraining different features has different strength in preserving data utility, and
this effect changes on different data sets.
Another question regarding preserving graph features is that whether attackers
can exploit the feature constraint information to breach the individual privacy. We
examine this problem in the next section.
5.2.3 Link Privacy Analysis
We are interested in how well graph generation can preserve the link privacy. Specif-
ically we investigate how attackers exploit the released graph as well as feature con-
straints 4 to breach link privacy. In Section 5.2.3, we present one attacking method
and empirically show its effectiveness in breaching link privacy.
Attacking Method. Let G and G̃ denote the original graph and the released graph
respectively. To simplify the notation, we also use G and G̃ to denote their corre-
sponding adjacency matrices.
The attacker can calculate the posterior probability of existence of a link by ex-
ploiting the Gd,S (or Gd when there is no feature constraints). Naturally, if many
graphs in Gd,S have an edge at (i, j), the original graph is also very likely to have the
4We assume that data owners need to release the switch strategy and the feature constraints S
for data mining purposes.
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Table 5.5: Feature means and standard deviations of synthetic graphs with feature
constraints
dolpins Karate
Sλ1 Sµ2 Sh SC Sλ1 Sµ2 Sh SC
E(λ1) – 6.96 7.20 7.74 – 7.16 7.35 7.21
σ(λ1) – 0.09 0.09 0.23 – 0.13 0.09 0.09
E(µ2) 0.34 – 0.01 0.27 0.84 – 0.40 0.64
σ(µ2) 0.20 – 0.03 0.18 0.12 – 0.13 0.17
E(h) 2.32 2.28 – 2.41 1.83 1.88 – 1.88
σ(h) 0.05 0.02 – 0.06 0.01 0.02 – 0.02
E(C) 0.14 0.12 0.15 – 0.18 0.24 0.27 –
σ(C) 0.02 0.02 0.03 – 0.02 0.03 0.03 –
polbooks Enron
Sλ1 Sµ2 Sh SC Sλ1 Sµ2 Sh SC
E(λ1) – 11.6 11.9 14.9 – 17.6 18.4 21.3
σ(λ1) – 0.11 0.14 0.50 – 0.16 0.17 0.14
E(µ2) 1.62 – 0.19 1.36 0.91 – 0.10 0.84
σ(µ2) 0.18 – 0.04 0.16 0.10 – 0.10 0.12
E(h) 2.11 2.29 – 2.23 2.07 2.06 – 2.16
σ(h) 0.01 0.02 – 0.02 0.01 0.01 – 0.02
E(C) 0.14 0.24 0.27 – 0.16 0.16 0.18 –
σ(C) 0.01 0.01 0.02 – 0.01 0.01 0.01 –
edge (i, j), and hence
Pr[G(i, j) = 1|Gd,S] = 1|Gd,S|
∑
Gs∈Gd,S
Gs(i, j). (5.17)
Data owner Public
true graph G
Markov chain−−−−−−−−→
with S
G̃ & S
p̂ij
estimate←−−−− G̃1, . . . , G̃N Markov chain←−−−−−−−−
know S
Attacker
Figure 5.5: Graph publishing and attacking process
The attacking method works as follows. Starting with the released graph G̃,
attackers apply the same randomization strategy to generate N samples G̃s (s =
1, 2, . . . , N). Then attackers calculate the posterior probability of existence of a link
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for all node pairs as p̂ij =
1
N
∑N
s=1 G̃s(i, j) and choose top t as predicted links. Figure
5.5 illustrates this attacking methods.
The attacking method works because the convergence of the Markov chain to the
stationary distribution does not depend on the initial point. In other words, starting
with the released graph G̃, attackers can also explore the graph space Gd,S similarly
as starting from the original graph. Since the single switch procedure can uniformly
generate graphs in Gd, for those graphs accessible by the Algorithm 3, they are also
equally likely to be generated. Due to this property, p̂ij is an unbiased estimator of
the posterior probability.
Intuitively, the more strict the constraint is, the closer graphs in Gd,S is to the
original graph. Figure 5.6 shows the attacker’s precisions when the range constraint on
µ2 for polbooks varies from S(G)±0.5σ̂ to S(G)±2σ̂. We compute the precisions of top
t predictions, where t varies from 0.1m to m. We can see that the precision decreases
as the range increases. When the range is S(G)± 2σ̂, the precision approaches that
without constraints. This is obvious, for as the constraints becomes wider, the graph
space Gd,S grows larger and eventually equal to Gd.
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Figure 5.6: Precision of Top t predictions with µ2 confined within different ranges for
polbooks.
Figure 5.7 shows the precisions of top t predictions using four different features.
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We can see that for all the cases, the attacker can achieve high accuracy, especially
for those top 0.2m candidate links. Even when t is increased to m, the precision is
much higher than random guess (with random guess the accuracy should be equal
to the sparse ratio 0.08 for polbooks). Moreover, when µ2 or h is confined within
the range, the attacker can achieve even higher accuracy, and is almost sure that the
top 0.2m candidate links are true links in the original graph. These results indicate
that, by exploiting the graph space, the attacker can effectively breach the individual
privacy.
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Figure 5.7: Precision of top t predictions for polbooks
We can also observe in Figure 5.7 that, when λ1 or transitivity (C) are confined
within the range, the attacker does not achieve accuracy higher than the case with
no constraints, indicating that preserving features does not always jeopardize private
information. We will discuss this phenomenon in the next section.
Features vs. Privacy. From Figure 5.7, we observe that preserving some feature in
the released graph can significantly violate the privacy, while preserving others may
not. We should also point out that, one feature that jeopardizes privacy in one graph
does not necessarily jeopardize privacy in another. We evaluate the attacking method
on other three networks. We can observe from Figure 5.8(c) that, for the Enron
network, unlike the polbook, the attacker can not achieve higher precision when µ2
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or h are preserved. In this section, we discuss about what causes this phenomenon.
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Figure 5.8: Precisions of top t predictions for different networks
Intuitively, we can measure the distance between two graphs in the graph space by
the number of different edges they have. Then, two graphs that have approximately
equal feature values are very likely to have shorter distance to each other.
One measure to denote the distance of two graphs is ‖G1 − G2‖2F , where ‖ · ‖F is
the Frobenius norm. Since G̃s and G have the same number of edges, it is easy to
check that 1
4
‖G̃s −G‖2F is the number of different edges, and we can then define the
relative distance measure between the original graph and the synthetic graph:
d(G̃s, G) =
‖G̃s −G‖2F
2‖G‖2F
=
‖G̃s −G‖2F
4m
. (5.18)
We can see that d(G̃s, G) is the proportion of different edges.
Table 5.6 lists the means and standard deviations of d(G̃s, G) of the attacker’s N
samples for different graphs. We can see that, for polbooks, when λ1 or C is confined
within the range, the mean of d(G̃s, G) is not much different from the case without
constraints. However, when µ2 or h is preserved, the mean of d(G̃s, G) is significantly
smaller than the case without constraints, indicating that graphs whose µ2 or h is
constrained have less edges different from the original graph, and thus release more
private information. This is consistent with our previous result that the attacker can
achieve higher attacking precision when these two features are preserved for polbooks.
However, for Enron network, the means of d(G̃s, G) are approximately equal in all
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cases, indicating that preserving any of the features does not produce graphs closer
to the original one.
Actually, as shown in our next result, the average distance of the graph space to
the true graph directly affects the attacker’s precision:
Result 5.2: Let d̄ denote the expectation of d(G̃s, G) over Gd,S:
d̄ = E[d(G̃s, G)] =
1
|Gd,S|
∑
G̃s∈Gd,S
d(G̃s, G).
When the sample size is large (N →∞), for the true edges (ij ∈ G), we have
∑
i<j,ij∈G
p̂ij → m(1− d̄). (5.19)
Proof. Let G̃s, s = 1, 2, . . . , N be the N samples uniformly from the Gd,S.
1
N
N∑
s=1
‖G̃s −G‖2F =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
s=1
(G̃s −G).2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
(∑
s
G̃.2s − 2G⊗
∑
s
G̃s + NG
.2
)∣∣∣∣∣ ,
(5.20)
where ⊗ and .2 denote the entry-wise multiplication and square respectively, and | · |
denotes the sum of all the elements in the matrix. Since G̃s and G are 0-1 matrices,
we have G̃.2s = G̃s and G
.2 = G, then continue with (5.20), we have
1
N
N∑
s=1
‖G̃s −G‖2F =
∣∣∣∣∣
1
N
∑
s
G̃s − 2G⊗
(
1
N
∑
s
G̃s
)
+ G
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
i,j
pij − 2
∑
ij∈E
pij + 2m
=4m− 2
∑
ij∈E
pij (note
∑
ij pij = 2m).
Therefore,
1
N
N∑
s=1
d(G̃s, G) =
1
N
N∑
s=1
‖G̃s −G‖
4m
= 1− 1
m
∑
i<j,ij∈E
p̂ij.
With the law of large number 1
N
∑N
s=1 d(G̃s, G) → d̄ as N →∞, and we have reached
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the conclusion of (5.19).
From (5.19), we can see that if the constraint S specifies a graph space which
has smaller average distance to the true graph (smaller d̄), the true edges must have
higher estimated posterior probability p̂ij. On the other hand, since
∑
i<j,ij 6∈G
p̂ij +
∑
i<j,ij∈G
p̂ij =
∑
i<j
p̂ij = m,
higher p̂ij for true edges implies that the missing edges in G must have lower p̂ij.
Therefore, when the attacker sorts the node pairs (i, j) by p̂ij in descending order,
the top t candidates contain more true edges and are thus more accurate.
Table 5.6: Means and standard deviations of d(G̃s, G) over different spaces with and
without range constraints
constraint no S Sλ1 Sµ2 Sh SC
dolphins
E(d) .852 .848 .850 .844 .849
σ(d) .025 .024 .025 .030 .025
Karate
E(d) .655 .650 .654 .651 .656
σ(d) .038 .042 .037 .036 .038
polbooks
E(d) .843 .844 .736 .700 .824
σ(d) .015 .015 .017 .018 .033
Enron
E(d) .825 .823 .824 .821 .812
σ(d) .011 .009 .011 .010 .023
5.2.4 Relaxed Graph Generation with Feature Range Constraints
In this section and Section 5.2.5, we present two graph generation algorithms for
the purpose of statistical testing. In the statistical testing, the graph generation
has stricter requirements. For example, the generator should be able to access all
potential graphs so that the testing result is not biased. In some other cases, the
feature values of the generated graphs should follow some prescribed distribution.
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All these problems involve constructing a Markov chain with a required stationary
distribution. The Metropolis-Hastings method [45] is one of the standard methods of
converting a Markov chain with one stationary distribution to another Markov chain
with a different stationary distribution.
Metropolis-Hastings Method. Suppose on the random variable X we have a
Markov chain M with transition matrix P and the stationary distribution π, and
we want to construct a Markov chain M∗ whose stationary distribution is q =
{q1, q2, . . . , qM}. The Metropolis-Hastings method works as follows: suppose at time
t, X t = xi, run Markov chain M and X t+1 = xj, then move to xj with probability
αij = min
(
1,
qjpji
qipij
)
, (5.21)
and stay in xi otherwise. Particularly, if P is symmetric,
αij = min (1, qj/qi) . (5.22)
Generally speaking, the graph generator with feature range constraint shown in
Algorithm 3 may not access all the graphs that satisfies the constraint. To overcome
this problem, we develop a relaxed algorithm in this section. The relaxed algorithm,
shown in Algorithm 4, can access all the graphs in Gd,S and achieve approximate
uniformity.
Algorithm 4 Relaxed graph generator with feature range constraint
Input: G0, [s−, s+], q(·) = ψ[S(·)]
Output: Gk as one sample
1: for t ← 1 to k do
2: Gt ← SingleSwitch(Gt−1);
3: if rand() ≥ min
(
1, q(G
t)
q(Gt−1)
)
then
4: Gt ← Gt−1
5: end if
6: end for
7: return Gk;
We modify Algorithm 2 into a Markov chain with q(·) as its stationary distribution.
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In generating graphs, q(G) is the probability that a graph G is produced by the relaxed
generator, and q(G) should be high for those graphs in Gd,S and should be low for
those graphs not in Gd,S. Generally speaking, we can choose
q(G) =
ψ[S(G)]
K
, (5.23)
where ψ(·) is a positive function over the real axis such that it decreases on [s0, +∞)
and increases on (−∞, s0] and K is a normalizer to ensure
∑
G∈Gd q(G) = 1. Notice
that Line 3 indicates Algorithm 4 only depends on the ratio of two probabilities, we
can simply set
q(G) ← ψ[S(G)]. (5.24)
The transition matrix in Algorithm 2 is symmetric, and we can thus set the ac-
ceptance ratio q(Gt)/q(Gt−1) as (5.22). The connectivity of the Markov chain in
Algorithm 4 is guaranteed for the acceptance ratio must be positive. Hence the chain
can reach any graph in Gd,S.
One way of choosing ψ(·) is to choose the p.d.f. of a normal distribution with mean
equal to s0:
ψ(s) =



1
σ1
√
2π
exp
[
− (s−s0)2
2σ21
]
, if s ≥ s0
1
σ2
√
2π
exp
[
− (s−s0)2
2σ22
]
, if s < s0
(5.25)
where σ1 =
s0−s−
2
and σ1 =
s+−s0
2
. When s0 6∈ [s−, s+], we can simply substitute s0
with s−+s+
2
in (5.25). When we set ψ(·) as
ψ(s) =



1 if s ∈ [s−, s+]
0 otherwise
(5.26)
we get Algorithm 3. We can see that Algorithm 3 is a special case of the relaxed
generator.
Theoretical Discussion. One theoretical question regarding to our relaxed gener-
ator is what are the feature distributions of the generated graphs. Actually, for the
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relaxed generator, the distribution of S(G)depends on both our choice of ψ(·) and
the natural distribution f(x) of feature S.
Property 5.1: Suppose that graph G is generated by the relaxed graph generator
with feature range constraint (Algorithm 4) whose q(·) is set as (5.23), then S(G) has
the distribution with p.d.f. 1
Ef [ψ(s)]
ψ(s)f(s) where Ef [ψ(s)] denote the expectation of
ψ(s) under p.d.f. f(·).
Proof. Note that f(s)|Gd| is the number of graphs in Gd whose S value equal to s,
and each such graph will be generated with probability ψ(s)
K
. Hence we have
Pr[s(G) = s] =
ψ(s)
K
f(s)|Gd|, (5.27)
Then for any interval [a, b], we have
Pr[a ≤ S(G) ≤ b] = |Gd|
K
∫ b
a
ψ(s)f(s)ds. (5.28)
Let the range be the whole real axis, then
1 = Pr[S(G) ∈ R] = |Gd|
K
∫
R
ψ(s)f(s)ds =
|Gd|
K
Ef [ψ(s)],
and we have K = |Gd|Ef [ψ(s)]. Combining this with (5.28), we have the property
proved.
From Property 5.1, we can know that for any two graphs G1, G2 ∈ Gd satisfying
ψ[S(G1)] = ψ[S(G2)], they have the same probability to be generated by Algorithm
4. If ψ(·) is a continuous function, q(G1) ≈ q(G2) when S(G1) ≈ S(G2).
We also know that not all graphs generated by the relaxed generator have their S
values within the range. According to Property 5.1, if graph G is from the relaxed
generator, we have
Pr(G ∈ Gd,S) = 1
Ef [ψ(s)]
∫ s+
s−
ψ(s)f(s)ds. (5.29)
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We can see that low value of f(x) over [s−, s+] reduces the probability in (5.29).
Given the graph space Gd and the range [s−, s+], f(x) over the range is determined,
and we can then increase ψ(·) over the range to improve the probability in (5.29).
When we choose ψ(·) as (5.26), we have that the relaxed generator will then always
on a graph within the range, for the probability in (5.29) is always equal to 1.
Figure 5.9 illustrates two choices of ψ(·). ψ(·) is the p.d.f. of a normal distribution
as shown in (5.25). To make the discussion easy, we assume s0 =
s−+s+
2
, then σ1 = σ2.
If we choose a small σ as ψ1(·), ψ1(·) is large over [s−, s+] and the relaxed generator
has higher probability to generate a graph in Gd,S. However, the value of ψ(·) changes
more dramatically within the range, which reduces the uniformity of the generated
graphs. When σ is large as ψ2(·), ψ(·) does not change greatly over the range and we
can guarantee the uniformity, but it reduces the probability that the generated graph
is in Gd,S.
s
−
s
+
←ψ
1
(x)
←ψ
2
(x)
Figure 5.9: Choice of ψ(·)
5.2.5 Graph Generation with Feature Distribution Constraints
In this Section, we study the generator that can generate graphs whose feature
value satisfies a prescribed distribution.
Let g(x) denote the p.d.f. of the target distribution of feature S. On the other
hand, S has its own p.d.f. f(x) over Gd. Algorithm 5 outlines the graph generator
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with feature distribution constraint.
Algorithm 5 Graph generator with feature distribution constraint
Input: G0, g(·), f(·)
Output: Gk as one sample
1: for t ← 1 to k do
2: Gt ← SingleSwitch(Gt−1);
3: if rand() ≥ min
(
1, g[S(G
t)]f [S(Gt−1)]
g[S(Gt−1)]f [S(Gt)]
)
then
4: Gt ← Gt−1
5: end if
6: end for
7: return Gk;
From Property 5.1, we know that given any input function ψ(x), the generated
distribution of S value has the p.d.f. as 1
Ef [ψ(x)]
ψ(x)f(x). By replacing ψ(x) with g(x)
f(x)
in (5.29), we have
Ef [ψ(s)] = Ef
[
g(x)
f(x)
]
=
∫ +∞
−∞
g(x)
f(x)
f(x)dx = 1.
Then also from (5.29) we have
Pr[S(G) ≤ x] = 1
Ef [ψ(s)]
∫ x
−∞
g(t)
f(t)
f(t)dt
=
∫ x
−∞
g(t)dt,
and then the p.d.f. of S value is equal to g(x). Hence, by setting q(·) in (5.22) as
q(G) ← g[S(G)]/f [S(G)], (5.30)
we can achieve the target distribution in Algorithm 5. We would like to point out
that, if we know that statistic S has uniform distribution over Gd, (5.30) is reduced
to set q(G) ← g[S(G)]. However, generally speaking, statistic S is not uniformly
distributed and we can not just set q(G) ← g[S(G)].
Example continued: Continue with the previous example. In Gd, G1 has transi-
tivity value 0 and the remaining six graphs have the same transitivity value 1
3
. The
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probability function of transitivity in Gd is
C value 0 1/3
f(x) 1/7 6/7
Suppose that we want to generate a series of graphs in Gd so that the required prob-
ability function g(x) on transitivity to be:
C value 0 1/3
g(x) 0.4 0.6
(5.31)
We set q(·) as in (5.30): q(Gi) = g[C(Gi)]/f [C(Gi)]. Let Q denote the transition
matrix of this Markov chain, then Qij = pij ×min{1, q(Gj)/q(Gi)} for i 6= j, and set
the diagonal entries so that Q has row sums equal to 1:
Q = 10−2 ×


97.50 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
1.67 93.33 1.67 1.67 0 0 1.67
1.67 1.67 93.33 0 1.67 1.67 0
1.67 1.67 0 93.33 1.67 1.67 0
1.67 0 1.67 1.67 93.33 0 1.67
1.67 0 1.67 1.67 0 93.33 1.67
1.67 1.67 0 0 1.67 1.67 93.33


.
We can verify that the stationary distribution of the new Markov chain is
(0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1),
which makes the transitivity distributed as shown in (5.31). We apply Algorithm 5
on this example, and sample group (5.32) lists 1000 samples (k = 500):
Graph G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
Count 399 90 93 109 97 105 107
(5.32)
Comparing sample group (5.32) with the stationary distribution, we have the χ2-
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statistics equal to 3.1325 with its p-value equal to 0.7920, which indicates the gener-
ated graphs well match the target distribution. ¤
5.2.6 Empirical Evaluation
µµ−2σ µ+2σ
(a) uniform
µµ−2σ µ+2σ
(b) double-triangle
Figure 5.10: Target distributions g(x)
We apply Algorithm 5 on graph polbooks to simulate two distributions for four
features: λ1, µ2, harmonic mean of shortest distance (h), and transitivity (C). The
first distribution is the uniform distribution on interval [µ̂− 2σ̂, µ̂ + 2σ̂], where µ̂ and
σ̂ are the sample mean and standard deviation of graph polbooks from Table 5.4.
The second distribution is a double-triangle-shaped distribution:
g(x) =
|x− µ̂|
4σ̂2
, x ∈ [µ̂− 2σ̂, µ̂ + 2σ̂].
The shapes of the two target distributions are shown in Figure 5.10. Both of them are
very different from the features’ natural distributions f(x). When applying Algorithm
5, we need to know the natural distribution of those features f(x), and we use the
kernel density estimator shown in (5.16) to estimate f(x) from the 3000 uniformly
generated samples. Figure 5.11 shows the distributions of the four features of the 500
generated samples (k = 6000) using Algorithm 5. We can observe from Figure 5.11
that all the four features of generated samples match well the target distributions
(shown in Figure 5.10).
In many practical cases that some feature distribution f(·) over Gd is unknown,
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the cost of estimating f(·) can be high since we need to generate a large number of
uniformly sampled graphs. To reduce the cost, we may simply specify f(·) as some
a-priori distribution (e.g., normal or uniform distribution) although it may sacrifice
the accuracy of feature target distribution of the generated samples.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we develop two types of feature-preserving graph randomization
procedures. The first type is the spectrum preserving graph randomization proce-
dures, Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch, which can better preserve graph character-
istics via preserving two eigenvalues of graph matrices, λ1 and µ2. The second type
of graph randomization procedure we presented is a simple switching based graph
generator which can preserve any feature of a real graph specified by users. We then
investigate the potential disclosure of sensitive links due to the preserved features.
Based on Metropolis-Hastings sampling, our graph generator can be easily modified
to generate synthetic graphs whose features satisfy a given distribution. This is of
great importance for significance testing of network analysis results.
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Figure 5.11: Feature distributions of generated graphs with feature distribution con-
straints shown in Figure 5.10 for polbooks.
CHAPTER 6: SPECTRAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS
In Chapter 5, we discussed the spectrum-preserving randomization procedures that
can preserve graph features via preserving some graph spectra. In this chapter, we
conduct more studies on the relation between the graph spectrum and the topological
patterns of the graph. One general question is that what information about the graph
the spectrum decodes. The real-world social networks are very different from the
random ones. As we apply randomization to a real-world graph, the graph approaches
to a random one. Then, can the graph spectrum captures the change from a real-world
graph to a random one? How can we measure the difference between a real-world
graph (or a randomized one) and a pure random one? In this chapter, we develop a
consistent framework to measure the randomness at the edge, node, subgraph, and
the overall graph level. The measures are based on the adjacency spectral space.
We further develop a community partition algorithm utilizing the adjacency spectral
geometry.
Let λi be the i-th largest eigenvalues of A and xi the corresponding eigenvectors,
and λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn. The spectral decomposition of A is A =
∑
i λixix
T
i . Let xi
be the unit eigenvector of λi and let xij denote the j’th entry of xi.
As shown in (6.1), the eigenvector xi is represented as a column vector. The row
vector (x1u, x2u, · · · , xnu) represents the coordinates of node u in the n-dimensional
spectral space. In Section 6.1, we show that only the coordinates of node u in the first
k-dimensional spectral space determine the randomness of u where k indicates the
number of communities within the graph. Hence we define αu = (x1u, x2u, . . . , xku) ∈
R1×k as the spectral coordinate of node u in the k-dimensional space.
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x1 xi xk xn
↓
αu →


x11 · · · xi1 · · · xk1
...
...
...
x1u · · · xiu · · · xku
...
...
...
x1n · · · xin · · · xkn
· · · xn1
...
· · · xnu
...
· · · xnn


(6.1)
In Section 6.1, we introduce the graph spectral geometry and its relationship with
the graph topology, especially the community structure. Based on the graph spectral
patterns, in Section 6.2, we develop a consistent framework to measure the random-
ness contained in the graph at the edge, node, sub-graph to the overall graph level.
We compare the graph patterns in the adjacency spectral space with those in other
spectral spaces in Section 6.3. We report our evaluation results in Section 6.4. In Sec-
tion 6.5, we present a community partition algorithm based on the adjacency spectral
geometry. Some of the results in this Chapter are also reported in [105, 108].
6.1 Graph Spectral Geometry
In this section, we explore how the spectral coordinate (α) of a node point locates
in the projected spectral space. Especially we show that node points locate along k
quasi-orthogonal lines when graph G contains k communities 1.
Proposition 6.1: For a graph with k communities, the coordinate of node u in k-
dimensional space, αu = (x1u, x2u, . . . , xku) ∈ R1×k, denotes the likelihood of node
u’s attachment to these k communities. Node points within one community form a
line that goes through the origin in the k-dimensional space. Nodes in k communities
form k quasi-orthogonal lines in the spectral space.
1Communities are loosely defined as collections of individuals who interact unusually frequently.
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Proof. Consider the division of a graph G into k non-overlapping communities G1, G2, . . . , Gk.
Let si = (si1, si2, . . . , sin) be the index vector of community Gi, and sij equals to 1 if
node j belongs to community Gi and 0 otherwise. Note that si and sj are mutually
orthogonal, i.e., sTi sj = 0.
For community Gi, we can define its density as
D(Gi) :=
# of edges in Gi
# of nodes in Gi
.
It can be expressed as
D(Gi) =
sTi Asi
sTi si
where A is the adjacency matrix of graph G. The density for this division of the
graph is
k∑
i=1
D(Gi) =
k∑
i=1
sTi Asi
sTi si
(6.2)
The task of our graph partition is to maximize (6.2) subject to sij ∈ {0, 1} and
sTi sj = 0, if i 6= j. This optimization problem is NP-complete. However, if we relax
sij ∈ {0, 1} to real space, based on the Wielandt’s theory [90], we have that the target
function reaches the maximum
∑k
i=1 λi when taking si to be xi.
Replacing A with
∑
i λixix
T
i in (6.2), we can derive that
∑k
i=1 D(Gi) would be
maximized by choosing the si proportional to the ith eigenvector xi of the adjacency
matrix when we relax the basic constraint sij ∈ {0, 1}. Hence we can conclude that
xij reflects the degree of node j’s attachment to the community Gi.
Property 6.1: A node u belongs to one community Gt if the tth entry of αu, xtu, is
much greater than the rest entries and xiu ≈ 0 for i 6= t.
A node u does not belong to any community if all the entries of αu are close to 0,
or equivalently, ‖α‖2 ≈ 0. We call such nodes noise nodes.
Property 6.2: If nodes u and v belong to the same community, then
| cos(αu, αv) |≈ 1.
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If nodes u and v belong to two different communities respectively, then
| cos(αu, αv) |≈ 0.
Otherwise, if node u belongs to one community Gt and bridging node v locates in
the overlap of two communities Gt and Gw, then | cos(αu, αv) | is not close to either
0 or 1.
Explanation. Notice that
cos(αu, αv) =
αuα
T
v
‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 .
When node u and v are in the same community Gt, xtu, we have that xtv is much
greater than the rest entries in αu and αv. Hence
αuα
T
v
‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 =
∑k
i=1 xiuxiv(∑k
i=1 x
2
iu
) 1
2
(∑k
i=1 x
2
iv
) 1
2
≈ xtuxtv|xtu||xtv| = ±1.
In other words, points αu and αv approximately locate along a straight line that goes
through the origin.
Similarly, when node u and v are in two different communities Gt and Gw respec-
tively, with xwu ≈ 0 and xtv ≈ 0, we have
αuα
T
v
‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 ≈
xtuxtv + xwuxwv
|xtu||xwv| ≈ 0,
which means that αu and αv are approximately orthogonal.
If a bridging node v is in the overlap of two communities St and Sw, both tth and
wth entries in αv are not negligible. Hence, ‖αv‖2 ≈ (x2tv + x2wv)
1
2 . For a node u from
Gt, we have ∣∣αuαTv
∣∣
‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 ≈
|xtuxtv|
|xtu| (x2tv + x2wv)
1
2
=
|xtv|
(x2tv + x
2
wv)
1
2
.
Since neither xtv nor xwv is close to 0, | cos(u, v)| is not close to either 1 or 0, which
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indicates that bridging nodes locate between the quasi-orthogonal lines formed by
communities, and are also away from the origin.
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Figure 6.1: A synthetic network with 3 communities and its spectral coordinates
projected in 3-D plot.
Figure 6.1(b) shows the 3-D spectral geometries of a synthetic network as shown
in Figure 6.1(a). In Figure 6.1(a), there exist three dense subgraphs (denoted by red,
blue and pink color respectively), which are separated by one bridging node (node 61,
denoted by a white triangle), in addition to some random nodes (denoted by green
color). We can observe from Figure 6.1(b) that nodes in the three dense subgraphs are
projected along three straight and quasi-orthogonal lines in the 3-D spectral space
and nodes in green locate around the origin in the projected space. We can also
observe that node 61 (white triangle), which bridges the three communities, locates
away from the origin and among the three quasi-orthogonal lines.
6.2 A Framework of Measuring Graph Non-randomness
In this section, we present our framework which can quantify randomness at all
granularity levels from edge, node, subgraph, to the overall graph. We begin with
a study of edge non-randomness by spectral coordinates of its two connected nodes
in the spectral space. We then define the node non-randomness as the sum of non-
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randomness values of all edges that connect to it. Similarly, we define the overall
graph (subgraph) non-randomness as the sum of non-randomness values of all edges
within the the whole graph (subgraph). The formal definition is given below.
Definition 6.1: Denote αu = (x1u, x2u, . . . , xku) ∈ Rk as the spectral coordinate of
node u and αv = (x1v, x2v, . . . , xkv) ∈ Rk as the spectral coordinate of node v.
1. The edge non-randomness R(u, v) is defined as
R(u, v) = αuα
T
v =
k∑
i=1
xiuxiv.
2. The node non-randomness R(u) is defined as
R(u) =
∑
v∈Γ(u)
R(u, v),
where Γ(u) denotes the neighbor set of node u.
3. Let G1 be a subgraph of G(V, E) with node set V1 ⊆ V and edge set E1 ⊆ E.
The subgraph non-randomness R(G1) (with respect to the G) is defined as:
R(G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
R(u, v). (6.3)
4. The graph non-randomness RG is defined as
RG =
∑
(u,v)∈E
R(u, v).
Throughout this section, we use polbooks network as an example to illustrate how we
define and calculate graph non-randomness at various levels. Figure 6.2(b) shows the
2-D spectral geometries of the politics book network data. We can observe from Figure
6.2(b) that the majority of vertices projected in the 2-D spectral space distribute along
two straight and quasi-orthogonal lines. It indicates that there exist two communities
with sparse edges connecting them. The first up-trend line consists of most nodes in
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Figure 6.2: Politics book social network
red color while the second down-trend line consists of most nodes in blue color. White
nodes distribute either around the origin or between two quasi-orthogonal lines in the
projected space.
6.2.1 Edge Non-randomness: R(u, v)
From Section 6.1, we know that the spectral coordinates of a node reflect its relative
attachment to different communities in G. When it comes to the measure of non-
randomness of an edge that connects two nodes, intuitively, we need to incorporate
the relationship of two nodes’ spectral vectors.
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Figure 6.3: Snapshot of different types of edges characterized by edge non-randomness
of politics book network
The edge non-randomness measure R(u, v) in Definition 1 can be rewritten as
R(u, v) = ‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 cos(αu, αu),
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which is determined by the product of ‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 and the cosine of the angle between
αu and αu. Generally, R(u, v) tends to be large when u and v are clearly belong to the
same community (since cos(αu, αu) ≈ 1). R(u, v) tends to be small when 1) u and v
are from two different communities (since cos(αu, αu) ≈ 0); 2) or either node (or both
nodes) is noisy (since ‖αu‖2‖αv‖2 ≈ 0). This intuitively reflects the formation of real
world social networks: two individuals within the same community have relatively
higher probability to be connected than those in different communities.
Figure 6.3(a) plots the distribution of edge non-randomness values, where x-axis
is the cosine value between αu and αv while y-axis denotes the product of the two
vector lengths. Figure 6.3(b) shows a snapshot of different types of 441 edges char-
acterized by edge non-randomness values of politics book network. We can observe
that distributions of edge non-randomness values characterized by different regions
reflect different types of edges in the original graph: edges with large cosine value
(plotted along the vertex line x = 1 and denoted by the blue ’+’) mostly connect two
nodes within the same community; edges with small vector length product (green ’+’
and plotted along the line y = 0) mostly connect to non-central nodes; edges plotted
in other area forms bridging edges between the two communities. All the above is
consistent with our previous explanations in Section 6.1.
6.2.2 Node Non-randomness: R(u)
A node’s non-randomness is characterized by the non-randomness of edges con-
nected to this node. This is well understood since edges in social networks often
exhibit patterns that indicate properties of the nodes such as the importance, rank,
or category of the corresponding individuals. Result 6.1 shows how to calculate the
node non-randomness using the spectral coordinates as well as the first k eigenvalues
of the adjacency matrix.
Result 6.1: The non-randomness of node u is the length of its spectral vector with
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eigenvalue weighted on corresponding dimensions:
R(u) =
∑k
i=1λix
2
iu = αuΛkα
T
u , (6.4)
where Λk = diag{λ1, λ2, . . . , λk}.
Proof. Let au denote the u’th row of the adjacency matrix A. Since xi satisfies
Axi = λixi and A is symmetric,


a1
...
an


xi = Axi = λi


xi1
...
xin


.
Hence, auxi = λixiu, and we have
R(u) =
∑
v∈Γ(u)
R(u, v) =
n∑
v=1
k∑
i=1
auvxiuxiv
=
k∑
i=1
(
xiu
n∑
v=1
auvxiv
)
=
k∑
i=1
xiuauxi =
k∑
i=1
λix
2
iu = αuΛkα
T
u .
We can see that the result is elegant since the node non-randomness is actually
determined by its vector length weighted by eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix.
Using node non-randomness measure, we can easily separate singleton nodes 2
and noise nodes (with small R(u) values) from those nodes strongly attached to some
community (with large R(u) values). We can also identify those nodes bridging across
several groups by examining its relative positions to orthogonal lines corresponding
to different communities.
Comparison with HITS. Our node non-randomness R(u) can be used to identify
2The singletons are degree-zero nodes who joined the network but have never made an interaction
with another user in the social network.
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those non-random individuals. However, it is different from those traditional link
based object ranking methods based on centrality measures. For example, HITS
algorithm [55] uses the principle eigenvector to assign authority/hub scores to each
node. For undirected social networks, since A is now symmetric, authority and hub
scores are the same, which are the principle eigenvector of A2. Denote A = XΛXT as
the eigen-decomposition of A. Since X is orthogonal, A2 = XΛ2X, the authority/hub
scores from HITS algorithm in undirected networks are equivalent to the entries of
x1. Therefore, if we are sure that the graph has only one community, our measure is
reduced to the HITS score. However, many real-world graphs contain more then one
community.
Table 6.1: Comparison of top 10 non-random nodes identified by R(u) and HITS.
HITS label R(u) label
85 liberal 9 conservative
74 liberal 13 conservative
73 liberal 85 liberal
31 liberal 74 liberal
67 liberal 73 liberal
75 liberal 4 conservative
76 liberal 31 liberal
77 neutral 67 liberal
87 liberal 12 conservative
72 liberal 75 liberal
Table 6.1 compares the difference between the top 10 non-random nodes identified
by our measure and the those identified by HITS for polbooks network. We can observe
from the Table 6.1 that top 10 nodes identified by our measures include important
nodes from two communities while HITS only identifies nodes from one community.
This is because HITS uses x1 only, the scores only reflect relative positions of points
along the x1-axis in Figure 6.2(b). Hence they can only discover central nodes in one
community (labeled as liberal) with the highest density. On the contrary, our node
non-randomness measure, which uses the weighted vector length in the k-dimensional
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spectral space, can successfully discover non-random nodes from all k communities.
This empirical evaluation indicates our node non-random measure is different from
the traditional centrality measures used to rank nodes.
6.2.3 Graph Non-randomness RG and Relative Non-randomness R
∗
G
In our framework, the graph non-randomness RG is defined as the sum of non-
randomness values of all edges within the graph. Result 6.2 shows RG can be directly
calculated using the first k eigenvalues.
Result 6.2: The graph non-randomness of the overall graph G can be calculated as
RG =
∑
(u,v)∈E
R(u, v) =
∑
u∈G
R(u) =
k∑
i=1
λi (6.5)
Proof. The second equation is straightforward. For the third equation, denote X as
(x1, x2, . . . , xk) where each column is an eigenvector of A: Axi = λixi, hence we have
∑
(u,v)∈E
R(u, v) =
∑
u,v
auvαuα
T
v = trace(X
T AX) =
k∑
i=1
λi.
The above result is elegant since we can use the sum of the first k eigenvalues
to determine the non-randomness of the overall graph. Recall that k indicates the
number of communities in the graph. In this paper, we assume the value of k is either
specified by domain users or discovered by those graph partition methods. There are
tons of work on how to partition graph into k communities (refer to a survey paper
[16]).
Chung and Graham indicated the use of the largest eigenvalue λ1 as an index of
the non-randomness of the overall graph since the first eigenvalue of random graphs
characterizes the frequency of subgraphs [21]. Our analysis shows that λ1 may not be
an appropriate measure to quantify the graph non-randomness for real-world social
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networks since they usually contain more than one communities. Actually, we can
see that the index of graph non-randomness using λ1 is a special case of our proposed
measure RG with k = 1.
All real networks lie somewhere between the extremes of complete order and com-
plete randomness. While the absolute non-randomness measure RG can indicate how
random a graph G is, it is more desirable to give a relative measure so that graphs
with different size and density can be compared. One intuitive approach is comparing
the graph’s non-randomness value with the expectation of non-randomness value of
all random graphs generated by ER model. We can use the standardized measure
defined as
R∗G =
RG − E(RG)
σ(RG)
where E(RG) and σ(RG) denote the expectation and standard deviation of the graph
non-randomness under ER model. Our Theorem 6.1 shows the distribution of RG.
Theorem 6.1: For a graph G with k(¿ n) communities where each community
is generated by ER model with parameter n
k
and p, then RG has an asymptotically
normal distribution with mean (n−2k)p+k and variance 2kp(1−p) where p = 2km
n(n−k) .
Proof. In G each community has n/k nodes, and hence
p =
2m
k n
k
(n
k
− 1) =
2km
n(n− k) .
Let λi be the largest eigenvalue of the ith community (i = 1, 2, . . . , k), then RG =
∑k
i=1 λi. Since λi has the asymptotical normal distribution with mean (
n
k
− 2)p + 1
and variance 2p(1 − p)[34], then RG also has the asymptotical normal distribution
with mean and variance as in the theorem.
With Theorem 6.1, we directly have the following result.
Result 6.3: The relative non-randomness of the overall graph G(n,m) can be cal-
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culated as
R∗G =
RG − [(n− 2k)p + k]√
2kp(1− p) , (6.6)
where p = 2km
n(n−k) .
For any two graphs, G1 and G2, if |R∗G1 | < |R∗G2 |, we can conclude that G1 is more
random than G2. Since the relative non-randomness measure R
∗
G of ER graph approx-
imately follows the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and standard variance
1, we can use 1−Φ(R∗G) to indicate the similarity between this graph and a random
graph, where Φ(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard nor-
mal distribution. Given a significance level α, when R∗G =
RG−[(n−2k)p+k]√
2kp(1−p) ≥ Φ
−1(1−α),
we can safely reject that G is a random graph.
r−regular 0
 ER−graph
R
G
* l−complete
← ≈ 1−Φ(R
G
* )
Figure 6.4: Relative non-randomness measure and its distribution
The relative measure indicates to what extent one real world graph is different
from random graphs in terms of probability. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, when R∗G
is close to 0, the graph G tends to be more likely generated by ER model. From
the statistical hypothesis testing point of view, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that G is generated by ER model. On the contrary, when R∗G is far away from 0, it
indicates the graph G is towards extreme ordered graph. We can safely reject the null
hypothesis since 1−Φ(R∗G) (denoted as the gray region in Figure 6.4) is significantly
small.
125
Another interesting property illustrated in Figure 6.4 is that R∗G of any graph
is lower (upper) bounded by that of r-regular (l-complete) graph respectively. For
graphs G(n,m) with k communities, we define the r-regular graph as a graph with
each node having r neighbors and the l-complete graph here as a graph where each
community is a clique of l nodes.
Theorem 6.2: For any graph G(n,m) with k communities, we have
R∗Gr−regular ≤ R∗G ≤ R∗Gl−complete
where R∗Gr−regular and R
∗
Gl−complete denote the relative non-randomness value of r-
regular graph and l-complete graph respectively. Similarly, we have
RGr−regular ≤ RG ≤ RGl−complete
Their expressions are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Non-randomness measure for different graphs with the same (n,m) and k
communities
Graph, p = 2km
n(n−k) RG R
∗
G
ER model (n− 2k)p + k 0
r-regular
(m = krn
2
)
kr − k√
2kp(1−p)
l-complete
(m = kl(l−1)
2
)
k(l − 1) kl−(n−2k)p−2k√
2kp(1−p)
Proof. We first prove the case k = 1. When k = 1, RG = λ1. Let dmin, dmax and
d̄ be the minimum, maximum, and the average degree. We have the following two
inequalities [24]:
dmin ≤ d̄ = 2m
n
≤ λ1 ≤ dmax (6.7)
λ1 ≤
√
2m− n− 1 (6.8)
Assume that m = rn/2 for some integer r, then we can construct a r-regular graph
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with m edges. In r-regular graph d̄ = 2m
n
= dmax = r, with Inequality (6.7), we have
RG = λ1 = r. Since for any graph with the same parameters, we have λ1 ≥ 2mn .
Hence the r-regular graph has the smallest non-randomness value.
The relative non-randomness measure is
R∗Gr−regular =
r − (n− 2)p− 1√
2p(1− p) , (6.9)
where p = r
n−1 for r-regular graph. When n is large, we can further simplify (6.9) as:
R∗Gr−regular = −
1√
2p(1− p) .
Assume that m = l(l−1)
2
for some integer l, then we can construct a complete graph
with node 1, 2, . . . , l, leaving the rest nodes isolated. Then, RGl−complete = l− 1. Since
any graph with the same parameters must involve no less than l non-isolated nodes,
and with Inequality (6.8), we have
λ1 ≤
√
2m− l − 1 = l − 1.
Hence the l-complete graph reaches the upper bound. Its relative non-randomness is
straightforwardly derived from the definition.
When k > 1, it is easy to verify that the minimum and maximum are reached
when the graph has k equal-sized r-regular graphs or l-complete graphs. We have the
theorem proved.
Discussion. When it comes to a graph with one community, our graph non-randomness
measure RG is reduced as λ1 as shown in 6.5. It has been shown in [34] that the largest
eigenvalue has asymptotically the normal distribution with mean (n − 2)p + 1 and
variance 2p(1 − p) when graph G follows ER model with parameter n and p. This
can be considered as a special case of our results shown in Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.2 shows that r-regular graph and l-complete graph are most non-random
graphs among all graphs G(n,m). The relative non-randomness value of r-regular
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Figure 6.5: Upper and lower bounds of R∗G for graphs with n = 30, k = 1, and varying
m
graph reaches the largest negative value while that of l-complete graph reaches the
largest positive value. Recall that the expectation of the relative non-randomness
value of ER graphs is 0. Figure 6.5 illustrates how the relative non-randomness values
of r-regular graph and l-complete graph vary when the density of graph increases.
Note that the number of nodes across all graphs is fixed (n = 30). When we increase
the number of edges, the range determined by the bounds decreases. In the extreme
case of m = 435, both relative non-randomness values are zero since the graph is a
fully complete graph.
6.2.4 Subgraph Non-randomness R(G1)
Let G1 denote a subgraph of G(V, E) with node set V1 ⊆ V and edge set E1 ⊆
E, |V1| = n1 and |E1| = m1. The subgraph non-randomness measure is R(G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1 R(u, v). It can indicate how much the subgraph G1 contributes to the non-
randomness of the whole graph.
For example, in the polbook network, a subgraph G1 with 53 nodes and 230 edges
(formed by choosing 50% of the nodes with the highest degrees and all the edges
among them), R(G1) = 17.86. Compared with the non-randomness of the whole
graph RG = 23.55, G1 with only
230
441
= 52.2% edges accounts for 17.86
23.55
= 75.8% of
the non-randomness of the whole graph. It indicates that G1 makes a significant
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contribution to the whole graph structure.
One natural question is what is the relationship between R(G1) and RG1 . The later
RG1 denotes the graph non-randomness when we regard G1 as an independent graph.
Lemma 6.1: Let G1 be a subgraph of G, given the same k as G, we have R(G1) ≤
RG1 .
Proof. First, we give a slightly different version of Corollary IV.4.4 in [90] as a lemma.
Lemma 6.2: Let X ∈ Rn×k have orthogonal columns. Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn be
the eigenvalues of symmetric matrix A, and µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µk be the eigenvalues of
XT AX, then for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, λi ≥ µi.
Let A1 denote the adjacency matrix of G1, and let µi be the i-th largest eigenvalue
of A1 with eigenvector yi. Then, we have
R(G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
R(u, v) =
∑
u,v∈V1
auvαuα
T
v
= trace

XT


A1 0
0 0

 X

 = trace(M).
Let ηi (i = 1, 2, . . . , k) be the i-th largest eigenvalues of M . With Lemma 6.2, we
know that ηi ≤ µi, then
R(G1) = trace(M) =
k∑
i=1
ηi ≤
k∑
i=1
µi = RG1 .
We have Lemma 6.1 proved.
Lemma 6.1 can be used to derive an upper bound of non-randomness of the whole
graph G.
Result 6.4: We randomly select m1 edges (m1 ≤ m) from the whole graph and form
a subgraph G1, then we have RG ≤ mm1 RG1 .
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Proof. With Lemma 6.1, we have:
RG1 ≥ R(G1) =
∑
(u,v)∈E1
R(u, v) ≈ m1
m
∑
(u,v)∈E
R(u, v) =
m1
m
RG. (6.10)
The approximation in (6.10) is because the m1 edges are randomly selected, and
∑
(u,v)∈E1 R(u, v) approaches
m1
m
∑
(u,v)∈E R(u, v) as the graph size increases. Then,
we immediately get RG ≤ mm1 RG1 .
We can also derive a lower bound of RG.
Result 6.5: Given a closed subgraph G1, we have RG ≥ RG1 . By closed subgraph,
we mean that subgraph G1(V1, E1) satisfies E1 = E ∩ (V1 × V1).
Proof. To make the expression simple, we assume G1 contains node V1 = {1, 2, . . . , n1}.
When G1 is a closed subgraph, we can rewrite the symmetric adjacency matrix A as
A =


A1 A12
A12 A2

 ,
where A2 is the adjacency matrix of the closed subgraph formed by node {n1 +
1, . . . , n} and A12 represents the edges between these two subgraphs. Note λi is the
i-th largest eigenvalue of A with eigenvector xi, and let Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yk), then
RG1 =
k∑
i=1
µi = trace(Y
T A1Y ) = trace

(Y T 0)A


Y
0



 .
With Lemma 6.2, we have
RG1 =
k∑
i=1
µi ≤
k∑
i=1
λi = RG.
We have Result 6.5 proved.
We can use this lower bound to determine whether the whole graph G is a random
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one. Since
R∗G =
RG − [(n− 2k)p + k]√
2kp(1− p) ≥
RG1 − [(n− 2k)p + k]√
2kp(1− p) ,
if
RG1−[(n−2k)p+k]√
2kp(1−p) ≥ Φ
−1(1 − α), we can reject that G is a random graph with the
significance level α.
Recall the subgraph G1 containing 50% of the nodes with the highest degrees in the
polbook network, it is a closed subgraph with RG1 = 20.54. Given the significance
level α = 0.05, the critical value is r0 = 19.69. Since RG ≥ RG1 ≥ r0, the whole graph
G must be significantly different from a random one.
Results 6.4 and 6.5 can significantly reduce the computation cost for (non-)randomness
testing of the overall graph G. RG involves the calculation of the k largest eigenvalues
of G. It generally takes O(n3) operations to compute eigenvalues and eigenvectors
[38]. The derived upper and lower bounds only need to calculate RG1 where G1 is a
much smaller graph.
6.3 Comparison with Other Graph Spectra
The graph spectrum has been well investigated in the graph analysis field. It has
been shown that the eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix and the normal matrix are
also good indicators of community clusters [27, 72, 86, 97]. One important question
is whether a similar non-randomness framework can also be derived using spectra of
the Laplacian or normal matrix. In this section, we present our theoretical results
and characterize differences among non-randomness measures derived using different
spectra.
6.3.1 Laplacian Spectrum
Laplacian matrix of a graph is defined as L = D−A, where D = diag{d1, d2, . . . , dn}
and di is the degree of node i. Let µi be the i-th smallest eigenvalue of L with
eigenvector yi. The smallest eigenvalue µ1 = 0 whose eigenvector is y1 ≡ 1. The
eigenvectors of L are good indicators of the community structure. This fact can be
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derived from the following minimization problem [84]: assign a k-dimensional vector
(p1u, p2u . . . , pku) to node u, so that the sum of the distances over the existing edges
is minimized, i.e.,
min JL(P ) =
1
2
∑
u,v
{
auv
k∑
i=1
(piu − piv)2
}
s.t. P T P = I
(6.11)
where P = (p1|p2| · · · |pk) and piu is the u-th entry of pi. The target function can be
rewritten as JL(P ) = trace(P
T LP ). Then, taking pi = yi gives the optimal solution,
and the minimum value is given by J(Y ) =
∑k
i=1 µi, where Y = (y1|y2| · · · |yk).
y1 yi yk yn
↓
βu →


y11 · · · yi1 · · · yk1
...
...
...
y1u · · · yiu · · · yku
...
...
...
y1n · · · yin · · · ykn
· · · yn1
...
· · · ynu
...
· · · ynn


(6.12)
With the same spirit of adjacency matrix, we can define β = (y1u, y2u, . . . , yku) ∈
R1×k to be the Laplacian matrix based spectral coordinates. β and yi are shown in
Formula (6.12). From (6.11), we know that the smaller distance between βu and βv
indicates the stronger community relation of node u and v, i.e., the edge is less likely
to be a random one. The spectral geometry of y2 and y3 for the three-community
synthetic graph in Figure 6.1(a) is shown in Figure 6.6(a). We neglect y1 for y1 ≡ 1.
We can see that the three communities form three clusters in the spectral space with
the bridging node at the middle, and those noise nodes are sparsely located. There-
fore, we need to define the Laplacian matrix based edges non-randomness measure
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via the Euclidean distance ‖βu − βv‖:
RL(u, v) = c− ‖βu − βv‖22. (6.13)
We use a constant c to minus the squared Euclidean distance. A smaller non-
randomness value indicates the edge is more likely to be a random one. Similarly, we
can further derive the node non-randomness measure RL(u) as
RL(u) =
∑
v∈Γ(u)
RL(u, v) = cdu −
n∑
v=1
{
auv
k∑
i=1
(yiu − yiv)2
}
=cdu −
k∑
i=1
µiy
2
iu +
k∑
i=1
n∑
v=1
auvyiv(yiu − yiv);
(6.14)
and the graph non-randomness RLG as
RLG =
∑
(u,v)∈E
RL(u, v) = 2cm−
n∑
u,v=1
k∑
i=1
au,v(yiu − yiv)2
=2cm− 2JL(Y ) = 2cm− 2
k∑
i=1
µi.
(6.15)
Then, from (6.15), we can see that the graph non-randomness measure is directly
related to the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix. However, unlike the case of the
adjacency matrix, the node non-randomness measure RL(u) defined in (6.14) does
not have a concise expression. The third term of (6.14) contains the information of
neighbor nodes, and we thus are unable to identify those non-random nodes simply
via their vector lengths. From Figure 6.6(a), we can see those noise nodes are not
particularly far from (or close to) the origin.
Another problem involved with the non-randomness measures is that it is difficult
to choose the constant c properly. One idea is that choose c to be the maximum of
‖βu − βv‖22. Obviously, ‖βu − βv‖22 ≤ ‖βu‖22 + ‖βv‖22 ≤ 2, and when node u and v
are two isolated nodes ‖βu − βv‖22 = 2, and we can thus choose c = 2. However,
the scales of the second and third term of (6.14) are usually small compared with
133
2du, then the node non-randomness measure based on the Laplacian matrix is almost
solely determined by the node’s degree, and the graph non-randomness measure is
also almost determined by the first term 4m.
The other extreme case is choosing c = 0, or equivalently RL(u, v) = ‖βu − βv‖22.
This choice is also problematic. Consider the following two type of nodes: nodes
connecting by many non-random edges (small edge non-randomness value), and nodes
connecting by one random edge (large edge non-randomness value). These two types
are very different: the former denotes the central node in the community, while the
later is usually the noisy one. However, the node non-randomness values of these two
types of nodes can be equal or very close, which makes impossible to distinguish them
using the node non-randomness measure based on the Laplician spectrum.
We can also have some other ways to define the non-randomness measures, for
example, define RL(u, v) = 1/‖βu − βv‖. But they will not give a consistent frame
work as the case of the adjacency matrix.
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Figure 6.6: Spectral geometry of the three-community synthetic network in Figure
6.1(a), based on Laplacian and normal matrix spectra.
6.3.2 Normal Spectrum
Normal matrix of a graph is defined as N = D−
1
2 AD−
1
2 . Let νi be the largest
eigenvalue of N , and zi be its eigenvector. We have that the largest eigenvalue ν1 = 1
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whose eigenvector z1 = (
√
d1, . . . ,
√
dn)
T , 1 = ν1 ≥ ν2 ≥ · · · ≥ νn ≥ −1, and νn = −1
if and only if the graph is a bipartite one, in which case νi and −νi appear pairwise
in the normal spectrum.
The relation between the normal spectrum and the graph structure can be shown in
the same minimization problem as Problem (6.11) but with the constraint normalized
by the nodes’ degrees [84]:
min JN(Q) =
1
2
∑
u,v
{
auv
k∑
i=1
(qiu − qiv)2
}
s.t. QT DQ = I
(6.16)
where Q = (q1|q2| · · · |qk) and qiu is the u-th entry of qi. With the method of Lagrange
multipliers and setting the derivatives equal 0, the necessary condition for optimality
is given by (D−A)qi = ζiDqi, where ζi is the Lagrange multiplier. With some simple
deduction, we have ND
1
2 qi = (1 − ζi)D 12 qi. Therefore, the solution is given by ζi =
1 − νi and qi = D− 12 zi. The constraint in Problem (6.16) is naturally satisfied, and
the minimum value is givn by JN(D
− 1
2 Z) = k −∑ki=1 νi, where Z = (z1|z2| · · · |zk).
D−
1
2 zi
↓
γu →


z11√
d1
· · · zi1√
d1
· · · zk1√
d1
...
...
...
z1u√
du
· · · ziu√
du
· · · zku√
du
...
...
...
z1n√
dn
· · · zin√
dn
· · · zkn√
dn
· · · zn1√
d1
...
· · · znu√
du
...
· · · znn√
dn


(6.17)
Since qi = D
− 1
2 zi, with the same logic as the case of Laplacian matrix, we need
to define the normal matrix based spectral coordinate γu =
1√
du
(z1u, z2u, . . . , zku)
as shown in Formula (6.17). Figure 6.6(b) shows the spectral geometry of D−
1
2 z2
and D−
1
2 z3 for the three-community synthetic graph, D
− 1
2 z1 ≡ 1. Similarly as the
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Laplacian geometry, the three communities form three clusters with the bridging node
in the middle, and the noisy nodes are scattered sparsely.
Similar to the case of Laplacian matrix, we can define the edge non-randomness
measure based on normal matrix via the Euclidean distance:
RN(u, v) = c− ‖γu − γv‖22. (6.18)
We further define the node non-randomness measure as
RN(u) =
∑
v∈Γ(u)
RN(u, v) = cdu −
n∑
v=1
{
auv
k∑
i=1
(
ziu√
du
− ziv√
dv
)2}
=cdu +
k∑
i=1
(2νi − 1)z2iu −
k∑
i=1
n∑
v=1
auvz
2
iv
dv
;
(6.19)
and the graph non-randomness measure as
RNG =
∑
(u,v)∈E
RN(u, v) = 2cm−
∑
u,v
auv
{
k∑
i=1
(
ziu√
du
− ziv√
dv
)2
}
=2cm− 2JN(D− 12 Z) = 2cm− 2k + 2
k∑
i=1
νi.
(6.20)
Similar as the case of the Laplacian matrix, RN(u) does not have a concise expres-
sion, and it is difficult to choose the constant c.
6.3.3 Modularity
Define the modularity matrix B as buv = auv − dudv2m , and let ηi be the i-th largest
eigenvalue of B with eigenvector si. The spectrum of B also has a close relation with
the graph community structure. This is because finding the best community partition
to maximize modularity Q can be written as follows:
max Q =
1
2m
trace(JT BJ) (6.21)
s.t. JT J is diagonal and trace(JT J) = n
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where J is the n × k index matrix: Jij = 1 if node i belongs to community j and
0 otherwise. Relaxing the 0-1 constraint, we have the i-th column of J is si except
for the vector length, and max Q =
∑k
i=1 ηi, suppressing a multiplicative constant.
We can also similarly define the spectral coordinate based on modularity matrix
B as δu = (s1u, s2u, . . . , sku), and [74] suggests that the direction of δu indicates
the community partition. However, generally speaking, communities forms neither
orthogonal lines nor clusters in the k-dimensional spectral space, and hence defining
edge non-randomness measure via inner product or Euclidean distance is impropriate.
Therefore, it is difficult to define a consistent framework based on matrix B.
It is worth pointing out that the authors in [74] defined the community centrality
of node u (denoted by CC(u) in our paper) to measure the node’s contribution to the
community structure, and CC(u) = (
∑k
i=1 ηjs
2
iu)
1
2 . Then, Q =
∑n
u=1 CC(u)
2. The
community centrality measure based on the modularity matrix B has a similar con-
cise expression as our node non-randomness measure based on the adjacency matrix
A. However, the community centrality actually measures to what extent the node’s
contribution to the community structure exceeds its expected value [74] while our
node non-randomness incorporates randomness values of all its connected edges.
In the synthetic graph shown in Figure 6.1(a), the bridging node (node 61) has its
community centrality value equal to 0.084, which ranks 57 among the 61 nodes. This
means that the bridging nodes makes little contribution to the modularity Q. We can
see that the the community centrality does not take the bridging effect into account,
and is thus unable to distinguish the bridging nodes from the noise nodes. However,
our node non-randomness can be used to separate the the bridging node from noise
ones (R(u) = 0.659 with rank 16, much higher than those noise nodes).
6.4 Empirical Evaluations
Data Sets. We used several network data sets in our evaluation, polbooks, polblogs,
dolphins, karate, netsci, and Enron. We also generated two synthetic graph with
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the same size: synthetic-1 with only one community that is generated using the ER
model with parameters n = 1000 and p = 0.2; and synthetic-1 with two disconnected
communities each of which is generated via ER model and has 500 nodes and 49910
edges.
In this section, we focus on graph non-randomness of both synthetic networks and
real social networks. We have also analyzed how edge non-randomness and node
non-randomness distribute in real-world social networks and random graphs. Our
results show that edge non-randomness and node non-randomness of real-world social
networks usually display some high skewed distributions, obeying either a power law
or an exponential law. On the contrary, random graphs display approximate normal
distributions.
Graph Non-randomness of Various Social Networks. Table 6.3 shows graph
statistics, and graph non-randomness values (calculated using RG and R
∗
G) of various
social networks. We can observe that the relative non-randomness measures (R∗G))
of real world social networks are significantly greater than zero while that of the
synthetic random graph is very close to zero. Using R∗G, we can relatively compare
the randomness of graphs with different sizes and densities. For example, we can
observe that the network of the dolphins contains less randomness than the karate
data since R∗G of the dolphins (1.61) is greater than that of the karate data (1.22).
Furthermore, R∗G also indicates to what extent the graph is different from random
graphs. For karate graph, we have R∗G = 1.22 and 1−Φ(R∗G) = 0.11, which indicates
how less likely the karate graph is generated by ER model. Similarly, for dolphins
data, we have R∗G = 1.61 and 1− Φ(R∗G) = 0.054.
We are also concerned with the connection between various real graph characteris-
tics and our graph non-randomness measure (which is derived from graph spectrum).
We conducted two types of perturbations on politics book: addition/deletion of ran-
domly chosen edges, and switches of edges. For each perturbed graph, we calculated
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Table 6.3: Graph non-randomness and characteristics of various social networks
Network n m Q RG R∗G
synthetic 1000 99820 0.06 200 0.02
karate 34 78 0.44 11.7 1.22
dolphins 62 159 0.54 13.1 1.61
polbooks 105 441 0.53 23.5 6.87
Enron 151 869 0.51 41.2 4.18
polblogs 1222 16714 0.80 134 187
netsci 1589 2742 0.92 38.5 128
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Figure 6.7: Graph characteristic vs. non-randomness measure for politics book net-
work with various perturbations.
λ1, RG with k = 2, and two real graph characteristics: transitivity C and Modu-
larity Q. The transitivity measure, C, is one type of clustering coefficient measure
and characterizes the presence of local loops near a vertex. It is formally defined as
C = 3N∆
N3
where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected
triples.
Intuitively, when the magnitude of perturbation increases, we expect the graph
tends to lose its structural properties. Figure 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) show our empirical
evaluations on how Transitivity, Modularity, λ1, and RG are changed along pertur-
bations on politics book. Furthermore, our graph non-randomness measure RG can
better reflect the change trend indicated by Transitivity and Modularity than λ1.
For example, in Figure 6.7(b), λ1 remains almost unchanged even when the graph is
significantly perturbed by random switches.
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One interesting phenomenon is that the relative non-randomness measure always
decreases when the magnitude of perturbations increases. Formally, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 6.3: Let Graph G(n,m) be a graph with k communities and p = 2m
n(n−1) <
1
2
, and graph is G′ obtained by randomly adding edges to G: each non-existing edge
is to be added with probability ∆p, ∆p < p and p + ∆p < 1
2
. Assume k communities
will not merge. If RG− [(n− 2k)p + k] ∈ O(pn), we have E(R∗G′) < R∗G, as the graph
becomes large.
Proof. Let A and Ã be the adjacency matrix of G and G′ respectively, E = Ã − A.
Let λi, λ̃i and εi be the i-th largest eigenvalue of A, Ã and E respectively. With
Theorem IV-4.8 in [90], we have
RG′ =
k∑
i=1
λ̃i ≤
k∑
i=1
λi +
k∑
i=1
εi = RG +
k∑
i=1
εi,
and hence
E(RG′) ≤ RG + E
(
k∑
i=1
εi
)
. (6.22)
We know that E(ε1) = (n− 2)∆p + 1 and with the Semicircle Law [32], we have
E(εi) ≤ 2
√
n∆p(1−∆p), i = 2, 3, . . . , k. (6.23)
Combining (6.6), (6.22) and (6.23), we have
E(R∗G′) =
E(R∗G′)− [(n− 2k)(p + ∆p) + k]√
2k(p + ∆p)(1− p−∆p)
≤RG + (n− 2)∆p + 1 + 2(k − 1)
√
n∆p(1−∆p)√
2k(p + ∆p)(1− p−∆p)
− (n− 2k)(p + ∆p) + k√
2k(p + ∆p)(1− p−∆p)
≤RG − [(n + 2k)p + k] + M√
2k(p + ∆p)(1− p−∆p)
(let M = 2(k − 1)
[
∆p +
√
n∆p(1−∆p)
]
+ 1)
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Hence, to prove E(R∗G′) < R
∗
G, we need only to show
RG − [(n + 2k)p + k] + M
RG − [(n− 2k)p + k] <
√
(p + ∆p)(1− p−∆p)√
p(1− p) . (6.24)
Since RG − [(n + 2k)p + k] ∈ O(pn) while M ∈ O(
√
∆pn), when n is large, the
left-hand side of Inequality (6.24) is close to 1. Notice that p < p + ∆p < 1
2
, the
right-hand side of Inequality (6.24) is greater than 1 regardless of n, then when n
goes large, we must have Inequality (6.24) stands.
Distributions of Node Non-randomness and Edge Non-randomness. It is
well known that the degree distributions in many real-world networks, such as the
power-law distribution observed for the Internet and the the Web graph, differ signif-
icantly from the Poisson distribution of random graphs [16]. We are interested in the
edge non-randomness distribution as well as the node non-randomness distribution
in real-world networks and how they are different from synthetic random networks
generated by the ER model.
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Figure 6.8: Edge non-randomness distributions
We conducted experiments using three networks: synthetic data generated by the
ER model with n = 1000 and p = 0.2, politics books, and Enron network. Figure
6.8 (Figure 6.9) shows distributions of edge (node) non-randomness of these three
networks. We can observe from Figure 6.8(a) and Figure 6.9(a) that the distributions
of both edge non-randomness and node non-randomness follow approximately normal
distributions.
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Figure 6.9: Node non-randomness distributions
The linear-log plot in Figure 6.8(b) indicates that edge non-randomness R(u, v)
of 441 edges in politics book has a highly skewed form, approximately obeying an
exponential law. However, Figure 6.8(c) shows that edge non-randomness R(u, v) of
the majority edges in Enron email network only approximately obeys an exponential
law. The log-log plot in Figure 6.9(b) indicates that node non-randomness R(u) of
105 nodes in politics book clearly follows a power law distribution. However, there is
no evidence to display the power law pattern for node non-randomness distribution
of 151 nodes in Enron data as shown in Figure 6.9(c).
The distributions of both edge non-randomness and node non-randomness for real
networks are quite different from those for random graphs. We also conducted evalu-
ations on other real-world social networks. Although we cannot reach the conclusion
that they definitely follow power law (or exponential law) distributions, our empirical
evaluations did show that they are usually highly skewed, with a small number of
edges (nodes) having an unusually large non-randomness values and a large number
of edges (nodes) having small non-randomness values.
The Effect of k. In Section 6.2, we have shown that the graph non-randomness
measure is determined by the sum of the first k eigenvalues, where k indicates the
number of communities in the graph. In this experiment, we are interested in how
different choices of k affect the graph non-randomness. We used the Enrol network
and perturbed it by randomly adding/deleting edges. For each perturbed graph,
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Figure 6.10: graph characteristics vs. non-randomness measures for Enron with
Add/Delete perturbations
we calculated one real graph characteristics, the Transitivity measure C, the first
eigenvalue λ1, and our non-randomness measure RG with three different k values (5,
50, 151). Note that there exist five roughly separated groups in Enron network. We
expected RG with k = 5 should best match the trend characterized by Transitivity
measure.
Figure 6.10 shows our experiment results. We can observe that λ1 did not match
the perturbations as well as RG with k = 5. RG with k = 50 and k = 151 are totally
unmatched with the perturbations. Specifically, RG with k = 151 remains unchanged
across all perturbed graphs while RG with k = 50 displayed opposite trend from that
suggested by Transitivity measure. We have shown in Section 6.2 that RG is always
zero when k equals the number of nodes n.
Evolution of Graph Non-randomness. We are interested in how the graph non-
randomness may change for dynamic social networks. We performed the randomness
analysis on the monthly email graphs from Enron data. In Table 6.4, we list graph
relative non-randomness values for 12 graphs constructed from Enron dataset from
June 2001 to May 2002. Each graph Gt is formed by the total email data in months
from 1 to t. We regard there’s an edge between node u and v in Gt when there is at
least three communications between u and v during this period. We use mt to denote
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Table 6.4: Enron dynamic relative non-randomness (k = 3)
mt R
∗
Gt
R∗Ht R
∗
Gt
−R∗Gt−1 R∗Ht −R∗Gt−1
G1 87 12.99 – – –
G2 187 12.41 4.84 −0.58 −8.16
G3 327 12.45 4.07 0.04 −8.35
G4 429 9.81 7.14 −2.63 −5.31
G5 627 7.89 2.01 −1.92 −7.81
G6 726 7.22 4.29 −0.67 −3.60
G7 765 7.12 5.82 −0.10 −1.40
G8 805 5.91 5.74 −1.20 −1.38
G9 826 5.69 5.22 −0.22 −0.70
G10 851 5.19 4.85 −0.51 −0.84
G11 879 4.88 4.27 −0.31 −0.92
G12 922 4.36 3.56 −0.52 −1.32
Table 6.5: Comparison of top k non-random nodes across monthly networks of Enron
data
| St | Jt
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
10 0.67 0.67 0.54 0.67 0.54 0.43 0.43 0.82 0.54 0.54 0.67
20 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.74 0.60 0.33 0.38 0.60 0.54 0.60 0.67
30 0.71 0.58 0.58 0.82 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.71 0.62 0.54 0.76
40 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.82 0.74 0.57 0.57 0.78 0.57 0.57 0.74
50 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.85 0.75 0.56 0.69 0.85 0.69 0.64 0.85
the number of edges of Gt. We can easily observe that Gt−1 ⊆ Gt and mt−1 < mt. We
use R∗Gt (k = 3) to denote the relative non-randomness of Gt. We can observe that
for most real Enron data sets, R∗Gt < R
∗
Gt−1 (except G3), showing that the relative
non-randomness of the graph decreases along the time.
One interesting question here is how those newly added edges in each month are
different from randomly added edges. To answer this question, we construct synthetic
data sets Ht by randomly adding mt −mt−1 edges to Gt−1. We can see in Table 6.4
that R∗Ht is always less than R
∗
Gt−1 since the randomly added edges increase the graph
non-randomness. Specifically, the 39 newly added edges in the real graph G7 decreases
the relative non-randomness by 0.10. However, when we randomly add 39 edges to
G6, the relative non-randomness of H7 decreases by 1.40. This difference indicates
those 39 newly added edges in G7 are significantly different from randomly added
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edges. On the contrary, 40 newly added edges in G8 are not significantly different
from randomly added edges.
Since the number of nodes are unchanged across all monthly graphs, we are also
interested in how the subset of individuals identified as top non-random nodes (e.g.,
top 30) is varied dynamically. We used Jaccard’s index measuring the similarity
between two subsets. Formally, we define
Jt =
| St−1 ∩ St |
| St−1 ∪ St |
where St denotes the subset of non-randomness nodes from data Gt. We can observe
from Table 6.5 that those non-random nodes do change along the time. Hence, our
node non-randomness measure R(u) can be applied in practice to monitor the change
of individual’s roles in terms of its randomness in the social network.
6.5 Adjacency Cut via Line Fitting
In this section, we present a novel graph partition algorithm, AdjCut, which utilizes
the line orthogonality pattern in the spectral space of the adjacency matrix. Our idea
is to fit node spectral coordinates with the k orthogonal lines in the k-dimensional
spectral space. Our algorithm is different from traditional spectral partition algo-
rithms [17, 27, 43, 50, 76, 78, 86] that utilize the cluster pattern in the spectral space
of Laplacian or normal matrix.
6.5.1 Problem Formalization
For a fixed k, let the unit row vector li = (li1, . . . , lik), i = 1, . . . , k, denote the k
orthogonal fitted lines. Each line corresponds to a community in the graph. If li is
well fitted, the spectral coordinate αu should be close to the line corresponding to the
community the node belongs to. When we project each node to its closest line, the
length of the projection vector α̂u should be large as shown in Figure 6.11. Hence,
we can estimate the k orthogonal lines by maximizing the total sum of projection
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lengths: J =
∑n
u=1 ‖α̂u‖2.
O
αu
α̂u
eu
lr
Figure 6.11: Vectors: lr, αu, α̂u and eu
Suppose lr is the line closest to a certain point αu. Then, the projection vector
is α̂u = (lrα
T
u )lr and |liαTu | is the projection length. We denote eu the residual
vector eu = αu − α̂u. Moreover, ‖α̂u‖2 should be the largest among all |liαTu |, i.e,
r = arg maxi |liαTu |. Then the objective function can be written as follows:
J =
n∑
u=1
‖α̂u‖2 =
n∑
u=1
k∑
i=1
huiliα
T ,
where hui = sign(liα
T
u ) if i = r and 0 otherwise.
Let L be the matrix of k lines: the i-th row of L is li, Yk = (y1|y2| · · · |yk), and let
H = (hui)n×k. Our optimization problem can be formalized as
max
H,L
J = trace(LY Tk H) (6.25)
s.t. hij ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, LT L = Ik.
The constraint LT L = Ik guarantees that the k fitted lines are orthogonal to each
other. H naturally indicates the community partition: node u is assigned to Ci if hui
is non-zero.
Once the lines are properly fitted, we can determine bridging nodes by examining
their locations with respect to the k fitted lines. Bridging nodes are those ones con-
necting to multiple communities. They usually lie on the boundaries of communities,
bridging gaps between otherwise disconnected groups. In the spectral space, they are
neither close to the origin, nor close to any orthogonal fitted line corresponding to a
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certain community. Therefore, we can mark a node as a bridging node if ‖αu‖2 ≥ τ1
and cos(αu, α̂u) = ‖α̂u‖2/‖αu‖2 ≤ τ2, where τ1 and τ2 are some thresholds.
6.5.2 Fitting k Orthogonal Lines
For the optimization problem shown in (6.25), it is difficult to obtain the optimal
H and L simultaneously. Here we present an iterative algorithm to solve this opti-
mization problem by fixing H or L and solving for the other matrix in each step, as
outlined in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 AdjCut: Fitting k lines
1: t = 0, Initiate L(0);
2: while not converge do
3: for u = 1, 2, . . . , n do
4: r = arg maxi |l(t)i αTu |;
5: h
(t)
ur = sign
(
l
(t)
r αTu
)
, and h
(t)
ui = 0 for i 6= r;
6: end for
7: USV T = Y Tk H, and L
(t+1) = V UT ;
8: t = t + 1;
9: end while
When L is fixed, the loop from Line 3 to 6 determines the optimal H. Given k
lines determined at step t, it assigns each node to the line closest to it. When H is
fixed, we have
J = trace(LY Tk H) = trace(LM),
where we write M = Y Tk H. Let M = USV
T be the SVD of matrix M , where
S = diag(σ1, . . . , σk) and σi is the singular value of M . Then we have
J = trace(LM) = trace(LUSV T ) = trace(SV T LU) ≤
k∑
i=1
σi, (6.26)
and when L = V UT , J reaches the maximum value in (6.26) (Line 7). During the
iterations, the objective function J (t) = trace(L(t)Y Tk H
(t)) is non-decreasing, and the
process hence converges to a local maximal.
Calculation of the eigenvectors of an n × n matrix takes in general a number of
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operations O(n3), which is almost inapplicable for large networks. However, in our
framework, we only need to calculate the first k eigen-pairs. Furthermore, adjacency
matrices in our context are usually sparse. The Arnoldi/Lanczos algorithm [38] gen-
erally needs O(n) rather than O(n2) floating point operations at each iteration. The
cost of our k orthogonal line fitting algorithm is O(k3n).
Initiate L. To have a proper initial L, we can apply the greedy search in the spectral
space, as shown in Procedure 2. We start with the searching subspace equal to the
full k-dimensional space. At iteration j, we pick up the vector with the largest length
in the searching space, normalize its length, and get lj (Line 2). The new searching
space is then the subspace orthogonal to lj and all vectors are projected to the new
searching space via the Graham-Schmidt process (Line 3). Apparently, the solution
L from the greedy search is an orthogonal matrix. When the spectral coordinates
form clear k quasi-orthogonal lines in the spectral space, the k fitted lines found by
the greedy algorithm are already close to the optimal solution, and the convergence
can then be very fast.
Procedure 2 Greedy Search for L
1: for j = 1, . . . , k do
2: s = arg maxi ‖αi‖2, and lj = αTs /‖αs‖2;
3: αi = αi − (αilj)lTj for i = 1, . . . , n;
4: end for
Determining Proper k. The objective function J is not appropriate in comparing
the goodness of fit when k varies. This is because the error length generally increases
as the dimension k increases. Next we propose the use of the normalized error to
determine proper k. Formally, we define the measure as
ρ =
∑n
u=1 ‖eu‖22
(k − 1) ∑nu=1 ‖αu‖22
. (6.27)
The measure is normalized by k − 1 since eu has the degree of freedom k − 1. Once
we fit the data by k orthogonal lines, we can calculate the statistic ρ. When k = 1,
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ρ is always 0 since we do the projection in a 1-dimensional subspace. For, k ≥ 2, we
have 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. When the graph contains k clear communities, spectral coordinates
form k quasi-orthogonal lines in the k-dimensional subspace. We can find the k
orthogonal lines that well fit the data. In this case ρ should be close to 0. However,
in the subspace spanned by less or more eigenvectors, the coordinates scatter from
those lines, and we will not obtain a very good fit of the data. So our strategy is to
determine a k value that incurs a low ρ value.
6.5.3 Evaluation of Adjacency Cut Algorithm
Data Sets. We use several real network data sets in our evaluation: polbooks, pol-
blogs, Enron and Facebook. We also generate two synthetic graphs: Synthetic-1 and
Synthetic-2. The Synthetic-1 has 5 communities with the number of nodes 200, 180,
170, 150, and 140 respectively, and each community is generated separately with
a power law degree distribution with the parameter 2.3 3. We add cross commu-
nity edges randomly and keep the ratio between inter-community edges and inner-
community edges as 20% in Synthetic-1. Synthetic-2 is the same as the Synthetic-1
except that we increase the number of links between community C4 and C5 to 80%.
As a result, the Synthetic-2 has four communities. Table 6.6 shows the statistics of
these data sets.
Line Orthogonality Property. We first check how line orthogonality property
holds in various networks. We can clearly observe from Figures 6.12(a), 6.12(b),
and 6.12(c) that there exist five orthogonal lines in the spectral space spanned by
x1, · · · , x5 and nodes from the same community (denoted by different colors) lie on
the same line for Synthetic-1. For Synthetic-2, we are particularly interested in the
subspace spanned by x3, x4, x5. As shown in Figure 6.12(d), we cannot observe any
clear line orthogonality pattern, which demonstrates our theoretical results since there
3Real social network data with one major component usually follow a power law degree distribu-
tion with the parameter between 2 to 3.48 according to [5].
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Figure 6.12: The plots of spectral coordinates for various networks
are actually four communities in Synthetic-2. We also show the 2-D and 3-D spectral
plots of polblogs. As we know, there are two communities in this data. Hence, we can
observe that spectral coordinates form two orthogonal lines in the subspace spanned
by x1 and x2 as shown in Figure 6.12(e). However, we cannot observe any clear line
orthogonality pattern when we introduce the additional eigenvector x3, as shown in
Figure 6.12(f).
Quality of Community Partition. Our strategy of determining k is to choose the
one with the small normalized error ρ. Figure 6.13 shows how ρ changes when we
vary k for various networks. We also circle out the k value we choose for each social
network in Figure 6.13. For Synthetic-1, we can observe from Figure 6.13(a) that
ρ reaches the minimum (0.0047) when k = 5 whereas for Synthetic-2, ρ reaches the
minimum (0.0069) when k = 4 for Synthetic-2 from Figure 6.13(a). This phenomenon
matches the community numbers we used to generate data. For polbooks, polblogs,
and Enron, we choose k that incurs the minimum ρ value. For Facebook, we can see
there are several good choices of k from Figure 6.13(f). Although k = 2 incurs the
150
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
← 0.0047
(a) Synthetic-1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
← 0.0069
(b) Synthetic-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
← 0.0014
(c) polbooks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
← 0.0063
(d) polblogs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
← 0.018
(e) Enron
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
k
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rr
or
 S
um
↑
0.012
(f) Facebook
Figure 6.13: Normalized error ρ vs. varied k
minimum ρ value, we instead choose k = 10 in our evaluation, which incurs small ρ
and matches our manual examination.
Since the original data descriptions of polbooks and polblogs (and Synthetic) provide
node-community relations, we evaluate the accuracy of our partition algorithm using
∑k
i=1 |Ci∩Ĉi|
n
where Ĉi denotes the i-th community produced by our algorithm. The
last column of Table 6.6 shows our results. We can see our algorithm achieves high
accuracy values. We also calculate the modularity Q of our partition algorithm on
all networks.
Table 6.6: Statistics of networks and partition quality
n m k Q Accuracy(%)
Synth-1 840 4917 5 0.38 90.83
Synth-2 840 5743 4 0.39 89.17
polbooks 105 441 2 0.45 96.7
polblogs 1222 16714 2 0.42 94.7
Enron 148 869 6 0.48 
Facebook 63392 816886 10 0.52 
Comparison with Normalized Cut. Researchers have developed several different
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versions of normalized spectral clustering algorithms. In this paper, we use the nor-
malized cut algorithm in [86] for comparison. The quality of the partitioning produced
by our algorithm is comparable or better than that produced by the normalized cut
for a wide range of graphs in terms of accuracy and modularity measures, as shown
in Figure 6.14.
One well known problem of the normalized cut algorithm is that it tends to produce
some small-sized partitions. Table 6.7 shows some statistics of the partition results
on Facebook data. All the last four communities produced by the normalized cut
contain less than 100 nodes, and have very few links to the rest of the graph. Take
the community of size 10 as example, the community has 24 edges within itself and
only 1 link connecting to other communities. These small communities do not make
significant contributions to network topology although they are good candidates to
minimize the number of cut edges. Clusters should be reasonably large groups of
nodes. Our AdjCut algorithm produce more balanced partitions.
Table 6.7: Partition statistics on the Facebook network (k = 10)
Algorithm Sizes of Ci Q
AdjCut 29492, 7574, 7420, 6791, 3107, 2862, 1728, 1579,
1496, 1341
0.5389
Normalized cut 28709, 13325, 9236, 4548, 4394, 3092, 65, 10, 7, 6 0.6014
For the normalized cut and its variants, node u tends to be assigned to Ci if node
u has more links to Ci than to other communities. Our AdjCut algorithm assigns u
to its nearest line in the spectral space. Nodes are deviated from ri due to its direct
connections to other communities. Note that ri is the closest line, and for any j 6= i
we have the following inequality:
xiu =
∑
v∈Ci
v∼u
xiv
λi
>
∑
v∈Γju
xjv
λj
.
Note that xiv or xjv indicates the “belongings” of node v in community Ci or Cj.
When the neighbors of node u in Ci have the largest total “belongings” (scaled by
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Figure 6.14: Comparison of community partition results
λi), AdjCut assigns node u to community Ci even though node u may have more links
to Cj than to Ci. The AdjCut may be more suitable for large and complex social
networks, because it takes the association to the communities into consideration: a
user is more likely to belong to the community when her friends in that community
are core members than other community even with more connections to unimportant
nodes.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we first discover the line orthogonality pattern in the spectral space
of the adjacency matrix. Based on this pattern, we then present a framework which
can quantify graph non-randomness at the edge, node, subgraph, and overall graph
levels. We show that all graph non-randomness measures can be obtained mathemat-
ically from the spectrum of the adjacency matrix of the network. We also present a
relative non-randomness measure of the overall graph, which allows quantitative com-
parisons between various social networks with different sizes and densities or between
different snapshots of a dynamic social network.
We explore whether other graph spectra (such as Laplacian spectrum and normal
spectrum) could also be used to derive a framework of non-randomness measures. Our
theoretical results show that they are unlikely, if not impossible, to have a consistent
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framework to evaluate randomness accurately at all granularity levels.
Utilizing the line orthogonality pattern in the adjacency spectral space, we develop
a novel algorithm AdjCut to partition graph communities. We also discuss how to
choose a proper k and conduct empirical comparison with the normal cut algorithm.
Wu et al. explore the spectral patterns of singed graphs [100]. In our future work,
we would like to extend our framework of graph non-randomness to signed graphs,
weighted graphs, directed graphs, and other types of rich graphs.
CHAPTER 7: SPECTRUM BASED NETWORK FRAUD DETECTION
In the preceding chapters, we mainly focus on the privacy-preserving graph random-
ization. Usually this type of randomization procedure is applied by the data owner.
In this chapter, we consider another special type of randomization: the randomization
caused by attackers. In large-scale and dynamic networks, each participant is vul-
nerable to various attacks including spam, denial of service, Sybil attacks, etc. The
attackers can also join the social network and create links among themselves or to
legitimate users, which constructs fraudulent nodes, links and subgraphs in the orig-
inal social network. One type of such attack models is the active attack. Generally
speaking, the subgraphs constructed by the attackers contain some patterns different
from that of the original graph to some extent. One questions is that how we detect
such subgraphs.
Specifically, we develop a fraud detection algorithm based on the non-randomness
spectral framework to identify various attacks. Our approach, which exploits the
spectral space of the underlying interaction structure of the network, is different from
traditional topological analysis approaches [19, 77, 88]. Traditional topology based
detection methods explore the graph topology directly and discover abnormal connec-
tivity patterns caused by attacks. Our approach is based on graph spectral analysis
that deals with the analysis of the spectra (eigenvalues and eigenvector components)
of the adjacency matrix. We study how to identify attackers by characterizing their
distributions in the spectral space.
Attacks in Social Networks. Social networks have always been vulnerable to
various attacks including spam emails, annoying telemarketing calls, viral market-
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ing, and individual re-identification in anonymized social network publishing. Spam
email has been one of the most effective attacks. A majority of such spam emails are
sent to victim email addresses that are generated randomly or chosen from existing
mailing lists. Victims are unrelated generally and lack the variety of mutual per-
sonal, professional, institutional ties among individuals. Various techniques against
spam [13, 14, 37, 42, 57, 83] have been developed. The key idea has been to build
classification models using machine learning and data mining algorithms.
A Viral Marketing attack aims to leverage the power of social networks to produce
rapid increase in brand awareness. Viral marketing is based on the fact that users
are more receptive to a product or service recommended by their friends. In viral
marketing, the marketer or attacker can create a set of seemingly innocent profiles, use
them to make friendship links with a large set of seed users, then send advertisements
to those seed users. It is expected that some seed users will recommend advertisements
to their friends.
In an auction network1, reputation systems have been used extensively by auction
sites to prevent auction fraud [20, 77, 81]. However, it is difficult to truly assess the
trustworthiness and show faithful representation of users’ reputation. Many fraud-
sters can be detected by identifying relatively small and densely connected subgraphs
since they usually interact in small cliques of their own (in order to mutually boost
their credibility). The authors [19, 77] uncovered a different modus operandi for
fraudsters in auction networks, which leads to the formation of near bipartite cores.
Fraudsters make use of accomplices, who behave like honest users, except that they
interact heavily with a small set of fraudsters in order to boost their reputation. The
fraud identities are the ones used eventually to carry out the actual fraud, while the
accomplices exist only to help the fraudsters carry out their job by boosting their
feedback rating.
1Transactions among users are modeled as a graph, with a node for each user and an edge for
one or more transactions between two users
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Recently, the authors in [88] provided a general abstraction, called the Random
Link Attack (RLA), which identifies the collaborative nature of these attacks to evade
detection. In an RLA, the malicious user creates a set of false identities and uses them
to connect with a large set of victim nodes. To evade detection, the malicious user also
creates various interactions among false identities, which make the subgraph formed
by false identities similar to that formed by regular users. This property makes the
discovery of the attack and the responsible entities a difficult task.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1, we first give our
result on the change of eigenvectors during graph perturbation. In Section 7.2, we
present a theoretical framework for detecting collaborative attacks based on spectral
coordinates. In Section 7.3, we focus on RLAs. We derive distributions of spectral
coordinates of attacking nodes and present our algorithm to filter attacking groups
using their spectral characteristics. In Section 7.4, we conduct empirical evaluations
and compare with topology based approaches. We extend RLAs to other attacking
scenarios and offer our concluding remarks and discuss future work in Section 7.5.
Some results in this chapter are also reported in [109, 110].
7.1 Graph Spectral Analysis
Our observed graph G̃ with adjacency matrix Ã contains some fake links and nodes
generated by the attackers. We use E to denote the difference matrix: Ã = A + E
(if new nodes are added, we simply extend A to the same dimension of Ã by adding
all-zero rows and columns). Let λj(λ̃j) denote the j-th largest eigenvalue of A(Ã)
with eigenvector xj(x̃j). We are interested in how the graph spectra (eigenvalue and
eigenvector) are affected by perturbation.
The relationship between x̃j and xj has also been well studied. In [90] (refer to
Theorem 2.7 and 2.8), it was shown that x̃j can be approximated by a function of all
original eigenvectors and the perturbation matrix E. However, it is difficult to apply
them to separate fraud nodes from regular ones in the perturbed spectral space. In
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this paper, we apply the Power Iteration method [38] to derive the following result.
Result 7.1: Suppose eigenvalue λj satisfies |λj| À ‖E‖2. For small integer t, the
eigenvector of λj, x̃j, can be approximated by:
x̃j ≈ xj +
t∑
l=1
1
λlj
(A + E)l−1Exj. (7.1)
Proof. To derive the relationship between x̃j and xj, we first introduce the Power
Iteration method [38].
Let A be a n×n symmetric matrix, and e(0) be an nonzero n× 1 vector, assuming
xT1 e
(0) 6= 0. Then, series e(s+1) = Ae(s)‖Ae(s)‖ converges to the eigenvector corresponding
to the largest eigenvector of A. To compute xi, starting with e
(0) that satisfies
xTi e
(0) 6= 0, series e(s+1) = Ae(s)‖Ae(s)‖⊥xj, j = 1, . . . , i− 1, converges to xi, where v⊥xj
means orthogonalizing vector v with previous eigenvectors.
Consider computing x̃1 and λ̃1 using the power iteration method. Since the noise
is moderate, the original eigenvector x1 is a good initial vector, and hence
Ãtx1
‖Ãtx1‖2 is
a good approximation of x̃1. To make the later proofs concise, we normalize Ã
tx1 by
λt1 instead of it exact vector length ‖Ãtx1‖2. Let x̃(t)1 = Ãtx1/λt1, then we have
x̃
(t)
1 =
(A + E)tx1
λt1
= x1 +
t∑
l=1
1
λl1
(A + E)l−1Ex1. (7.2)
When t is not too large, ‖x̃(t)1 ‖2 is close to 1. This is because E is formed by adding
edges, and hence λt1 ≤ ‖Ãtx1‖2 ≤ λ̃t1 ≤ (λ1 + ‖E‖2)t. When λ1 À ‖E‖2 and t is not
too large, we have 1/‖Ãtx1‖2 ≈ 1/λt1. Altogether, we have
x̃1 ≈ Ã
tx1
‖Ãtx1‖2
≈ Ã
tx1
λt1
= x̃
(t)
1 . (7.3)
Note that vector x̃
(t)
1 and
Ãtx1
‖Ãtx1‖2 have the same direction but slightly different
vector lengths, and x̃
(t)
1 thus converges to x̃1 in direction. Let θt denote the angle
between x̃1 and x̃
(t)
1 . With the power iteration, we have cos θt = 1 − O(| λ̃2λ̃1 |
t), i.e.,
cos θt approaches to 1 geometrically with ratio | λ̃2λ̃1 | [38].
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Similarly, we can show (7.1) stands for x̃j (j 6= 1) when λj À ‖E‖2. When it
comes to x̃j (j 6= 1), we need to ensure the orthogonality of the eigenvectors. The
orthogonality approximately stands since ‖Exj‖2 ≤ ‖E‖2 ¿ |λj|.
Remarks: The approximation in (7.3) stands when t is small, in which case
‖Ãtx1‖2 ≈ λt1. How to determine t and what is the exact form of the error term
are beyond the scope of this work. We would like to give some illustration here.
Eigenvectors x̃i (i = 1, . . . , n) form a basis in Rn. Let x1 =
∑n
i=1 cix̃i, where ci
is the coefficient, ci = x
T
1 x̃i. When the noise is moderate, x̃1 and x1 are close in
direction, i.e., c1 is close to 1 while ci (i 6= 1) is close to 0 (note that
∑
i c
2
i = 1). Then
x̃
(t)
1 =
Ãtx1
λk1
=
∑n
i=1 ci(
λ̃i
λ1
)tx̃i. Hence the error term is
‖x̃(t)1 − x̃1‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥[c1(
λ̃1
λ1
)t − 1]x̃1 +
n∑
i=2
ci(
λ̃i
λ1
)tx̃i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
(
[c1(
λ̃1
λ1
)t − 1]2 +
n∑
i=2
c2i (
λ̃i
λ1
)2t
) 1
2
≈ |1− c1( λ̃1
λ1
)t|. (ci ≈ 0, for i 6= 1)
Similarly, we can have
‖x1 − x̃1‖2 =
[
(c1 − 1)2 +
n∑
i=2
c2i
] 1
2
≈ |1− c1|.
Note that c1 is a constant less than 1, and
λ̃1
λ1
> 1. When t is small, c1(
λ̃1
λ1
)t is closer
to 1 than c1, and hence ‖x̃(t)1 − x̃1‖2 ≤ ‖x1 − x̃1‖2. As t increases, c1( λ̃1λ1 )t goes to
infinity, and hence the error increases. This is because, when t is large, ‖Ãtx1‖2 can
be much greater than λt1, and more accurate normalization in vector length is desired.
In our work, we only use t = 1, 2. We find the above approximations are very stable
in most practical cases.
We can see that in our approximation x̃j is expressed as a function of only xj and
E for those leading eigenvectors (|λj| À ‖E‖2). The approximation in (7.3) stands
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when t is small. How to determine the optimal t is beyond the scope of this work.
Please refer to our proof and remarks in Appendix 1 for the discussion of the error
term. In this paper, we use t = 1, 2 and find the above approximations are very stable
in most practical cases.
7.2 A Spectrum Based Framework for Detecting Attacks
In this section, we present a spectrum based fraud detection framework, which
is different from the traditional topology based fraud detection. In our framework,
we exploit the spectral space and characterize the difference between the spectral
coordinates of regular users and that of attackers, rather than exploring the graph
topology directly.
In a collaborative attack, the malicious user has complete control over the attacking
nodes and uses them to attack (e.g., send emails) a large set of victim nodes. Assume
there are c (c ¿ n) attacking nodes and they form a subgraph with adjacency matrix
C = {cij}c×c. The outgoing links from attacking nodes to regular nodes form the
subgraph with adjacency matrix B = (bij)n×c: bij = 1 if the j-th attacking node has
a link to the i-th regular node, and bij = 0 otherwise. The graph after attacks G̃ has
N = n + c nodes, and we can arrange the nodes in the graph so that node 1 to c are
attacking nodes and node c + 1 to N are regular ones. We have:
A =


0 0
0 An

 , Ã =


C BT
B An

 , E =


C BT
B 0

 (7.4)
The degree of node i, di, is the number of links connecting to node i in G̃, including
the attacking links: di =
∑N
j=1 ãij.
Let zj be the eigenvector of A associated to λj, and z̃j be the eigenvector of Ã
associated to eigenvalue λ̃j. Then, zj and z̃j can be partitioned as follows:
zj =
(
0c×1
xj
)
, z̃j =
(
ỹj
x̃j
)
,
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where ỹj = (ỹj1, . . . , ỹjc)
T denotes the entries corresponding to the attackers in z̃j
and x̃j = (x̃j1, . . . , x̃jn)
T denotes the entries corresponding to those regular nodes in
z̃j. Since A is expanded by adding 0’s into An, xj is then the eigenvector of An along
with the eigenvalue λj. Let x̄j be the mean value of entries in xj: x̄j =
1
n
1Tnxj. To
make the deduction simple, we choose the sign of xj so that x̄j ≥ 0.
We utilize the leading k eigenvalues and eigenvectors to detect attacks in network
data. In the following sections, we denote αu = (x1u, x2u, · · · , xku) as the spectral
coordinate of regular node u in the original spectral space. It is the u-th row in
the bottom part of the matrix shown in (7.5). Denote βi = (y1i, y2i, · · · , yki) as the
spectral coordinate of attacking node i (the i-th row in the upper part of the matrix
in (7.5)). Since we assume there is no attack in the original graph, βi is actually a
zero vector. Similarly, we denote α̃u = (x̃1u, x̃2u, · · · , x̃ku) and β̃i = (ỹ1i, ỹ2i, · · · , ỹki)
as the spectral coordinate of regular node u and attacking node i in the perturbed
spectral space respectively, as shown in (7.6).


0 · · · 0
x1 · · · xk

 =


0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
x11 · · · xj1 · · · xk1
...
...
...
x1n · · · xjn · · · xkn


← βi
← αu
(7.5)


ỹ1 · · · ỹk
x̃1 · · · x̃k

 =


ỹ11 · · · ỹj1 · · · ỹk1
...
...
...
ỹ1c · · · ỹjc · · · ỹkc
x̃11 · · · x̃j1 · · · x̃k1
...
...
...
x̃1n · · · x̃jn · · · x̃kn


← β̃i
← α̃u
(7.6)
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Result 7.2: In a graph G̃ under collaborative attacks, for attacking node i, the
eigenvector entry ỹji (1 ≤ i ≤ c, 1 ≤ j ≤ k) can be approximated by:
ỹji ≈ 1
λj
∑
u∈Ωi
xju +
1
λ2j
c∑
r=1
(
cir
∑
u∈Ωr
xju
)
, (7.7)
where Ωr denotes the victim set of attacking node r. For any regular node u, 1 ≤
u ≤ n, x̃ju is approximately unchanged: x̃ju ≈ xju.
Proof. Substituting the corresponding matrices as shown in (7.4) to Result 7.1, we
can approximate the eigenvectors after attacks z̃j by zj and λj:


ỹj
x̃j

 ≈


0
xj

 + 1
λj


BT xj
0

 + 1
λ2j


CBT xj
BBT xj

 .
With the above expression, we can write the i-th entry in ỹj as
ỹji ≈ 1
λj
bTi xj +
1
λ2j
c∑
r=1
cirb
T
r xj
=
1
λj
n∑
u=1
buixju +
1
λ2j
c∑
r=1
(
cir
n∑
u=1
burxju
)
. (7.8)
Note that br is the index vector for the victims attacked by node r, then
∑n
u=1 burxju =
∑
u∈Ωr xju, and we get (7.7).
For the the regular nodes, it is unlikely that a regular node u is attacked by many
RLA attackers, and hence the terms of λ−2j can be further neglected, and we have
x̃ju ≈ xju. We prove the result.
Result 7.2 shows that the spectral coordinate of an attacking node can be approx-
imated by the spectral coordinates of its victims. Figure 7.1 shows a collaborative
attack example. Attacking nodes (black ones in the dashed region) form an inner
subgraph and each attacking node links to some victims (gray ones). For example,
the victim set of attacking node p, Ωp, includes victims u, v, w. For example, the
spectral coordinate of attacking node p is mainly determined by the sum of spectral
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Figure 7.1: A collaborative attack example
coordinates of its victim set Ωp scaled by 1/λj (the first term of the right hand side
of (7.7)). The second term captures the effect of all its neighbor attacking nodes’
victims, Ωq and Ωt (scaled by 1/λ
2
j).
When attackers do not collaborate with each other (C = 0c×c), the second term
of the right hand side of (7.7) disappears. We simply have ỹji ≈ 1λj
∑
u∈Ωi xju, which
indicates the attacker’s spectral coordinate is fully determined by that of its victims.
From (7.7) we can also observe that the inner structure C among the attackers only
affects ỹji in the order of λ
−2
j . When λj is large, the second term of the right hand
side of (7.7) is already negligible, which means that the inner subgraph structure has
little impact on the distribution of attackers in the spectral space.
The above result is mathematically elegant. We show that the spectral coordinate
of an attacker is mainly determined by that of its victims and the inner structure
among collaborative attackers has negligible impact on attackers’ spectral coordinate
distributions in the spectral space. Hence the efforts by the collaborative attack-
ers of resembling the rest of the network do not help much in hiding their spectral
characteristics in the spectral space.
In practice users have no knowledge about which nodes are attackers (or victims).
In other words, users do not know the true spectral coordinates of victim nodes
(i.e., xji) as well as the eigenvalues of the original graph (i.e., λj). As a result, we
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cannot derive the exact spectral coordinates of attacking nodes (i.e., yji). In the
next section, we will present our results on the random link attack. We will show
that the distribution of attackers’ spectral coordinates under random link attack are
determined by z̃j and λ̃j, which can be calculated directly from the observed graph
Ã.
7.3 Detecting Random Link Attack
A Random Link Attack (RLA) is a special type of collaborative attacks. The ma-
licious user has complete control over the attacking nodes and uses them to attack
(e.g., send emails) a large randomly chosen set of victim nodes. To masquerade as
regular users, the attackers usually form a dense subgraph by increasing the number
of edges among themselves such that the attacker’s neighborhood is structurally sim-
ilar to that of a regular user. One assumption here is that the attacker’s victim set
is selected randomly. In other words, each regular node in the graph has an equal
probability to be attacked, independent of other victims. Also note that for a suc-
cessful attack, the size of the victim set is typically large as compared to the size of
the attacker set. If this is not true, then the scope of the RLA attack is severely
constrained. The nodes in the neighborhood of a regular user typically contains a set
of communities, or a group of nodes that also have edges between themselves. On
the contrary, the randomly chosen victim nodes in the neighborhood of the attackers
have a different structure with fewer edges between themselves.
Definition 7.1: Random Link Attack (RLA) In a RLA, the malicious user cre-
ates c(¿ n) false identities (attacking nodes) and uses them to connect with a large
set of victims. Attacking node i randomly attack vi victims and each regular node
has the same probability to be a victim. The total number of victims is v =
∑c
i=1 vi.
To evade detection, the malicious user also creates mc links among attacking nodes,
which may make the subgraph formed by attacking nodes similar to that formed by
regular users.
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Figure 7.2: Spectral coordinates of political blogsphere data under a degree attack
with 20 attackers.
Throughout this section, we use polblogs as an example to illustrate our theoretical
results. Figure 7.2 plots the node spectral coordinates under a degree attack2 with 20
attackers. We also show node degrees in the z-axis. We can observe from the figure
that the majority of nodes projected in the 2-D spectral space distribute along two
straight and quasi-orthogonal lines. This indicates that there exist two communities
with sparse edges connecting them. We also observe that attacking nodes (denoted as
black) locate between the two quasi-orthogonal lines in the spectral projection space.
7.3.1 Identifying Suspects in Spectral Space
In this section, we investigate how attackers distribute in the spectral space. By
identifying the distribution of attackers’ spectral coordinates, we expect to separate
attacking nodes from regular ones in the spectral space.
Result 7.3: Let Λk = diag(λ1, . . . , λk) and Xk = (x1, . . . , xk). When all attackers
satisfy vi ≤ λk and di ≤ n2 , the spectral coordinate β̃i(ỹ1i, ỹ2i, . . . , ỹki) asymptotically
follows the multivariate normal distribution whose mean and covariance satisfy the
2Attacking nodes have the same degree distribution as the regular nodes. For attacking node i,
it attacks 2di3 victims.
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following two inequalities3:
E(β̃i) ≤ diX̄kΛ−1k = di
(
x̄1
λ1
, . . . ,
x̄k
λk
)
, (7.9)
Cov(β̃i) ≤ di
n
(
1− di
n
)
Λ−2k . (7.10)
Furthermore, ỹsi and ỹti (s 6= t) are independent. When attackers do not collaborate
with each other (C = 0c×c), the expectation and variance reach their upper bounds.
Proof. Since each regular node has the same probability to be attacked, and entries
of bi are i.i.d. bernoulli random variables with parameter pi =
vi
n
. We thus have
E(bi) =
vi
n
1n×1, Cov(bi) =
vi
n
(1− vi
n
)In×n.
With (7.8), ỹji is a linear function of bi and br. Since entries of bi (or br) are i.i.d.
bernoulli random variables, when n is large, ỹji asymptotically follows the multivariate
normal distribution. Taking the expectation of (7.8), we have
E(ỹji) =
1
λj
E(bi)
T xj +
1
λ2j
c∑
r=1
cir E(br)
T xj
=
vix̄j
λj
+
1
λ2j
c∑
r=1
cirvrx̄j (7.11)
With vr ≤ λj, we have
E(ỹji) ≤ vix̄j
λj
+
1
λj
c∑
r=1
cirx̄j
=
x̄j
λj
(
vi +
c∑
r=1
cir
)
=
dix̄j
λj
.
We have proved the upper bound for the expectation shown in (7.9). Note that when
C = 0, E(ỹji) is reduced to
E(ỹji) =
1
λj
E(bi)
T xj =
vix̄j
λj
=
dix̄j
λj
.
3By using “≤” between two vectors or matrices, we mean entry-wise less or equal.
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The last equality holds because there is no link among attackers( vi = di). In this
case, the expectation reaches the upper bound.
With (7.8), we can write β̃i = (ỹ1i, . . . , ỹki) in matrix form:
β̃i = b
T
i XkΛ
−1
k +
c∑
r=1
cirb
T
r XkΛ
−2
k .
When the graph is large, we simply regard that bi and br are independent. Also
notice that cii ≡ 1, and we have
Cov(β̃i) = Λ
−1
k X
T
k Cov(bi)XkΛ
−1
k
+
c∑
r=1
cirΛ
−2
k X
T
k Cov(br)XkΛ
−2
k
=
vi
n
(1− vi
n
)Λ−2k + Λ
−4
k
c∑
r=1
cir
vr
n
(1− vr
n
). (7.12)
When vi ≤ di ≤ n2 , vin (1 − vin ) < din (1 − din ). We can thus enlarge the first term of
(7.12) to di
n
(1− di
n
)Λ−2k , and the term of Λ
−4
k is then negligible. In summary, we have
Cov(β̃i) ≤ di
n
(
1− di
n
)
Λ−2k .
Notice that the covariance matrix in (7.12) is an diagonal matrix. For multivariate
normal distribution, we know that two entries ỹsi and ỹti (s 6= t) are then independent.
When C = 0, the second term of (7.12) is 0, and Cov(β̃i) then reaches the upper
bound.
Specifically, ỹji follows the normal distribution whose mean and variance satisfy
the following two inequalities:
E(ỹji) ≤ dix̄j
λj
, V(ỹji) ≤ di
n
(
1− di
n
)
1
λ2j
. (7.13)
When attackers do not collaborate with each other, we know the exact values of
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expectation and variance of ỹji.
E(ỹji) =
dix̄j
λj
, V(ỹji) =
di
n
(
1− di
n
)
1
λ2j
. (7.14)
Lemma 7.1: In the setting of RLA, let ¯̃zj denote the mean of z̃j: ¯̃zj =
1
n+c
1Tn+cz̃j.
When λj À ‖E‖2, we have ¯̃zj → x̄j, as n →∞.
Proof. When G is attacked by RLA (either with or without collaboration), z̃j can be
approximated to the first order as z̃j ≈
( 1
λj
BT xj
xj
)
. Then, we have
¯̃zj =
1
n + c
1Tn+cz̃j =
1
n + c
(1Tc ,1
T
n )


1
λj
BT xj
xj


=
1
n + c
(
1
λj
1Tc B
T xj + nx̄j
)
→ 1
n + c
(
1
λj
1Tc E(B
T xj) + nx̄j
)
, as n →∞. (7.15)
Note that E(BT xj) = diag(v1x̄j, v2x̄j, . . . , vcx̄j), we have
1
λj
1Tc E(B
T xj) =
x̄j
λj
c∑
i=1
vi =
vx̄j
λj
.
Continue with (7.15), and we have
¯̃zj → v
(n + c)λj
x̄j +
n
n + c
x̄j. (7.16)
Since v ≤ n and λj À 1, the first term in (7.16) is negligible. The second term in
(7.16) approaches 1 since c ¿ n, and we get the result ¯̃zj → x̄j as n →∞.
One problem here is that users do not know the values of x̄j. Lemma 7.1 shows that
in the setting of RLA, x̄j can be approximated by ¯̃zj, which can be directly calculated
from the observed Ã. Hence, we can simply use ¯̃zj to replace x̄j in (7.9),(7.10), (7.13),
and (7.14) . We can see that both expectation and variance are functions of node
degree.
We can regard node i as a suspect if the corresponding entry ỹji is within the
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confidence interval E(ỹji) ± ε
√
V(ỹji) where ε > 0 denotes the
1+p
2
quantile of the
standard normal distribution (i.e., interval [−ε, ε] covers probability p). In our work,
we choose ε = 2 if not otherwise noted, and the confidence interval covers more than
probability 0.954.
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Figure 7.3: Spectral plot of RLAs in polblogs network, 20 attacking nodes. Attackers
do not establish any connections among themselves.
Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 plot z̃1 vs. degree (or z̃2 vs. degree) of both attacking
nodes and regular nodes under various RLA attacking schemes (with and without
collaboration). Figure 7.3(c) and Figure 7.3(d) correspond to one independent RLA
with 30 attacking nodes and each having 30 outgoing links on average (v̄i = 30),
whereas Figure 7.3(a) and Figure 7.3(b) corresponds the RLA with each attacking
node having 60 outgoing links on average (v̄i = 60). The number of victims of
attacking node i is uniformly chosen from the interval [v̄i − 10, v̄i + 10]. We plot
the mean value (the black line) and the upper and lower bounds (the dashed lines).
We can observe that a majority of attacking nodes (denoted as black) form a region
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Figure 7.4: Spectral plot of RLAs in polblogs network, 20 attacking nodes. Attackers
establish some connections among themselves.
which locates within 2 standard deviations from the mean values while the majority
of regular nodes locate in different regions. Hence we can regard nodes within two
dashed lines as suspects. We can also observe that the more outgoing links (victims)
of attacking nodes, the farther their spectral coordinates are away from those regular
ones.
In the next attacking schemes, we introduce various inner link structures in the
attacking subgraph. In Figure 7.4(a) and Figure 7.4(b), connections among attacking
nodes follow the ER-model with probability 0.5 In Figure 7.4(c) and Figure 7.4(d),
we masquerade attacking nodes as good users by specifying a degree distribution for
connections among attacking nodes with the same parameters as the regular nodes
(degree attack). Our result shows that we can successfully separate attacking nodes
from regular ones no matter how the malicious creates links among attacking nodes.
In other words, our method is robust with the subgraph C formed by attacking nodes.
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When attackers do collaborate with each other, ỹji still follows the normal distri-
bution. However, we only have the upper bound of its expectation and variance as
shown in (7.13). We shown the formula of the derived confidence interval in our next
result.
Result 7.4: Given probability p ∈ [0, 1], let ε > 0 denote the 1+p
2
quantile of the
standard normal distribution (i.e. interval [−ε, ε] covers probability p). RLAs. For
an attacker i with observed degree di ≤ N2 , ỹji has probability more than p to fall
into the interval [τlw, τup], where
τup =
di ¯̃zj
λ̃j
+
ε
λ̃j
[
di
N
(
1− di
N
)] 1
2
, (7.17)
τlw =
v∗ ¯̃zj
λ̃j
− ε
λ̃j
[
v∗
N
(
1− v
∗
N
)] 1
2
, (7.18)
and v∗ = min{di, N2 [1−
Nx̄j
(ε2+N2x̄2j )
1/2 ]}.
Proof. If node i perform the RLA, ỹji is normally distributed, and has probability p
to fall into interval [τ1, τ2] = E(ỹji)± ε
√
V(ỹji). When vi ≤ di ≤ n2 , with (7.13), it is
easy to get that the upper bound of τ2:
τ2 ≤ dix̄j
λj
+
ε
λj
[
di
n
(
1− di
n
)] 1
2
. (7.19)
Note that the upper bound is obtained when attacker i does not collaborate with
other attackers.
Next, we obtain an lower bound for τ1. Neglecting terms of λ
−2
j and higher in (7.11)
and (7.12), we have that τ1 can be expressed as a function of vi:
τ1(vi) = E(ỹji)− ε
√
V(ỹji) =
vix̄j
λj
− ε
λj
[vi
n
(
1− vi
n
)] 1
2
. (7.20)
By taking the derivative and setting it to be 0, we have that τ1(vi) reaches the
minimum when
vi = vmin :=
n
2
[
1− nx̄j
(ε2 + n2x̄2j)
1
2
]
. (7.21)
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Moreover, τ1(vi) is a decreasing function when 0 ≤ vi ≤ vmin, and is an increasing func-
tion when vi > vmin. Notice that vi ∈ [0, di], and we thus have τ1 ≤ τ1(min{di, v∗}),
and the lower bound is obtained when attacker i attacks min{di, v∗} victims.
When the graph is large and the number of attackers c is much smaller than the
graph size N , x̄j ≈ ¯̃zj (with Lemma 7.1), λ̃j ≈ λj (with the Weyl’s Theorem) and N ≈
n. By substituting the unknown values (x̄j, λj and n) with those values obtainable
from Ã (¯̃zj, λ̃j and N) in (7.19), (7.20) and (7.21), we get the result.
Although we can filter out attackers by checking whether their spectral coordinate
values locate within the confidence interval at each dimension, it is very tedious in
practice. Users would prefer a single metric to quantify each node’s likelihood of
being an attacker. Next, we adopt a combined metric, the node non-randomness, to
identify suspects.
In Section 6.2 we presented a framework that can quantify non-randomness at
all granularity levels from edge, node, subgraph, to the overall graph. All graph
non-randomness measures can be obtained mathematically from the spectra of the
adjacency matrix of the network. The node non-randomness can be calculated as
Ru =
∑k
j=1λjx
2
ju = αuΛkα
T
u , where Λk = diag{λ1, λ2, . . . , λk}, which means the non-
randomness of node u is the length of its spectral vector with eigenvalue weighted
on corresponding dimensions. As pointed by [90], eigenvalues and eigenvectors with
large eigen-gaps are generally more stable under perturbation. In our work we choose
k so that λk − λk+1 is maximized.
Result 7.5: For attacking node i, its node non-randomness is defined as
Ri = β̃iΛ̃kβ̃
T
i =
k∑
j=1
λ̃j ỹ
2
ji. (7.22)
Then, the expectation and variance of Ri have the following upper bounds respec-
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tively: E(Ri) ≤ UEi , and V(Ri) ≤ UVi , where
UEi = d
2
i
k∑
j=1
x̄2j
λj
+
di
n
(1− di
n
)
k∑
j=1
1
λj
; (7.23)
UVi =
4d3i
n
(1− di
n
)
k∑
j=1
x̄2j
λ2j
+
2d2i
n2
(1− di
n
)2
k∑
j=1
1
λ2j
. (7.24)
E(Ri) and V(Ri) reach the upper bounds when the attackers do not collaborate
(mc = 0).
Proof. For attacking node i, Ri =
∑k
j=1 λj ỹ
2
ji. Since ỹji is normally distributed with
mean µji and variance σ
2
ji, ỹ
2
ji/σ
2
ji follows the noncentral χ
2-distribution with degree
of freedom 1 and parameter µ2ji/σ
2
ji, and hence we have
E
(
ỹ2ji
σ2ji
)
= 1 +
µ2ji
σ2ji
, V
(
ỹ2ji
σ2ji
)
= 2 +
4µ2ji
σ2ji
.
Then, E(ỹ2ji) = µ
2
ji + σ
2
ji, and we have
E(Ri) =
k∑
j=1
λj E(ỹ
2
ji) =
k∑
j=1
λj(µ
2
ji + σ
2
ji).
Substitute µji and σ
2
ji with their upper bounds shown in (7.13), we get the upper
bound of E(Ri) shown in (7.23).
Similarly, V(ỹ2ji) = 2σ
4
ji + 4µ
2
jiσ
2
ji, and hence
V(Ri) =
k∑
j=1
λ2j V(ỹ
2
ji) =
k∑
j=1
λ2j(2σ
4
ji + 4µ
2
jiσ
2
ji).
Substitute µji and σ
2
ji with their upper bounds shown in (7.13), we get the upper
bound of V(Ri) shown in (7.24).
Ri is non-negative and it is naturally lower bounded by zero. Ri is a linear combi-
nation of noncentral χ2 random variables. The distribution of such type of random
variable was given in [79]. We can then choose a proper ε such that, for attacking
node i, Ri has a high probability to fall into the interval [0, µ + εσ]. Substituting the
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mean and standard deviation with their upper bounds, we can regard node i as a
suspect if
Ri ≤ UEi + ε(UVi )
1
2 . (7.25)
Similarly, we can replace the unknown variables (x̄j, λj and n) in (7.23) and (7.24) by
those values obtainable from Ã (¯̃zj, λ̃j and N). The non-randomness test to identify
suspects is shown in Procedure 3.
Procedure 3 Node non-randomness test
Input: Ã, Output: suspect set Vsusp
1: Calculate λ̃j, z̃j and ¯̃zj from Ã, j = 1, . . . , k;
2: for i ← 1 to N do
3: Calculate node non-randomness Ri by (7.22);
4: Calculate UEi , U
V
i by (7.23) and (7.24);
5: if Ri ≤ UEi + ε(UVi )
1
2 then
6: Vsusp ← Vsusp ∪ {i};
7: end if
8: end for
Figure 7.5 plots Ri vs. degree under four RLA attacking scenarios. The inner
structure of the attacking groups is formed by Erdos-Renyi model [30] with parameter
pin: any two attacking nodes are connected with probability pin. The black line
shows the expected value of attacking nodes. The dashed pink line is the decision
line corresponding to the upper bound as shown in (7.25). We regard nodes under
the decision line as suspects. We can observe that for all four attacking scenarios
non-randomness values of those fraud nodes are well below the decision lines, which
indicates that our node non-randomness test is robust with any inner structure of the
subgraph formed by attackers.
Comparison with Topology Based Testing. The authors in [88] first formalized
the RLA property. Basically, an attack set A is called a RLA iff it satisfies 1) |A| ≤ k;
2)the size of the victim set is larger than a constant (α) factor of the attack set; and 3)
the number of distinct external triangles (formed by attackers and with the rest of the
graph) 4A ≤ θ. They proposed two tests, the clustering test and the neighborhood
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Figure 7.5: Node randomness measure of various RLAs (20 attackers). (a)-(c): ER
attacks with parameter pin and v̄i = 30; (d): degree attacks.
independence test, to identify suspects. Identification of the suspect set is the first
step towards finding an RLA, i.e., the identification of a set of suspect nodes that are
potentially part of the attacking group.
A node in the graph is marked as a suspect if it fails either the clustering property
or the neighborhood independence property. A node i satisfies the clustering prop-
erty iff 4i ≥ ρdi(di − 1)/2 where 4i denotes the number of triangles of node i. A
node i satisfies the neighborhood independence property iff the size of the maximum
independent set in the neighborhood of node i4 is less than α − θ
k
(more accurately,
see inequality (5) in [88]). There are several limitations of this topology based test
approach. First, the testing procedures contain too many parameters. In practice,
it is hard to determine those parameters properly for a given network. Hence, the
4In the independence test, an independent set is defined as a set of nodes such that no two nodes
share an edge.
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identified suspect set contains a large number of false positives (good nodes marked as
suspects). Second, the neighborhood independence test involves huge computational
cost since it needs to find the maximum independent set for each node.
Table 7.1: Testing results for polblogs network, 20 attackers in all cases (ρ = 0.0865
in clustering test). ssp: number of suspects found by the testing; atk: true attackers
in the suspects.
indpdt. ER attacks, v̄i = 30 degree
v̄i = 60 pin = 0 pin = .5 pin = 1 attack
ssp atk ssp atk ssp atk ssp atk ssp atk
Node nonrandomness test
22 20 22 20 22 20 23 20 21 19
θ Cluster and Neighborhood independence test
100 63 20 211 20 210 20 212 20 282 16
150 68 20 240 20 236 20 236 20 321 18
200 74 20 293 20 291 20 290 20 386 20
250 76 20 324 20 326 20 318 20 440 20
300 84 20 390 20 398 20 396 20 496 20
Table 7.1 shows the comparison between the topology based test approach and our
spectrum based test approach for polblogs under five attacking scenarios. For each
attack, we report the number of suspect nodes identified by each approach and the
number of true attacking nodes among the identified suspect nodes. We follow their
strategy by setting ρ = .0865 so that 95% of the nodes in the original graph satisfy
the clustering property. We vary the θ with different values in the neighborhood
independence test. We can see that for all five attacking scenarios (especially degree
attack) the topology based test generates a large number of false positives, which will
affect both accuracy and efficiency of catching the true attacking groups in the next
step. In contrast, our spectrum based test results in much fewer false positives across
all attacking scenarios.
7.3.2 Spectrum Based RLA Detection Algorithm
In this section, we present our spectrum based detection algorithm called Spctra
to catch RLAs. The algorithm consists of three steps, as shown in Algorithm 7. In
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Algorithm 7 Spctra: Spectrum based RLA Detection
Input: Ã, Output: attacking groups
1: Vsusp ←node nonrandomness test on Ã by Procedure 3;
2: Gsusp ← subgraph formed by Vsusp;
3: Find dense subgraphs Hs, s = 1 . . . , l, in Gsusp via the algorithm in [18];
4: for each dense subgraph Hs do
5: if Hs pass node nonrandomness test then
6: return Hs as an attacking group
7: end if
8: end for
the first step, we conduct node non-randomness test to identify suspects as shown in
Procedure 3.
The subgraph Gsusp formed by suspects expect to contain most attacking nodes as
well as some regular ones. It is unlikely that regular nodes in the suspect set form
dense subgraphs in Gsusp. In the second step, from Gsusp we identify suspect groups as
candidates of RLA groups. In our work, we implemented the greedy algorithm [18] to
approximately find dense subgraphs in O(nsusp) time. The algorithm starts with the
full graph (Gsusp in our setting). At each iteration, the node with minimum degree
is delete, and the density of the remaining subgraph is calculated and recorded. The
subgraph with the maximum density is finally returned.
In the third step, we test whether each dense subgraph is a true RLA group. As
a result, we can filter out dense subgraphs accidentally formed by regular nodes.
We regard nodes in a suspect group Hs as one single super-node regardless its inner
structure. If Hs is mainly formed by a true RLA, the super-node expects to behave
as an independent RLA node. We then check the super-node using the node non-
randomness test. This requires the calculation of the eigenvector entries of the super-
node. With Result 7.2, we can approximate the corresponding eigenvector entries.
Let ΩHs denote the set of nodes connected to Hs. Then, its corresponding entry in
177
the j-the eigenvalue and the node non-randomness measure can be approximated by:
ỹj,Hs =
1
λ̃j
∑
u∈ΩHs
x̃ju, and RHs =
k∑
j=1
λ̃j ỹ
2
j,Hs .
Similarly, UEHs and U
V
Hs
can be calculated by replacing di with dHs = |ΩHs | in (7.23)
and (7.24). If RHs ≤ UEHs + ε(UVHs)
1
2 , we consider Hs as a RLA group.
Complexity. Our algorithm involves the calculation of the first k eigenvectors of a
graph in Line 1 of Procedure 3. In general, eigen-decomposition of an n × n matrix
takes a number of operations O(n3). In our framework, we only need calculate the first
k largest eigenvalues and their eigenvectors. Furthermore, adjacency matrices in our
context are usually sparse and well structured. We implemented the Arnoldi/Lanczos
algorithm [38] which generally needs O(n) rather than O(n2) floating point operations
at each iteration. The storage cost is reduced to nO(k)+O(k2). The greedy algorithm
to find dense subgraphs from the suspect set, in Line 3 of Algorithm 7, takes O(nsusp).
The authors in [88] developed the Greedy algorithm to catch RLAs from the sus-
pect set. The Greedy algorithm is to mine subgraphs satisfying the RLA-property,
starting from the suspect nodes identified by two tests. It grows a potential attack
cluster by iteratively adding nodes with a high degree of connectivity with the cluster.
However, the Greedy algorithm does not scale well for large graphs since it makes
many calls to the expensive Filter procedure (to find the maximum independent set).
The time complexity of the neighborhood independence test is O(
∑
i d
2
i ) = O(m
2)
(the approximation algorithm to find the maximum independent set around node i
needs O(d2i ) time). To catch attacking groups among nsusp suspects, the Greedy
needs O(m2susp) time. The authors also developed the second technique, triangle ran-
dom walk (Trwalk), which performs a randomized graph traversal starting at each
suspect. They reported the Trwalk is 8 to 10 times more efficient than the Greedy
but Trwalk is less accurate than the Greedy.
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7.4 Experimental Results
One challenging research issue is how to effectively separate fraud nodes under a
set of mixed attacks from regular users in large networks. Since different attacks can
form different topological patterns, we evaluate how effectively our Spctra algorithm
can characterize them in large-scale networks. We also compare our algorithm with
the topology based detection approach [88].
Data Set and Setting. We conducted experiments on the Web Spam Challenge
2007 data [6], which contains over 105 million pages in 114,529 hosts in the .UK
domain. The number of links among these hosts is 1,836,228. It also contains a small
labeled training data set (6,382 hosts) where 341 hosts were labeled as spam. Our
node non-randomness test identified 1,127 hosts as suspects (i.e., their node non-
randomness values are below the decision line), among which 54 hosts were labeled
as spam in the training data set. These 54 nodes randomly attack 14,283 victims in
total. We analyzed the inner subgraph formed by these 54 nodes is very sparse and
there is no evidence to show they are from a collaborative random link attack.
To evaluate the efficacy of our algorithm, we generated a mixed instance of at-
tacks and added them together to the original network. We then ran our algorithm
to detect the attack set on this modified network. We implemented our spectrum
based detection algorithm and the topology based detection algorithm [88] (including
two testing procedures, clustering test and neighborhood independence test, and the
Greedy algorithm) in Matlab. We evaluated both run-time and the accuracy of
catching RLAs. Our experiments were carried out on a Windows XP64 workstation
with a 3.0 GHz Pentium-IV CPU and 2GB RAM.
Accuracy of Detecting RLAs. We generated 8 RLAs with varied sizes and con-
nection patterns (links between attackers and victims and internal links among the
attackers), as shown in Table 7.2. The total number of attacking nodes is 650 and
the size of victims is 56,144. Our goal is to test whether algorithms (Spctra and
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Table 7.2: Evaluation results on Web Spam data set, 8 RLA attacking groups, 650
total attackers, and 56144 total victims.
setting Spctra Greedy
RLA size v̄i pin ssp atck ssp atck
1 50 100 .3 50 50 49 47
2 50 100 .6 50 50 0 0
3 50 100 1 50 50 50 50
4 50 200 .3 50 50 79 47
5 100 100 .3 100 100 3 3
6 50 degree 49 49 20 20
7 100 degree 97 97 6 6
8 200 degree 188 188 27 27
final results (total) 634 634 4534 200
Greedy) can catch them and how accurate they achieve. Each algorithm output a
set of suspect groups (i.e., RLA candidates).
Our Spctra algorithm (with k = 3) successfully identified all 8 RLAs and no false
suspect group was reported. For the first five RLAs (generated by ER model), our
Spctra algorithm achieved 100% accuracy and no false positive or false negative
node was introduced, as shown in Table 7.2. Even for those degree based RLAs (6,
7, 8), our Spctra algorithm achieved more than 94% accuracy.
In contrast, the Greedy algorithm (with the best chosen parameters: the max-
imum size of attacking groups is 200, ρ = 0.008, θ = 300, α = 50) output 4,534
suspect nodes. It successfully identified RLA 3, in which attackers form a clique
among themselves. However, it missed most attacking nodes in other RLAs (e.g.,
2,5,7). The number of true attacking nodes among the output suspect groups was
only 200. Table 7.2 shows our detailed comparisons.
Table 7.3: Execution time (in seconds) of for different data sets
Data set Alg. Testing Grouping Total
polblogs Spctra 0.037 0.041 0.078
(1222, 16714) Greedy 16.20 6.047 22.24
Web Spam (33%) Spctra 0.702 0.239 0.941
(37562, 199406) Greedy 577.2 515.4 1093
Web Spam Spctra 4.017 29.68 33.69
(114529, 1836228) Greedy 12728 83314 96043
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Running Time. In this experiment, we compare the running times of the Spctra
and Greedy algorithms using three data sets, polblogs, Web Spam, and a sample
of Web Spam data. In Table 7.3, we report the running time for both Spctra
and Greedy including the testing step (catching suspects) and the grouping step
(catching RLAs). We can see that the time taken by Greedy is 285, 1161, and 2851
times more than our Spctra algorithm. For example, the Greedy takes more than
23 hours for the Web Spam Data while our Spctra takes only 34 seconds. Although
the Trwalk improves the efficiency to some extent, it is still not scalable for large
social networks since it uses the same expensive testing procedures.
7.5 Summary and Future Work
There are other types of collaborative attacks that can be considered as RLA
variations.
Bipartite Core Attack. Pandit et. al. [19, 77] uncovered a new type of attack called
the bipartite cores attack in auction networks. As illustrated in Figure 7.6(a), there
are two types of identities: fraudsters (denoted as red cycle) and accomplices (denoted
as blue +). The attacker creates some fake identities (denoted as fraudsters). The
attacker is also capable of controlling a small set of regular identities (denoted as
accomplices). Accomplices behave like honest users, except that they interact heavily
with the set of fraudsters in order to boost their reputation. The fraudster identities
are the ones used eventually to carry out the actual fraud. To avoid detection, the
fraudsters or accomplices have few links to nodes of the same type, and they hence
form a (nearly) bipartite subgraph in the network. In the bipartite core attacks,
we assume that each regular node has the same probability to be controlled by the
attacker. Then, the links between the accomplices and the fraudsters follow the
random pattern, and the bipartite core attack can be regard as a special type of
RLA. Therefore, the node non-randomness Ri for the frausters should also satisfy
Result 7.5.
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Figure 7.6: The spectral patterns for polblogs: bipartite core attacks with 20 fraudsters
and 30 accomplices
Figure 7.6 shows the spectral patterns of the bipartite core attacks for polblogs
network. The dashed pink line in Figure 7.6(d) is the decision line under which nodes
are regarded as suspects of fraudsters. We can easily observe that the fraudsters nodes
locate in the region different from regular nodes, and the distribution of fraudsters
is also characterized by the means and variances shown in Result 7.3 and 7.5. The
accomplices which are from the regular nodes are not distinct from other regular
nodes. However, once the majority of fraudsters are captured, we can further detect
related accomplices by searching the links.
DDoS Attacks. In the distributed denial of service attack (DDoS), the attacker
randomly control a large number of regular nodes and create links from the controlled
nodes to a target node, and the links between the target node and the controlled nodes
follow the random pattern. Meanwhile, the target node also have its regular links,
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but the proportion of regular links is small compared with the attacking links.
Figure 7.7 shows one DDoS attack on the polblogs network. In this attack, we
randomly selected 10% nodes as attacking nodes and used them to attack one vic-
tim node. The spectral positions of the victim node before (blue star) and after
(red circle) attacks are shown in the figure. By comparing spectral projects before
and after attacks, we can easily locate the victim node and then identify attacking
nodes through links connected to the victim. We can see from Figure 7.7 that the
victim’s non-randomness value remains almost unchanged while its degree increases
significantly. This is very different from the change pattern of regular nodes’ non-
randomness values during graph evolution.
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Figure 7.7: DDoS attacks on polblogs network.
In summary, we have presented a novel framework that exploits the spectral space
of underlying network topology to identify frauds or attacks. Our theoretical results
showed that attackers locate in a different region of the spectral space from regular
users. By identifying fraud patterns in graph spectral spaces, we can detect various
collaborative attacks that are hard to be identified from original topological struc-
tures. Focusing on RLAs, we presented an efficient algorithm, Spctra, and com-
pared with the topology based detection approach [88]. Empirical evaluations show
that our approach significantly improves both effectiveness and efficiency especially
when a mix of RLAs are introduced.
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In our future work, we will explore various other attacking scenarios in both social
networks and communication networks. Specifically, we will study how our spectrum
based detection works when attackers choose victims purposely (rather than randomly
) or only attack very few victims when they launch their collaborative attacks. For
example, in the passive and active attacks [8], an adversary may only identify tar-
geted individuals or derive sensitive relationships between targeted individuals from
published node-anonymized social networks. The adversary constructs a highly dis-
tinguishable subgraph with edges to a set of targeted nodes, and then re-identifies the
subgraph and consequently the targets in the released anonymized network. We will
explore the effectiveness and efficiency of using spectral characteristics to detect the
attacking subgraph. Another example is the Sybil attack. In a direct Sybil attack [75],
a physical device controlled by adversaries may demonstrate multiple identities to its
neighbors. A Sybil attack usually forms a group that has very few edges with the vic-
tims. We will empirically study whether we can still use the spectral characteristics
to identify them. In practice, networks are constantly changing as both legitimate
and fraud nodes (edges) can be added as networks evolve. Since the detection of some
interested events depends on observing anomaly changes of network parameters over
a time duration, we will consider time an important dimension in data representation
and attack detection. We will extend our approach to use the temporal information in
these evolving networks to identify and catch potential attacks. We will also explore
matrix visualization and organization approaches that enable interactive navigation
between network topology and its spectral spaces.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In our work, we investigated the application of graph randomization techniques on
social network data to preserve both data privacy and data utility. We conducted the-
oretical studies and empirical evaluations on the tradeoff between utility and privacy
of various graph randomization techniques as well as investigation of some potential
attacking methods from adversaries.
We studied various adjacency spectral properties of many real-world networks as
well as some random ones. To quantify the data utility, we developed a consis-
tent framework of non-randomness measures and applied it to community partition
and fraud detection in social network settings. Extensive theoretical analysis and
empirical evaluations were conducted to demonstrate the efficacy of our developed
techniques.
8.1 Privacy Analysis of Social Network Randomization
Privacy Disclosure Risks. We first investigated the link disclosure risk of a ran-
domized graph. To quantify the link disclosure risk, we considered the three proba-
bilities on a sensitive link (i, j): the prior probability, the posterior probability given
the existing (or non-existing) link (i, j) in the randomized graph, and the enhanced
posterior probability utilizing the observed link as well as the some proximity measure
between the two nodes.
For Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch randomization procedure, we established the
relationship between the posterior probabilities and the magnitude of randomization.
Not surprisingly, the posterior probabilities decrease as the randomization magni-
tude increases. We then calculated the minimal randomization magnitude needed to
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protect the link privacy to a tolerable level.
The enhanced posterior probability based on proximity measures was derived for
Rand Add/Del procedure. We studied the attacking model in which the attacker
can learn the correlation between the proximity value and the existence of a link in
the randomized graph, estimate the correlation in the original graph, and improve his
prediction of sensitive links. Our empirical results showed that the enhanced posterior
probability can greatly increase the attacker’s ability of inferring the presence of a
link and the prediction accuracy for those links between nodes with high similarity
values.
We also proved one important property of the prior probability, posterior probabil-
ity, and the enhanced posterior probability: the summations of the three probabilities
are all (or approximately) equal to the total number of edges m. This equality in-
dicates that, the more information the attacker utilizes, the higher accuracy he can
achieve in predicting sensitive links.
In addition to the link disclosure risk, we investigated the identity disclosure risk of
randomization. Our studies were based on one most widely used type of background
knowledge, node degree. Although the nodes’ degrees in the randomized graph are
generally different from those in the original graph, our theoretical studies showed that
the attacker could still estimate the degree sequence of the original graph based on the
degree sequence of the randomized graph. We also derived the minimal randomization
magnitude needed to protect the identity privacy given tolerable level.
Feature Preserving Randomization. Our empirical evaluations showed that pure
randomization can significantly incur the loss of graph utility. Therefore, we devel-
oped two randomization procedures to better preserve graph characteristics without
sacrificing much privacy protection during randomization.
The spectrum based randomization procedures, Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch,
preserve the data utility by preserving some certain eigenvalues of the graph matrices.
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We derived the conditions that the edge modification will increase or decrease the ran-
domized eigenvalues. Then, our algorithms carefully choose the edges to be modified
during the randomization, so that the eigenvalues of the randomized graph are close
to the original values. Our evaluations showed that, compared with Rand Add/Del
and Rand Switch, Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch procedures can not only better
preserve the targeted eigenvalues but also many topological features of networks.
One limitation of the spectrum based randomization procedures is that they only
consider some certain eigenvalues. Hence to what extent they can preserve general
topological features is not guaranteed. We further developed the Markov chain based
randomization procedure that could preserve any graph feature specified by users.
The users or analysts usually require some feature of the randomized graph is close to
the original value, resulting in a feature constraint on the randomized graph. When
a feature constraint is placed, we established the switch-based Markov chain that
can access any graph with the original degree sequence and satisfying the feature
constraint. Using Metropolis-Hastings sampling, a standard method for generating a
Markov chain with a target distribution, our graph generator can output any graph in
the graph space with equal probability. Note that this graph generator (possibly with
some minor adjustment) can also be used in testing the significance of data mining
results.
We further investigated the potential disclosure of sensitive links due to the pre-
served features. We studied the attacking model in which the attacker can estimate
the probability of a true link by uniformly sampling the graph space and thus breach
the link privacy. One interesting finding by our evaluation is that, for some features,
the constraints do not increase the attacker’s posterior belief on true links (compared
with the randomization without constraints). This is very important to data miners,
because if the graph feature they focus on is one of such features, the data owner
can safely place the feature constraint on the randomized graph to preserve the data
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utility without increasing privacy disclosure risks. The extent to which the feature
constraint can increase the privacy disclosure risk depends on the characteristics of
the graph space specified by the feature constraint, which we would like to further
investigate as our future work.
8.2 Spectral Analysis of Social Network Randomization
We discovered that the adjacency spectral spaces of many real-world graphs have
clear patterns different from random ones. If the graph has k disconnected commu-
nities, the spectral coordinates of the nodes lie only on the axes in the space spanned
by the leading k eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix, forming k strictly orthogonal
lines. Nodes from the same community all lie on one axis with the central nodes far
from the origin and the noisy ones close to the origin. When the communities are
loosely connected, the nodes form k quasi-orthogonal lines that are rotated away from
the axes for a certain degree. Those nodes with links outwards their own communities
would deviate away from the lines. This pattern is different from those displayed in
the spectral space of normal or Laplacian matrix. In the normal or Laplacian matrix,
the communities form some clusters, and hence it is usually difficult to distinguish
the central nodes from the noisy ones.
Based on this phenomenon, we then developed a consistent framework to quantify
the graph non-randomness at edge, node, subgraph and the overall graph levels. We
showed that all graph non-randomness measures can be obtained mathematically
from the spectra of the adjacency matrix of the network. A relative non-randomness
measure of the overall graph was also presented. It allows quantitative comparisons
between various social networks with different sizes and densities or between different
snapshots of a dynamic social network. We proved that the relative non-randomness
measure of any graph is lower (upper) bounded by the regular (complete) graph. We
also analyzed the distributions of both edge and node non-randomness for real-world
social networks and random graphs. Our results showed that edge non-randomness
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and node non-randomness of real-world social networks usually display some high
skewed distributions, obeying either a power law or an exponential law. On the
contrary, random graphs display approximate normal distributions.
We further studied two applications of the non-randomness framework: commu-
nity partition and fraud detection. Utilizing the property of line orthogonality, we
developed the algorithm, AdjCut, to partition the communities by fitting orthogonal
lines in the spectral space. Our algorithm achieves comparable accuracy with the nor-
mal spectrum based cutting algorithm and better than the Laplacian spectrum based
algorithm. Our evaluations showed that the communities produced by our AdjCut
algorithm have more balanced sizes. One difference between our AdjCut algorithm
and the normal spectrum based cutting algorithm is that the normal spectrum based
algorithm partitions the communities by cutting as few edges as possible, whereas our
AdjCut algorithm does the partition by assigning a node to the community to which
it has the strongest association.
The second application of the non-randomness measures we studied is the fraud
detection in social network settings. We developed a novel framework that exploited
the spectral space of underlying network topology to identify frauds or attacks. Our
theoretical results showed that attackers locate in a region different legitimate users in
the spectral space. Specifically, the spectral coordinate of an attacker is mainly deter-
mined by that of its victims. The inner structure among collaborative attackers has
limited impact on attackers’ distributions in the spectral space. By identifying fraud
patterns in graph spectral spaces, we can detect various collaborative attacks that are
hard to be identified via graph topology. For random link attacks, we proved that the
spectral coordinates of the fraudulent nodes should follow the multivariate normal
distribution in the adjacency spectral space. Therefore, the node non-randomness
values of the fraudulent nodes follow the χ2-distribution and are significantly lower
than the values of the legitimate nodes. Based on this statistical property, we de-
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veloped an efficient algorithm, Spctra, to filter the fraudulent nodes. Empirical
evaluations showed that our approach significantly improved both effectiveness and
efficiency especially when a mix of RLAs were introduced.
8.3 Future Work
In our future work, we would like to further study the privacy disclosure risks for
the feature-preserving randomization procedures. As we discussed earlier, preserving
some features would jeopardize the privacy while preserving some others would not.
We are interested in what aspects of characteristics of the features make this differ-
ence. We will investigate how to efficiently randomize graphs to preserve multiple
features, and study its impacts on privacy disclosure risks.
We will conduct comprehensive comparisons among the randomization, K-anonymity,
and generalization based privacy-preserving techniques. Based on the background
knowledge of nodes’ degrees, some preliminary comparison results between the ran-
domization and K-degree techniques have been reported in Section 4.2. More com-
parisons merit further study, especially when adversaries are able to exploit various
complex background knowledge in their attacks.
We will also study the scalability issue of graph randomization techniques and
conduct empirical evaluations on large social networks. The computational cost of
some graph features can be very expensive, which raises an challenge to preserve
such features for large social networks. For example, we may preserve the feature
with high computational cost by preserving a highly correlated feature but with low
computational cost, and approximate the feature rather than calculate it precisely
during the randomization.
For spectral analysis of social network randomization, we have shown that the
graph non-randomness measures are determined by the spectral space spanned by
the leading k adjacency eigenvalues, where k indicates the number of communities
in the graph. We will also investigate the full relationship between our proposed
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non-randomness measures (especially the graph non-randomness) and the traditional
topology based measures.
For the adjacency spectrum based fraud detection, we will explore more attacking
scenarios in both social networks and communication networks. Specifically, we will
study how our spectrum based detection works when attackers choose victims pur-
posely (rather than randomly) or only attack very few victims when they launch their
collaborative attacks. For example, in the active and passive attacks, an adversary
may only attack a small number of targeted individuals and derive sensitive relation-
ships among them. We will empirically study whether we can still use the spectral
characteristics to identify the attacking nodes. In practice, networks are constantly
changing as both legitimate and fraudulent nodes (edges) can be added as networks
evolve. We will extend our approach to use the temporal information in these evolv-
ing networks to identify and catch potential attacks. We will also explore matrix
visualization and organization approaches that enable interactive navigation between
network topology and its spectral spaces.
We will investigate differentially private algorithms for social network data. It
involves deriving accurate sensitivity values of various social network features and
graph mining algorithms. The differential privacy mechanism is very different from
those non-interactive social network release mechanisms which can be used to answer
an unlimited number of queries. In our future work, we would like to compare the
differential privacy and non-interactive social network release mechanisms for the
social network data.
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